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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ALLIES OF OTHERS:  
HOW STAKEHOLDERS’ RELATIONSHIPS SHAPE NON-MARKET STRATEGY  
Katarzyna D. Odziemkowska  
Witold J. Henisz 
This dissertation shifts analytic focus from firm, stakeholder and institutional characteristics as 
drivers of a firm’s non-market strategy to the fields in which stakeholders are embedded which are 
characterized by their own social relationships, norms and identities. In so doing, I strive to develop 
a more socialized view of non-market strategy. The first chapter provides evidence that the identity 
of stakeholders in their fields and the structure of relations between them can circumscribe firms’ 
strategic responses to stakeholder conflict that require stakeholder cooperation. The second chapter 
explores the pathways by which firms attenuate stakeholder threats through an understudied 
phenomenon: cooperative non-market strategy, or when firms establish formal cooperative 
relationships with stakeholders. I find that cooperative non-market strategy is an effective way for 
firms allay threats from a broad swathe of stakeholders by exploiting the social networks and 
identity of an allied stakeholder. The first two chapters draw on a unique, self-constructed 25-year 
panel of all contentious and collaborative interactions between 118 environmental movement 
organizations and Fortune 500 firms, complemented by multiplex network data on movements and 
firms. While the first two chapters explore cooperative non-market strategy, the last chapter 
demonstrates the utility of taking account of stakeholder fields in unilateral non-market strategy, in 
this case, improvements in corporate social and environmental performance. Drawing on a dataset 
of 250 million media-reported events to construct comprehensive socio-political networks and 
stakeholder fields across 42 countries, I find that stakeholder ties to country-level socio-political 
networks and to each other, and who participates in stakeholder fields and mobilizes against firms, 
manifest in observable differences in corporate social and environmental performance across 
vii 
countries. In addition to establishing that stakeholder fields are central to explanations of non-
market strategy, this dissertation finds that the mechanisms underlying their impact are multi-
faceted, and consistently operate through two characteristics of stakeholder fields: the relational 
ties of stakeholders, and the identity of stakeholders within their field. Stakeholder fields are central 
to understanding firms’ strategic management of stakeholders because fields constrain stakeholder 
agency, are susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, and 
in turn, influence issue salience for outsiders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A central question in strategic management research is how firms respond to and actively 
manage their external environments to improve performance. While much of the research 
addressing this question has focused on competitive threats, a growing research stream concerns 
threats from firms’ non-market environment. As social activists, social movement organizations, 
and communities increasingly mobilize against firms, scholars have highlighted the impacts of 
these non-market threats on location choice (Ingram, Yue, and Rao, 2010), firm scope (Soule, 
Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2014), profits (Luders, 2006), market returns (King and Soule, 2007), 
and market risk (Vasi and King, 2012). Firms manage these threats by improving their social and 
environmental performance (Bartley, 2003; Soule, 2009), impression management (McDonnell and 
King, 2013), adopting social management devices (McDonnell, King, and Soule, 2015), or forming 
formal cooperative relationships with the most threatening stakeholders (Dorobantu and 
Odziemkowska, 2019). In doing so, they hope to quell future threats (McDonnell, 2016), promote 
their social image (McDonnell et al., 2015), and improve market and financial performance 
(Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017; Henisz, Dorobantu, and 
Nartey, 2014). 
To date, research on firms’ strategic management of non-market stakeholders has focused 
on stakeholder characteristics, firm characteristics and institutional underpinnings that condition 
unilateral actions firms take in response to stakeholder pressure and the returns to those actions. 
Firms have been shown to be more responsive to stakeholders with greater power and legitimacy 
(Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, and Justis, 2008; Mitchell, Agle, 
and Wood, 1997; Yang and Rivers, 2009). Firm characteristics such as financial performance, 
reputation (King, 2008), corporate social responsibility board committees (McDonnell et al., 2015), 
CEO ideology (Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014), and the response of industry peers (Briscoe 
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and Safford, 2008), have been shown to condition which firms respond and how. Institutions, such 
as shareholder protection laws, are also common explanatory variables both through their effect on 
stakeholder power (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) or how prevailing societal norms influence the 
legitimacy of stakeholder requests (Eesley and Lenox, 2006). Similarly, work focused on outcomes 
of firms’ non-market strategy has shown that returns are contingent on stakeholder characteristics 
(Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017), firm characteristics (Barnett and Salomon, 2012), or 
prevailing institutions (Flammer, 2013).  
Although past research has advanced our understanding of how disparate stakeholders can 
pressure organizations, and prompt organizational actions with different performance outcomes, 
this work reflects a general analytic strategy of studying interactions between firms and non-market 
stakeholders as detached from the larger social structures in which stakeholders are embedded. To 
date explorations of stakeholders’ ability to induce a response from the firm paint stakeholders as 
largely atomistic actors with more or less influence as a function of their characteristics, tactics or 
the institutions that confer power or legitimacy. Similarly, research on the outcomes of firms’ 
strategic management of non-market stakeholders typically does not consider how outcomes may 
be contingent on the position and identity of stakeholders in broader networks (see Nartey, Henisz, 
and Dorobantu, 2018 for an exception). Finally, in focusing on unilateral actions firms take in 
response to non-market stakeholders, such as conceding to stakeholder demands or reforming their 
practices (Bartley, 2003; McDonnell et al., 2015), existing research says little about the efficacy of 
cooperative strategy in non-market settings, where firms establish formal interorganizational 
relationships with non-market stakeholders to manage external threats. 
Detaching the antecedents and outcomes of firm-stakeholder interactions from larger social 
structures in which these are embedded is problematic if we consider that the individual 
components of an organization’s external environment are inter-linked (Wry, Cobb, and Aldrich, 
2013). The interconnectedness of organizations and actors in the environment creates “webs of 
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power” that affect the level of influence associated with different interests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003: 65). In other words, firms are not perceiving, nor responding to, atomistic stakeholders in a 
vacuum of dyadic interactions, but rather the interaction of multiple influences from their entire 
stakeholder environment (Rowley, 1997). Therefore, dis-embedding non-market strategy from the 
interconnected environment in which it is enacted overlooks relational sources of power and 
influence, where stakeholders may wield influence via ties to powerful others, use their networks 
to propagate issue frames (Beckfield, 2003), or engage in coordinated action (Coff, 1999; Rowley, 
1997). Simultaneously, a dis-embedded view cannot not adequately model the outcomes of non-
market strategy without considering how stakeholders are influenced by others in their environment 
to whom they are connected or perceive as peers (Dorobantu, Henisz, and Nartey, 2017) or how 
firms’ interactions with one set of stakeholders can affect their interactions with others in their non-
market environments (McDonnell and Werner, 2016). 
Finally, a dis-embedded view is particularly problematic for the emergent study of 
cooperative non-market strategy, where firms attempt to manage threats in their non-market 
environment by establishing formal cooperative relationships with stakeholders (Dorobantu and 
Odziemkowska, 2019; den Hond, de Bakker, and Doh, 2015). Cooperative strategy in market 
settings (i.e., alliances) has repeatedly been shown to be influenced by the social structures in which 
alliances are embedded (Gulati, 1998). Conversely, existing research has not considered how firms’ 
cooperative non-market strategy is shaped by the social structures (i.e., networks) in which 
stakeholder counterparties are embedded. Instead, the focus has been on the firm-stakeholder dyad, 
and the implementation activities underlying collaborations (Selsky and Parker, 2005), or the 
motivation of firms to enter collaborations (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2019; den Hond et al., 
2015). 
In sum, if non-market strategy is concerned with actions firms take in their non-market 
environment to improve performance (Baron, 1995), and non-market environments are composed 
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of myriad actors that are inter-linked and take each other into account, then it follows that taking 
account of the interconnectedness of actors in firms’ non-market environments is critical to 
understanding which stakeholders and issues firms engage and how, and the outcomes of non-
market strategy. Despite the foregoing, the structural embeddedness of firm-stakeholder 
interactions in broader interconnected stakeholder fields is not commonly addressed in empirical 
research on firm-stakeholder relationships (de Bakker et al., 2013), nor in non-market strategy 
(Mahon, Heugens, and Lamertz, 2004). Unsurprisingly then, social movement, non-market strategy 
and stakeholder theory scholars have repeatedly called for research on firm-stakeholder relations 
to take more seriously the embeddedness of their interactions in broader fields (de Bakker et al., 
2013), encouraging researchers “to study the network dynamics of stakeholder relationships” 
(Wood et al., 2018: 36).  
Theoretical Approach, Research Questions and Settings 
This dissertation answers this call by developing a more socialized view of the antecedents 
and outcomes of firms’ non-market strategy by taking account of the embeddedness of stakeholders 
in broader fields with their own relations, norms and common understandings. Considering 
stakeholders as embedded in broader fields relaxes the assumption that stakeholder power and 
influence is a discrete organizational characteristic operating at the firm-stakeholder dyad level. 
This is particularly important in non-market strategy, where some of the greatest pressures on firms 
to change their practices have come from interconnected networks of activists, governments, or 
inter-governmental efforts (Bartley, 2003; Doh and Guay, 2006). Further, field theory departs in 
important ways from past work on the embeddedness of actors and action from a network or 
institutional theory perspective. Compared to network perspectives, field theory emphasizes field-
level understandings and norms even in the absence of ties between actors in the field. Explicitly 
acknowledging shared understandings of “what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable” 
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11) in a field is particularly important for non-market strategy where 
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two counterparties (i.e., firms and stakeholders) are embedded in disparate social contexts with 
different understandings and norms. Juxtaposed against institutional theory, field theory more 
explicitly allows for conflict within fields and places less emphasis on conformity (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). As firms increasingly engage stakeholders in novel ways, field theory offers the 
possibility to consider how these novel tactics may represent deviance from stakeholder field norms 
and result inter-stakeholder discord. In sum, I employ field theory as my overarching theoretical 
lens because it not only explicitly acknowledges how structure and field understandings shape 
power and action, but is also focused on understanding field dynamics rather than actors’ 
conformity within fields. 
I define a stakeholder field as a set of stakeholders concerned with collective strategic 
action to achieve tangible change in the private sector, where stakeholders “interact with knowledge 
of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the 
relationships in the field, and the field's rules.” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 3). A social 
movement is one archetype of a stakeholder field, where activists (i.e., stakeholders) mobilize and 
coordinate to further a specific agenda and members connection to the field is related to their 
ideological commitment (Zietsma et al., 2017). Stakeholder fields can also form around specific 
issues where stakeholders interact and take one another into account on issues like environment or 
human rights (Hoffman, 1999). Stakeholder fields that form around issues typically contain a 
diverse set of stakeholders with distinct identities such as government, communities, activists, or 
intergovernmental organizations (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). 
In this dissertation I consider how both movement fields and stakeholder issue fields shape 
firms’ non-market strategy. In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I focus on the interplay of 
movement fields and cooperative non-market strategy. Specifically, I study firm-activist 
collaborations where firms and social activist work together by committing resources to achieve 
mutually relevant outcomes, such as McDonald’s collaboration with the Environmental Defense 
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Fund to reduce waste in its operations. I complement and extend social movements theory with 
field theory and network perspectives to answer two questions central to research on cooperative 
non-market strategy, partner selection and outcomes. In the third chapter, I explore how stakeholder 
issue fields shape unilateral non-market strategy, where firms’ strategies are not dependent on the 
voluntary cooperation of stakeholders. I focus on corporate social performance, or the outcome of 
the activities firms’ engage in on environmental, labor and human rights issues, often in response 
to pressure from stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Murillo-Luna, Garcés-Ayerbe, and 
Rivera-Torres, 2008; Yang and Rivers, 2009).  
In the context of cooperative non-market strategy, I find that the structures of stakeholder 
fields are critical to explaining firms’ ability to form formal cooperative relationships with 
stakeholders in the field. Interestingly however, the means by which inter-stakeholder relationships 
affect non-market collaboration formation differ from those emphasized by network perspectives 
on cooperative strategy in market settings, where networks facilitate information and learning about 
potential partners and can act as safeguards against opportunism (Gulati, 1998). In cooperative non-
market strategy, where firms seek out collaborations following conflict with the broader 
stakeholder field, I find that stakeholder field structure is a determinant of the degree to which 
collaborations with firms besieged by conflict are, or can become, acceptable to other stakeholders. 
In other words, social structure matters to cooperative non-market strategy because it is a  
determinant of whether firms and stakeholders can cooperate without fear of reprisal from other 
stakeholders when conflict precedes cooperation.  
I also find that stakeholder fields play an equally important role in conditioning the returns 
from cooperative non-market strategy. Building on and extending past work on interorganizational 
ties as both pipes and prisms (Podolny, 2001), I argue and find that firms can indirectly co-opt the 
broader stakeholder field by exploiting the social networks and identity of their partner stakeholder. 
Although the role of networks in stakeholder mobilization and influence have long been argued 
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(Rowley, 1997), this chapter highlights that networks are equally operative as pathways by which 
stakeholders demobilize against firms that succeed in penetrating stakeholder fields. Importantly I 
also find that stakeholder networks alone are insufficient in explaining the co-optation of the 
stakeholder field. Instead, the identity of the stakeholder with whom firms collaborate are powerful 
pathways of co-optation because they do not rely on inter-stakeholder ties and therefore operate at 
the field-level rather than at the level of individual interconnected members of the stakeholder field.  
In the third chapter, I expand the stakeholder field to include all stakeholders with interests 
in corporate performance on human rights, environmental and labor issues (i.e., stakeholder issue 
fields). I show how differences in the ties that stakeholders have in broader socio-political networks 
and to each other, and who participates in stakeholder fields and mobilizes against firms, contribute 
to differences in corporate social and environmental performance across countries. Complementary 
to my findings on cooperative non-market strategy, both stakeholders’ ties and identity in their 
fields are key determinants of observable differences in firms’ unilateral non-market strategies (i.e., 
corporate social performance). 
Taken together, the three chapters demonstrate the utility of taking account of the 
interconnectedness of firms’ environment in understanding the actions firms take in their non-
market environment to improve performance (Baron, 1995). Across all three studies, two 
characteristics of stakeholder fields are consistently found to impact non-market strategy: the 
relational ties of stakeholders, and the identity of stakeholders within their field. The results 
demonstrate the need for an embedded perspective for both cooperative and unilateral non-market 
strategy, and across both fields populated by a single stakeholder type (e.g., activists in social 
movements), and those fields populated by multiple non-market stakeholders that form around a 
single issue.  
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Empirical Approach 
Generally, theory development (de Bakker, 2012; Mahon et al., 2004; Rowley, 1997; 
Sciarelli and Tani, 2013) has outpaced empirical work examining the intersection of non-market 
strategy and stakeholder fields or networks. This may not be surprising given the methodological 
challenges of simultaneously studying interactions between firms and stakeholders and inter-
stakeholder relationships (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012), in the absence of archival databases on 
which scholars of cooperative strategy in market settings typically rely (Schilling, 2009). 
In my empirical approach, I attempt to overcome this data collection challenge in two ways. 
First, in studying the interplay of stakeholder fields and cooperative non-market strategy I 
circumscribe the stakeholder field to include only the social movement organizations (SMOs) 
operating in various environmental movements. Relying entirely on hand-collected data for all 
relational ties between every SMO (nearly 14,000 dyads), as well as their participation in different 
movements over time, necessitated that the data collection focused on SMOs only, rather than 
expanding the fields to other non-market stakeholders with interests in environmental issues. As 
my interest is the interplay of field-level conflict and cooperative strategy, I focus on environmental 
movement fields because of the large variance in tactics employed by environmental SMOs 
(Bertels, Hoffman, and DeJordy, 2014) in engaging firms (i.e., conflictual and cooperative). 
Further, prior research suggested that the structure of environmental movements are highly 
clustered and there is large variation in the network profiles of individual SMOs (ibid.). This gave 
me confidence that sufficient variation across movement fields and time existed to investigate their 
impact on cooperative non-market strategy. I further manage the primary data collection challenge 
by randomly sampling Fortune 500 companies, which are most likely to have conflictual and/or 
collaborative relations with social activists.  
The last chapter of the dissertation complements the first two by expanding the scope of 
the stakeholder fields to include a broader swathe of non-market stakeholders, including 
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governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, social movement 
organizations and communities that coalesce around environmental and social issues. To overcome 
the challenges of building a relational network for all of these stakeholder, I rely on secondary data 
on media-reported verbal and material, cooperative and conflictual ties. The data set allows me to 
expand the scope of stakeholder fields across multiple countries, myriad stakeholders, and construct 
directed and valued networks of relations between all corporate social performance stakeholders 
and socio-political and private sector actors within a country. To my knowledge, the construction 
of stakeholder, business, and socio-political fields across 42 countries, represents the first cross-
national study of fields of this scale. 
Relevance to Existing Research 
 In taking account of the interconnectedness of firms’ non-market environment, this 
dissertation documents that stakeholder fields not only matter to non-market strategy, but that the 
mechanisms underlying their impact are multi-faceted. In cooperative non-market strategy, 
stakeholder identities and inter-stakeholder relationships are pathways by which firms can 
favorably influence stakeholders beyond their partner. This finding extends past work on the role 
that stakeholder prior beliefs and peers play in stakeholder mobilization (Dorobantu et al., 2017), 
to highlight how stakeholders can be demobilized through formal collaborations, a heretofore 
understudied phenomenon. As non-market and stakeholder research increasingly emphasizes the 
value of cooperative stakeholder relationships, this dissertation also highlights that the structure of 
stakeholder fields is important to understanding when cooperative strategy can be effected. 
Acrimonious relationships with the broader stakeholder field can crowd out firms’ ability to shift 
to more cooperative strategies where inter-stakeholder relationships that enable negotiation 
between stakeholders are absent. Finally, the composition of stakeholder fields and the identities 
of stakeholders that mobilize against firms are important to understanding firm responsiveness to 
the issues non-market stakeholders advocate. Similarly, the degree to which stakeholders are 
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connected to broader socio-political networks matter for non-market strategy because they 
influence managerial perceptions of the salience of issues advocated by the field. Taking account 
of the relationships within stakeholder fields and their relationships with others demonstrates the 
importance of relational sources of stakeholder power and influence that more atomistic 
characteristics like resources cannot account for. In sum, stakeholder fields contribute to our 
understanding of the actions firms take in their non-market environment (Baron, 1995) because 
fields are susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, field 
norms can constrain stakeholder agency, and the composition and ties of issue fields influence issue 
salience and in turn firm responsiveness. 
In developing an embedded view of non-market strategy, this dissertation also speaks to 
several open questions in research on social movements, field theory, cooperative strategy and 
organizational theory.  
 First, this dissertation is one of the first empirical studies of collaboration between social 
activists and firms, an increasingly prevalent way of interacting that Heyes and King (2018) 
describe as an understudied phenomenon in need of deeper theoretical and empirical understanding. 
Contrary to existing research on contentious targeting where firm characteristics exogenous to 
movements feature prominently as explanations for which firms are chosen for contention, I find 
that partner choice for collaboration is driven by the dynamics and structure of the social movement 
itself. Further, in accounting for both contention and collaboration, the first chapter is one of the 
first empirical tests of the positive radical flank effect (Haines, 1984) in the context of movements 
and firms. Building on the idea that the legitimacy of tactics is context bound (Ingram and Yue, 
2008), I find an important boundary condition on the positive radical flank materializing: the 
relational configurations of movement fields. While not undermining past findings on the positive 
radical flank effect where firms’ responses to contentious targeting are unilateral (McDonnell, 
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2016), this dissertation suggests that complications arise where firms respond to the radical flank 
with bilateral efforts that require the voluntary cooperation of activists.  
Relatedly, in focusing on the interaction between non-market stakeholders and firms, this 
dissertation sheds light on how relationships between fields evolve over time, iteratively shaped by 
and shaping the conditions within the respective fields, an underexplored area in field theory 
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Beginning with the idea that fields are characterized by a shared 
understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable,” 
(ibid.,: 11), I document that the structure of fields are key to explanations of when field actors can 
pivot from using legitimate tactics to novel ones without fear of reprisal from the broader field. In 
considering the mechanisms underlying the influence of cross-field ties on fields, I diverge from 
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) picture of shocks in one field sending ripples to another by way of 
pre-existing cross-field ties. While this may well be true, I find that cross-field ties can also 
influence a focal field by way of a slow trickle that successively shapes the calculus of field actor’s 
decision-making in relation to actors in other fields.  
 In considering the interplay between conflict and collaboration, this dissertation is also 
poised to contribute to cooperative strategy research where scholars are increasingly considering 
the multiplexity of interorganizational ties (e.g., Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). To date, 
cooperative strategy research emphasizes the role of conflict in crowding out collaboration at the 
level of a dyad or triad. By taking a field-level perspective, this dissertation highlights that the 
crowding out of collaboration by conflict does not require relational ties between actors nor occurs 
only at the level of a dyad or triad. That is, when members of a field have conflictual ties with 
another actor, actors embedded in that field may be circumscribed in forming cooperative 
relationships with that actor. This draws attention to the value of a field-level perspective on 
multiplex ties which explicitly acknowledges norms and field-level understandings, rather than just 
networks of relations within a field.    
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 Finally, to organizational theory, this dissertation highlights the importance of considering 
the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships. Despite the ubiquity of the ‘legitimacy’ 
construct in organizational theory, few studies have considered how the legitimacy of 
interorganizational relationships or linkages (see Baum and Oliver, 1991; Dacin, Oliver, and Roy, 
2007 for exceptions) impacts interorganizational strategies and outcomes. By theoretically 
engaging interorganizational relationships as potentially contested practices or tactics, I highlight 
how field-level relations can constrain field members in forming novel interorganizational 
relationships. Removing the assumption of the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships is 
likely most relevant in settings where members of an organizational field define their identity in 
opposition to another field, or where there is a history of acrimonious relations between two 
organizational fields. In such organizational fields, the logic underlying partner selection may not 
be focused on partner capabilities or bargaining power, but instead be driven by the social 
acceptability of the partner and interorganizational form.  
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CHAPTER 1: Frenemies: Partner Selection in Firm-Activist Collaborations 
In directly engaging firms to change their behavior, activist groups employ a wide array of tactics, 
ranging from more contentious (e.g., protests, lawsuits, sabotage) to more collaborative (e.g., cross-
sector partnerships or alliances) (Baron, Neale, and Rao, 2016; Soule and King, 2008). To date, 
most inquiries into social activist strategies have focused on contentious tactics. Research in this 
stream suggests activists target large, visible, branded firms with commitments to social or 
environmental responsibility (Bartley and Child, 2014; McDonnell et al., 2015) with the aim of 
winning concessions in the form of practice change. Conversely, activists’ collaborative strategies 
and tactics are less well understood. The direct import of insights from contentious targeting to the 
study of collaboration is complicated by collaboration requiring a willing partner (i.e., a firm). 
Moreover, contention (i.e., conflict) is typically understood as crowding out collaboration (Heider, 
1946; Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014). Therefore, in addition to the challenges of collaborations 
forming where interests, practices and goals of participants differ, firm-activist collaborations have 
the added challenge of being set against a backdrop of typically acrimonious relations between 
movements and firms. In this paper, I seek to contribute to emergent inquiries into when social 
movements and firms transform contention into collaboration (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Van 
Wijk et al., 2013), by asking: which firms and activists form collaborations?  
Existing literature offers seemingly contradictory answers to this question. On the one 
hand, existing theory and evidence suggests contentious targeting by social movements is precisely 
what drives firms to seek out collaborations with activists (Baron, 2012; Haines, 1984; McDonnell, 
2016). On the other hand, social movement theory also suggests movements actively work to 
identify adversaries in order to mobilize resources and improve their prospects of success against 
them (Hunt, Benford, and Snow, 1994). From this perspective, collaborating with contentiously 
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targeted firms, or adversaries of the movement, may be seen as undermining the broader 
movement’s goals and result in peer sanctioning. As such, the emphasis on the symbiosis between 
contention and collaboration for the firm in the first perspective, belies the tension created for 
activists suggested by the second perspective: firms most motivated to enter collaborations are 
precisely those that pose risks to their partner activists. I directly engage the tension activists face 
in collaborating with adversaries of the movement and suggest the social structure of the movement 
influences the magnitude of the risks they face. Specifically, because field members develop shared 
understandings of what tactics are legitimate (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) and ideology shapes 
social relations within a movement (Diani and McAdam, 2003), the social structure of the 
movement is a determinant of the degree to which collaborations with ‘adversary’ firms are, or can 
become, acceptable to other activists.  
In my theoretical development, I take account of how the objectives of both counterparties 
interact in driving the probability of firm-activist collaborations forming. I argue that while forming 
collaborations with activists can be a powerful tool for firms to improve their legitimacy, their 
associated costs suggest their discriminant use when firms face increasing costs of contention. 
However, activists’ ability to collaborate with firms besieged by contention from the movement is 
dependent on the level of risk they face from the broader social movement, as well as the firm. 
Specifically, the number of cooperative ties between activists that rely exclusively on contentious 
tactics (i.e., radical activists) and those that employ both contention and cooperation (i.e., moderate 
activists) determines both the probability of open attacks on collaborating activists for “selling out” 
(Zald and McCarthy, 1980) and their ability to leverage prior ties to negotiate over the legitimacy 
of emergent practices (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014). Therefore, I hypothesize that in movements 
where radical and moderate activists share few ties, firm-activist collaborations are unlikely to 
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form. Activists also actively manage ‘greenwashing’1 risk by partnering with firms most likely to 
follow through on their commitments. In doing so, activists use firms’ reputations for 
responsiveness to activism to avoid firms more likely to use the collaboration for greenwashing 
their reputation rather than making substantive changes during the course of the collaboration.  
I rely on over 130,000 archival documents, including media articles, press releases, legal 
proceedings, congressional documents, and firms’ annual reports to construct a novel 25-year panel 
of social movement networks and all contentious and collaborative interactions between 118 
environmental movement organizations and 300 of the largest firms in the United States. I control 
for firm-level characteristics that past research has shown to drive contentious targeting (e.g., firm 
visibility, public approval), to isolate the additive effect of contention on collaboration. To improve 
the causal interpretation of my findings, I instrument for the non-random assignment of firms to 
responsiveness, and contentious targeting, using exogenous extreme weather events in the firm’s 
headquarter city, and legal cases brought by the Environmental Protection Agency, respectively. I 
find that firms besieged by contention succeed in forming collaborations with activists, if they can 
assure the activist they won’t use the collaboration for greenwashing through their reputation for 
being responsive to activism. I also find that in movements with few social relations between 
radical and moderate activists, activists avoid collaborations with firms that are adversaries of the 
movement. Interestingly, this results in activists being more likely to collaborate with firms that 
have been contentiously targeted by peers with whom they have ties.  
Contrary to existing research on target selection for contention, which focuses on firm 
characteristics exogenous to the movement, I find that partner selection for collaboration is 
influenced by the dynamics and structure of the social movement itself. Complementary to research 
                                                          
1 Greenwashing refers to selective disclosure of positive environmental information by firms with poor 
environmental performance to improve their image (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). Collaborations with 
activists may be used for ‘greenwashing’ if a firm touts the intention to improve performance via a 
collaboration without following through. 
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on the diffusion of contentious tactics through activist ties (Wang and Soule, 2012), I highlight the 
constraints segmented social structures place on tactical innovation (Wang and Soule, 2016) where 
new tactics (i.e., collaboration) transgress the movements’ understanding of what tactics are 
legitimate. In doing so, this paper suggests an important precursor to conflict enabling 
collaboration: cooperative ties between conflictual and collaborative segments of a field. 
Intuitively, we may think activists will avoid collaborating with firms that are adversaries of their 
friends because field members have a desire to maintain their social bonds. I find it is precisely in 
the absence of social bonds that social movements and firms fail to “transform contestation into 
collaboration” (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008: 422). Answering the call for a field-level perspective 
on interactions between social movements and firms (McAdam and Scott, 2005), this paper 
contributes to emergent research on boundary conditions (Hiatt, Grandy, and Lee, 2015) on a 
central construct in social movement theory: the radical flank effect (Haines, 1984, 2013).  
This paper focuses on partner selection, a central question in cooperative strategy, but one 
yet to be examined in the context of firm-activist collaborations (Montgomery, Dacin, and Dacin, 
2012). As such, it also answers the call for research to examine firms’ governance of relationships 
with nonmarket stakeholders where the interplay of private and public incentives and interests (Jia 
and Mayer, 2017; Mahoney, McGahan, and Pitelis, 2009) and strained historical relations pose 
challenges. This paper highlights that strained relations do not only manifest within a dyad, but also 
in the social context in which a stakeholder is embedded. This suggests that for firms to succeed in 
managing threats in their nonmarket environments through formal relationships (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), they must shift from a dyadic to a network perspective on the strategic 
management of stakeholder relationships (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Rowley, 1997). To cooperative 
strategy research, the findings draw attention to the idea that the legitimacy of collaborative 
interorganizational relationships is context bound (Ingram and Yue, 2008). In contexts where 
collaborations may be contested practices, the logic underlying partner selection is not exclusively 
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focused on partner capabilities or resources, but also a logic of social acceptability of the 
interorganizational relationship.  
FIRM AND SOCIAL ACTIVIST COLLABORATIONS 
Social activists’ direct engagement of firms to change their behavior has risen in recent decades as 
a result of facilitating technologies and perceptions that government is less responsive and state-
level corporate regulation is increasingly ineffective (Soule, 2009). Most research to date focuses 
on activists’ use of contentious tactics like boycotts, protests and shareholder proxy proposals to 
change firm behavior. However, in the 1990s a new form of direct engagement emerged: activists 
collaborating with firms to reform their behavior. Prominent examples include the Environmental 
Defense Fund’s (EDF) partnership with McDonald’s to examine waste reduction opportunities in 
its operations, which resulted in the substitution of polystyrene containers with paper packaging for 
its hamburgers. Similarly, consumers increasingly get their Coke from hydrofluorocarbon-free 
refrigerators and vending machines thanks to a collaboration between Coca-Cola and Greenpeace. 
Firm-activist collaborations also involve co-management of assets or projects which produce public 
goods (King, 2007). The Conservation Fund’s purchase agreement to a critical forest habitat from 
International Paper, which allowed International Paper to harvest timber from the property, is one 
example of asset co-management. In an example of public goods creation, Starbucks partnered with 
Global Green to develop and promote an online game to educate the public about climate change.  
I define a firm-activist collaboration as an instance of ‘organizations working together by 
committing resources to achieve mutually relevant outcomes.’ Similar to definitions of strategic 
alliances between firms (Gulati, 1995; Kale and Singh, 2009), a collaboration’s key characteristics 
are that organizations work together in a purposeful way (i.e., with a goal of creating outcomes) 
and that each party commits resources (i.e., financial, human capital etc.). As such, collaboration 
does not include purposeful but unilateral transactions, such as when a firm donates to an activist 
organization, or bilateral arms-length arrangements like licensing of logos or cause-related 
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marketing (Galaskiewicz and Colman, 2006). The mutually relevant outcomes to be created via the 
collaboration are broad enough to encompass changes within company practices (e.g., EDF-
McDonald’s collaboration), as well as outcomes whose primary purpose is public goods creation 
(e.g., Starbucks-Global Green climate change education). Finally, the focus on ‘outcomes’ means 
the firm and activist can have separate motivations for entering the collaboration (e.g., the firm 
seeks to repair its reputation, and the activist wishes to influence best practices in an industry) that 
are achieved through the pursuit of an outcome desired by both parties. 
Firm-activist collaborations offer the possibility of advancing progress on grand challenges 
like climate change (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014), offer activists direct say in how firms design 
their social and environmental practices, while offering firms contextual knowledge about issues 
important to stakeholders and allowing them to leverage the collaboration as a shield against future 
contention (McDonnell, 2016). Despite potential benefits, research on firm-nonprofit 
collaborations, which typically takes the form of rich case studies, points to the challenges of 
relationships with two parties with different backgrounds, motivations and goals (Selsky and 
Parker, 2005). Recent research has emphasized the role of boundary work (Zietsma and Lawrence, 
2010) and organizations (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008) in facilitating collaborative settlements 
which maintain disparate interests.   
However, a separate challenge may emerge where potential collaborations are set against 
a backdrop of contention, as is often the case with social movement activists and firms. Burchell 
and Cook (2013a: 511) summarize the challenge to activists as juggling the potential for change in 
firm behavior with “a continuing commitment to reflect the concerns and demands of their own 
stakeholders whose support for direct action activities provided the basis for gaining influence in 
the first place.” Because social activists are members of broader movements that target firms 
contentiously, they may not only have disparate interests, but also face disparate risks associated 
with diverging from the direct contentious actions of the movement. In addition to partner-specific 
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risks associated with interorganizational relationships (e.g., risk of unfulfillment of contract, 
reputational risk etc.), activists face risks that peer activists question the collaboration and launch 
an attack. One Fortune 500 executive I interviewed explained the challenge of forming 
collaborations with activists as follows:  
Here you had all these groups that want to better the world … and no one wanted 
to work with us. Some of it was motivated in a broader concern: it’s that whole 
idea that you’re going to work with the enemy… and pressure from their own 
community that if somebody gets in bed with [the enemy firm], “what are you 
doing?” 
 
So while research suggests firms may be most motivated to seek out collaborations when 
beset by contention (Baron, 2012; Haines, 1984; McDonnell, 2016), understanding when firm-
activist collaborations form requires taking account of the unique risks activists face in 
collaborating with contentiously targeted firms. 
Little is known about when social activists engage collaboratively with which firms. Most 
inquiries into which firms activists choose to interact with have focused on their choice of targets 
for contention (e.g., protests, boycotts, lawsuits). This stream of research focuses on features of a 
targeted firm or its circumstance that are exogenous to a targeting campaign and yet influence its 
probability of eliciting a positive firm response (e.g., Bartley and Child 2014; Briscoe et. al. 2014; 
King 2008). The direct import of insights from contention to the analysis of collaboration is limited 
by the fact that selection of firms for contention is driven by an underlying mechanism of shaming 
the corporation into action, while collaborations involve bi-directional voluntary interactions, 
whose mechanism for effecting change is not shaming but working together to change practices. 
As such, the question of which firms and activists form collaborations remains open (Montgomery 
et al., 2012). 
In answering this question, I start from the assumption that interaction between activist 
groups and firms is, at least partly, guided by an instrumental logic under resource constraints, 
where firms seek to maximize shareholder returns, and activists seek to maximize institutional 
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change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Gray (1989: 263) points out that collaborations are not 
founded solely on altruistic motives, but require that “parties see a direct opportunity to pursue their 
self-interest.” Firms maximize shareholder returns by seeking collaborations with activists in 
instances where the benefits of collaboration outweigh the costs associated with formal 
interorganizational relationships. For activists, collaborations with firms achieve the goal of 
institutional change by working to change a practice within the firm, that may subsequently 
influence other firms to change their practices (Briscoe, Gupta, and Anner, 2015). Therefore, 
activists seek out collaborations with firms with whom they have strong bargaining power to 
negotiate substantive changes in practices, and with firms likely to follow through on negotiated 
commitments. Additionally, activists have to consider the risks of peer sanctioning associated with 
cross-sector collaborations, which can undermine their goal of institutional change and endanger 
the credibility and legitimacy that they rely on to mobilize financial and human capital resources. 
With the preceding logic of how collaborations contribute to achieving the firms’ and 
activists’ respective goals, in the following section I develop hypotheses regarding the factors that 
influence the probability a firm and social activist form a collaboration. In developing my 
arguments, I incorporate the objectives of both the firm and activist, with a particular focus on how 
contention between firms and social movements drive the respective costs and benefits of engaging 
in collaborations. As my theoretical inquiry focuses on the interplay of conflict and collaboration, 
I set to the background, and empirically control for, other characteristics of counterparties (e.g., 
collaboration experience), the firm-activist dyad (e.g., interactional history of the two parties) and 
the institutional context (e.g., policy environment) that have been shown to drive collaboration in 
other contexts. Importantly, I also acknowledge that firm-level characteristics predictive of 
contentious targeting by a movement (e.g., firm visibility, public approval, CEO ideology) may 
also influence an activist’s desire to collaborate with such firms. I empirically separate out the effect 
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of contention on collaboration, independent of these potentially common correlates by including 
them as controls in my models.  
PARTNER SELECTION FOR COLLABORATION 
Contention as a driver of collaboration 
Firms seek out collaboration with activists as a means by which to establish external legitimacy 
(Baron, 2012; McDonnell, 2016; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Selsky and Parker, 2005). There 
are many avenues by which firms can improve their social or environmental performance to better 
align with the expectations of stakeholders, including drawing on internal capabilities (King and 
Lenox, 2002), leveraging outside consultants (Boleslavsky, Chatterji, and Lewis, 2014), or through 
acquisition of those capabilities (Berchicci, Dowell, and King, 2012). The distinct benefit of a 
collaboration with an activist is the public certification and legitimacy the activist offers.2 As Baron 
(2012:148) notes, a firm may recognize changing its practices would improve its performance, “but 
it may lack a mechanism to assure [external audiences] that it has actually changed its practices.” 
Social activists’ focus on social causes imbues them with a moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) that 
firms may struggle to build on their own, but may nevertheless be endowed with, through their 
association with organizations reflecting a prosocial logic. Steven W. Percy, former chairman and 
CEO of BP America Inc., for example, lists “the halo effect that the NGO’s reputation brings to a 
partnership,” (Percy, 2010: 235) as the top benefit for firms in associating with activists. 
Nevertheless, collaborations with activists are not costless, and in fact, are likely to be more 
costly than unilateral actions. In addition to the negotiation and monitoring costs associated with 
formal interorganizational relationships, activists’ advice is “typically biased toward larger 
                                                          
2 Research also points to other benefits of cross-sector partnerships to firms, such as leveraging non-profit 
capabilities in countries with low institutional development (Ballesteros and Gatignon, 2019). While non-
profit organizations offer partnering firms various capabilities, this inquiry focuses on ‘activist’ non-profit 
organizations with capabilities in mobilizing contentiously against public and private organizations, rather 
than service-oriented non-profits (e.g., the Red Cross) which offer firms distinct partner capabilities.  
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investments,” than the firm requires or others advise (Boleslavsky et al., 2014: 3). Unlike paid 
external advisors, such as environmental consultancies, activists goal of effecting institutional 
change drives them to seek larger, and likely more costly, changes in firm practices. As information 
about a firm’s practices is revealed during the course of a collaboration, the collaborating activist’s 
asks can escalate where transparency reveals unanticipated issues. Finally, an arms-length counter-
party with experience in contentious targeting raises the costs of defection, should the firm not be 
able to meet its commitments due to unforeseen changes in circumstances. Commenting on the 
activist backlash that followed Ford’s failure to meet its commitments, Martin B. Zimmerman, then 
vice president of Corporate Affairs, suggests firms “need to weigh the risks of changed 
circumstances making the commitments unattainable,” (Zimmerman, 2010: 227). 
As such, I do not expect collaborations with activists to be used by all firms. Instead, I 
expect that firms will seek collaborations with activists when the value of the legitimacy the 
relationship offers is greatest, thereby offsetting the costs and risks of collaboration. That value is 
likely to be greatest in times of contention, when firms’ profits (Luders, 2006), market returns (King 
and Soule, 2007) and reputation (King 2008) are threatened. By establishing external legitimacy, 
collaborations with activists are a means by which to defuse future contention and its associated 
costs (Baron, 2012; Baron et al., 2016).3 This is consistent with the assumption that firms seek to 
maximize shareholder returns, as shareholders are more likely to respond positively to the use of 
costlier formal governance mechanisms (e.g., contracts) with non-market stakeholders where 
stakeholders pose a credible threat to their investment (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017). 
The idea that firms are most motivated to form collaborations with activists in times of 
contention finds support in social movement theory, formal models of strategic activism, as well 
as anecdotal evidence from both firms and activist organizations. In social movement theory, this 
                                                          
3 This is in line with research on strategic alliances where resource complementarities drive partner 
selection, where resources can include social legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996). 
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dynamic is called the positive radical flank effect (Haines, 1984, 2013). Radical flank effects are 
the effects that ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ factions of a movement have on each other through their 
interactions with third parties outside the movement. Radical activists, which typically rely on more 
contentious tactics and oppositional ideology, can strengthen the bargaining position of moderate 
activists (Haines 1984) by making the moderates’ demands seem more reasonable, and by creating 
crises for targets (i.e., firms or government) that they seek to resolve by accommodating moderates. 
The mechanism underlying the effect in Haines’ (1984) landmark study was that corporate elites 
recognized their interest in pacifying contention by accommodating certain manageable demands. 
Typically considered an unintended results of uncoordinated efforts (Haines 2013), the positive 
radical flank effect suggests that firms are pushed into collaborating with more moderate activists 
thanks to the more contentious tactics of their radical peers. For example, in response to a toxics in 
electronics campaign, Sony released communication to key players in the industry, noting the 
contentious threat of "highly active, well organized [environmental] groups," and recommended 
companies “look into partnership support with reliable NGOs.” (Multinational Monitor, 2000) 
Formal models of firm-activist interactions similarly suggest the greater the threat from 
confrontational activists, the more aggressively firms seek collaborations with moderate activists 
(Baron, 2012). The mechanism underlying the effects is that collaboration with an activist 
“provides a shield against a confrontational activist” (Baron 2012: 150), because the firm has 
committed to change its practices through a transparent process with an external party with 
legitimacy (ibid.). Empirical support is provided by McDonnell (2016), who found that as firms 
experienced more contentious targeting from activists, they were more likely to voluntarily 
cooperate with activists to sponsor boycotts of other companies.   
From the perspective of the activist, this research also posits that the bargaining power of 
the collaborating activist is strengthened when a firm is repeatedly threatened by confrontational 
activists (Baron, 2012). Increased bargaining power increases the magnitude of the practice change 
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that the collaborating activist can negotiate and increases the probability that the firm will actually 
change its practices (Baron, 2012). Both these effects suggest activists evaluating potential 
collaboration partners are likely to view firms besieged by contention as valuable partners for 
achieving their goal of institutional change. Mindy Lubber, president of Ceres, explains the 
symbiosis between contention and collaboration as follows (Lubber, 2018): 
The effect that some of the grassroots activists go after banks or other companies, 
we get the phone call the next day saying “what do we do?”, our answer is “this is 
how you get them off your back,” our answer is well “you’re asking for this, we’ll 
help you get there, let’s figure out how to make it happen.” 
The foregoing suggests that firms contentiously targeted will be most motivated to seek the 
legitimacy offered by a collaboration with activists, and offer activists greater bargaining power to 
achieve institutional change. Therefore, I predict:   
Hypothesis 1: The probability that a firm collaborates with an activist increases in the 
contentious challenges the firm experiences.  
 
Activist risks as boundary conditions 
Although firms previously contentiously targeted are both willing partners and offer greatest 
bargaining power, activists may be circumscribed in taking advantage of these opportunities where 
the risks of doing so are prohibitive. Risk is an important determinant of partner selection (Baum 
et al., 2005; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012), and often associated with the characteristics of the 
potential partner (Gulati, 1995), as well as the social context in which the collaboration is embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985). Below I develop arguments regarding two risks activists face that undermine 
their goal of effecting institutional change, and therefore, inform their partner selection decisions. 
The first, peer sanctioning, stems from the social context in which firm-activist collaborations are 
embedded. The second, the firm’s potential unfulfillment of commitments is grounded in the 
assumption that all contracts are inherently incomplete, and puts the activist at risk of the firm using 
the collaboration to greenwash its reputation. Both moderate the relationship between the 
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contentious challenges the firm experiences and the probability that it forms a collaboration through 
their effect on the activist’s risk.  
Peer sanctioning risk 
Beginning with the social context, collaborating with firms previously contentiously 
targeted puts the activist at risk of costly peer sanctioning. Social movement theory suggests 
activists clearly identify adversaries to mobilize resources and improve the effectiveness of 
contentious tactics (Hunt et al., 1994). As such, an activist that collaborates with an adversary firm 
(i.e., one contentiously targeted by the movement), may be seen by its field peers as undermining 
their goals, which may result in peer sanctioning (Bacharach, Bamberger, and Sonnenstuhl, 1996). 
Peer sanctioning, which often takes the form of allegations of ‘selling out’ or ‘sleeping with the 
enemy’ (Burchell and Cook, 2013a), is particularly damaging to activist organizations that rely on 
their credibility to mobilize the financial and human capital resources necessary to achieve their 
goals. Such allegations also undermine the activist’s goal of effecting broader institutional change 
by undermining the diffusion of new practices to other firms, because observing firms will be more 
cautious when deciding whether to adopt practices that result from collaborations that have been 
criticized (Briscoe and Murphy, 2012).  
Anecdotal evidence of peer sanctioning abounds. Following the EDF signing on as a 
strategic partner in the Center for Sustainable Shale Development, a coalition of 67 groups, 
including prominent environmental movement organizations like Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth, released a statement that EDF does not speak for them on climate change issues – essentially 
making EDF part of the out-group (Hunt et al., 1994). Criticism of activists’ collaborations have 
also resulted in reputational damage, defections by parts of the activist organization, and 
endangered the activist’s survival. A collaboration between environmental activist Pollution Probe 
and a grocery retailer to certify its products, for example, was met with a public attack from 
Greenpeace shortly after its announcement. With demonstrations and satirical leafleting at stores, 
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the controversy achieved wide-spread awareness, and left Pollution Probe with a battered 
reputation, staff layoffs, and the resignation of its executive director (Stafford and Hartman, 1996). 
In another case, a local Sierra Club in Michigan disbanded to protest a collaboration with Clorox, 
citing concerns the national organization “sold their soul to the highest bidder," (Flesher, 2008).  
Therefore, although firms previously contentiously targeted are both willing partners and 
offer the greatest bargaining power, activists will vary in the degree to which they can pursue such 
partners due to the risk of peer criticism and its associated costs. What remains an open question is 
when are such risks greatest? I argue that the answer lies in the movement field itself, because fields 
are characterized by a shared understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics are possible, 
legitimate, and interpretable,” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11). In fields where collaborative 
tactics are perceived as illegitimate, field members who engage in such tactics face heightened 
probability of sanctioning. I focus on the social structure of the social movement field to understand 
the acceptability of collaborative tactics within the field. 
The structure of social relations within a field evolve through several mechanisms that 
constrain and enable network building including similarity (i.e., homophily), resource dependence, 
and competition. However, in the context of social movement fields, social distance or proximity 
is also driven by the ideological stances of activists (Diani and McAdam, 2003). Although 
membership in a movement is defined by a shared collective identity (i.e., common purpose and 
shared commitment to a cause) activist groups can be distinguished by their ideological stance since 
“nearly all social movements divide into ’moderate’ and ’radical’ factions at some point in their 
development” (Haines 1984:31). In the context of effecting change in the private sector, moderate 
groups “believe that although companies are part of the problem, they can also be part of the 
solution,” while radical groups do not believe firms can be part of the solution (den Hond and 
Bakker, 2007: 903). As such, moderate groups use a combination of contentious and cooperative 
tactics, while radical groups only use the former. As one interviewee from a prominent activist 
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organization explains, “I think most people understand that there's a left flank that... is like sue, do 
big public facing campaigns... push for the aspirational goal. Then there's the sort of practical, yes 
but don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good [approach].”   
 If tactics are an indicator of ideology and ideology can relationally segment movement 
fields into moderate and radical groups, I expect that the degree to which the two groups share 
social relations is an indicator of their ideological commitment or purity (Diani and McAdam, 
2003). Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz (1977) show that if two groups with different 
preferences can negotiate instrumentally on an outcome, they create cross-group ties to bargain 
over the outcome despite differing opinions and practices. Conversely, when “clearly held value 
commitments” are threatened (Laumann et al., 1977: 601) by particular tactics, segmented social 
structures are more likely, where little discussion occurs across groups. The foregoing suggests the 
degree of ideological commitment of field members will manifest in the observable social relations 
that characterize the field. It follows that social movements where few social relations exist between 
radical activists (i.e., using solely contentious tactics) and moderate activists (i.e., using both 
contentious and collaborative tactics) are likely populated by radical activists with strong 
ideological commitments. For radical activists with strong ideological commitments, “alliances 
with corporations are anathema” (Hoffman, 2006: 28). In segmented movement fields, where 
ideological commitments are stronger, the probability of open conflict between activists is 
heightened because conflict over ideology “normally takes the form of open attacks” by radical 
activists upon moderate activists for “selling out” (Zald and McCarthy, 1980: 12).  
Conversely, in movement fields where radical and moderate activists have relational spaces 
(Kellogg, 2009) for negotiation over institutional practices, actors who support dissimilar 
institutional models can overcome conflict (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014). Pre-existing ties enable 
the sharing of trustworthy and nuanced information about the potential collaboration and partner 
firm, and facilitate the exploration of possible bases of compromise between radical and moderate 
28 
groups (Laumann et al., 1977), thereby lowering the risk of peer criticism. The role of social 
proximity between radical and moderate activists in attenuating the risk of peer criticism is 
supported by qualitative research on firm-activist collaborations. For instance, Earthwatch 
consulted with other activist groups prior to collaborating with Rio Tinto asking them whether they 
would regard Earthwatch badly if it entered a partnership with Rio Tinto (Seitanidi and Crane, 
2009). Pre-existing ties between Earthwatch and other activist groups facilitated consultation on 
possible collaboration targets. Such ties are most likely to exist where radical activists do not define 
their identity in opposition to corporations. 
Intuitively, we may think activists will not collaborate with firms that peers with whom 
they have relations have contentiously targeted because field members have “a desire to maintain 
their social bonds” (Zietsma et al., 2017: 399). However, I propose that it is counterintuitively in 
the absence of social bonds that previously targeted firms will be avoided. My argument centers on 
the role of cooperative ties in facilitating dialogue, and segmented social structure being reflective 
of strong ideological commitments that increase the probability of open conflict (Zald and 
McCarthy, 1980). In movements characterized by greater social proximity between contentious and 
cooperative activists, collaborations with firms have a lower probability of garnering criticism from 
contentious activists because they do not define their identity in opposition to corporations. Instead, 
collaboration is a legitimate tactic that they themselves may not engage in, but that can nevertheless 
supplement their own more contentious tactics in effecting institutional change. In the presence of 
pre-existing ties, activists considering collaborations can consult with their trusted radical peers 
and find common ground that mitigates peer criticism.  
Therefore, I expect that in social movements with relatively few ties between radicals and 
moderates, activists that collaborate with firms face heightened probability of criticism from their 
contentious activist peers, and therefore, will avoid collaborations with previously contentiously 
targeted firms.  
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Hypothesis 2: The probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm 
collaborates with an activist decreases in the level of segmentation along tactical 
lines in the social movement in which the activist operates. 
 
Greenwashing risk  
Whether using contentious or collaborative tactics, the aim of activists is in changing the practices 
of focal firms with the hope of effecting broader institutional change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007; 
Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). A cross-sector collaboration with a firm achieves the goal of 
institutional change by working to change a practice within a firm that may subsequently influence 
other firms to change their practices (Briscoe et al., 2015). However, these benefits can only be 
realized in the course of the collaboration because, given the inherent incompleteness of contracts, 
the activist has no assurance that the firm will change its practices. As such, activist perceptions of 
the risk that a firm may not follow through on its commitments are also relevant to partner selection.  
I argue that activists make ex ante judgements about a firm’s willingness to change during 
the course of a collaboration to mitigate such risk. They do so by looking to a firms’ history of 
responses to contention, which vary substantially across firms. Some firms are ‘receptive’ to 
contention, conceding to pressure and seeking to address activists’ concerns by reforming their 
practices and operations (Bartley, 2003; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015). Conversely, other 
firms are ‘resistant,’ taking a defensive or evasive stand against contentious activists (Briscoe and 
Safford, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015). Over time, prominent 
organizations that are targets of campaigns acquire reputations for being resistant or receptive based 
on their past willingness to change (Baron and Diermeier, 2007; Briscoe and Safford, 2008). While 
a firm’s responsiveness to activism may change over time with the adoption of new social issue 
management devices (McDonnell et al., 2015) or changes in top management teams (Briscoe et al., 
2014), in the absence of updating, these reputations are sticky because they are typically attributed 
to persistent internal characteristics of the firm, such as corporate culture, founder effects or its 
strategic focus (Briscoe and Safford, 2008).   
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These sticky reputations are salient identity categories that contentious activists employ in 
selecting targets (McDonnell et al., 2015), and as such, should be equally salient for activists when 
considering collaborations. Moreover, they are likely to be particularly important in collaborations 
where activists’ greatest asset, their credibility, is on the line. As a spokesperson from Natural 
Resources Defense Council explains, “The biggest danger to an environmental group when it looks 
for common ground with one company is that [it] will be used by the company for public relations 
advantage.” (Philadelphia Inquirer, 1994). 
In evaluating potential collaboration partners, activists look to a firm’s reputation as 
activism-receptive or activism-resistant to make ex ante judgements about its propensity to change 
its practices. Specifically, activists will avoid resistant firms because they have a history of using 
impression management strategies that evade, rather than address, activists’ concerns (McDonnell 
and King, 2013). Resistant firms will be seen by activists as having a low propensity to undertake 
substantive changes in the course of a collaboration, being instead motivated to use a collaboration 
with an activist as a means of impression management via greenwashing. A campaigner with 
Friends of the Earth notes, "we're very wary of companies using us to ` greenwash' their reputation," 
(Stecklow, 2006). Conversely, firms that have previously positively responded to activism, suggest 
to activists a future willingness to change. Activists are also likely to judge receptive firms as 
carrying lower risks of negative reputation spillover in the future (McDonnell and Pontikes, 2017).  
The foregoing arguments suggest a firm’s reputation on the continuum of resistant to 
receptive to activism influences the probability that an activist accepts an offer of collaboration 
from a contentiously targeted firm through its effects on the activist’s perception of ex post risk. 
For firms with a history of being resistant to activism, the heightened risks of the collaboration 
being used for greenwashing lowers the probability they will be chosen for collaboration. 
Conversely, such risks are mitigated as the firm’s receptivity to activism increases, and therefore, 
should positively moderate the relationship hypothesized in H1. 
31 
Hypothesis 3: The probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm collaborates 
with an activist increases in the firm’s history of receptivity to activism.   
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
I test these hypotheses using a novel 25-year panel database that tracks all contentious and 
cooperative interactions reported in the media, or by activist or corporate press releases or filings, 
between 118 U.S.-based environmental social movement organizations (SMOs) and a sample of 
300 large U.S. companies between 1988 and 2012. While reliance on publicly reported or disclosed 
data may be biased if either contentious or cooperative interactions are underreported, I believe this 
risk is mitigated by both firms’ and SMOs’ incentives to disclose. Firms are motivated to make 
public their collaborations with SMOs as their goal in entering these collaborations is to build their 
legitimacy. This is confirmed in my data where over 50 percent of the sources for collaboration 
data are press releases. Conversely, contentious challenges are unlikely to be underreported because 
of the incentives of both SMOs and media outlets. SMOs seek media attention to their cause and 
mobilization, while media outlets are focused on the newsworthiness of events for audiences, where 
negative news, and particularly that surrounding prominent firms like those in the Fortune 500 and 
sponsored by an SMO are more likely to be reported (Earl et al., 2004).  
The panel begins in 1988 because the collaboration between McDonald’s and EDF, first 
announced in 1990, is commonly considered one of the first environmental SMO-firm 
collaborations. Comments made two decades later by the head of EDF's corporate partnerships 
suggest SMO-firm collaborations did not exist at the time: “At the time, it was heresy to say that 
companies and NGOs could work together; now it is dogma, at least for the Fortune 500” 
(Economist, 2010). Beginning data collection in 1988, two years before the EDF-McDonald’s 
collaboration, ensures the panel tracks the evolution of SMO-firm collaborations and confirms no 
collaborations existed in the preceding two years. 
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The 300 companies in the sample were randomly drawn from the pool of all companies 
that appeared in the Fortune 500 during the sample period. The Fortune 500 list was sampled 
because prior research has shown that activists tend to contentiously target large, high-status firms 
(King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015) and engage them in collaborations, as suggested by the 
preceding quote from EDF. The sample of activist organizations, or SMOs, was created by 
analyzing Factiva archives of US newspapers for all organizations described in media as an 
“environmental activist group/organization” or “conservation activist group/organization” or 
“environmental advocacy group/organization” or “conservation advocacy group/organization.” 
The organizations this search yielded were subsequently matched with formal non-profit tax filings 
made available by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). The terms ‘activist’ and 
‘advocacy’ were employed in the searches because activism and advocacy are a key function of an 
SMO and is necessary to classify an organization as belonging to a social movement (Soule and 
King, 2008). This approach distinguishes SMOs from other non-advocacy non-profits listed in the 
NCCS database (e.g., non-profits that are service oriented) which are not part of the environmental 
movement. Finally, while others have relied on archival directories such as the Encyclopedia of 
Associations (Minkoff, 1999) or the Yearbook of International Associations (e.g., (Smith and 
Wiest, 2005), such directories rely on self-reporting by the SMO which can lead to 
underrepresentation of some activist organizations, especially protest organizations (Minkoff, 
1999) or smaller organizations (Larson and Soule, 2009).  
Data sources 
SMO-Firm Interactions. Following common practice in social movements research (Earl 
et al., 2004), I rely on media reports to code contentious and collaborative interactions between an 
SMO and firm. Relying on media reports can create two forms of bias: selection bias (i.e., 
ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events) and description bias (i.e., the veracity of the 
coverage) (Earl et al., 2004). To overcome selection bias due to ideological biases, the media source 
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list includes a wide range of major news and business publications rather than relying on one media 
outlet. Secondly, to overcome selection bias associated with over-reporting of negative events (e.g., 
protests may be over-reported in comparison to collaborations), the source list also includes press 
releases, which tend to report more positive news from the perspective of the issuer. To mitigate 
description bias, I rely only on “hard facts” of the event (e.g., who, what, when), which is relatively 
accurate in media reports (Earl et al. 2004: 65). The source list includes all English-language 
sources included in Factiva’s categories of major news and business publications and press release 
wires for North America4, which includes major wire sources providing corporate press releases.  
I restrict my search to North America for two reasons. First, the impact of SMOs and their 
tactics vary by region (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), therefore SMOs’ decision-making on 
campaign strategy is often geography specific. Secondly, the environmental performance of firms, 
a likely driver of contentious targeting, may vary across countries (e.g., due to the pollution haven 
hypothesis) and comparable environmental performance data is not available across countries for 
the same firm. Finally, North America was employed as the filter because of Canada’s economic 
integration with the United States and because many of the most environmentally controversial 
events or projects resulted in contentious mobilization that crossed borders (e.g., Exxon Valdez, 
Keystone Pipeline). This source list was searched for any articles or press releases where the firm 
name and SMO name appear in the same report, resulting in over 60,000 individual articles or press 
releases. Each resulting article or press release was read by undergraduate student coders, and then 
reviewed again by the author,5 selecting instances where the SMO contentiously interacted with a 
                                                          
4 The major news and business publications category includes over 100 print and online sources from 
outlets such as ABC News, The Boston Globe, and the Wall Street Journal, while the press release wire 
category includes over 200 press release wires such as Business Wire, Greenwire and 
Nasdaq/Globenewswire.  
5 During the training period, which spanned one month and approximately 2,000 articles coded by each coder, 
I read every article that the undergraduate students coded and provided feedback. Once each coder was 
trained to a performance level of at least 95% correct coding, I continued to read and enter into a database 
every article that was coded as containing either a contentious or cooperative interaction, but not those that 
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firm (e.g., protests, boycotts, shareholders’ proposals, lawsuits), or cooperatively interacted with a 
firm (e.g., monetary or in-kind donations, board interlock, collaboration). All contentious and 
cooperative interactions between a firm-SMO dyad are recorded by the author with unique 
identifiers, allowing for deduplication of a single event (e.g., SMO A protested against firm B) 
reported multiple times in the media.  
Identifying SMO-Firm Collaborations. I define a collaboration between an SMO and firm 
as ‘organizations working together by committing resources to achieve mutually relevant 
outcomes.’ Included in the definition of collaborations are what Rondinelli and London (2003) 
describe as intensive environmental management alliances and interactive collaborations. Intensive 
environmental management alliances are collaborations aimed at improving environmental 
performance of the firm, such as when the EDF and McDonald’s created a task force to study ways 
in which McDonald’s can reduce waste in its operations. Interactive collaborations are similarly 
purposeful, interactional and involve the commitment of resources by each party, but their primary 
focus is not changing the firm’s internal practices. Interactive collaborations are more externally 
focused and include: targeted project support (e.g., development of eco-preserves on company 
property); environmental awareness and education collaborations (e.g., co-sponsorship of 
education programs, producing research in support of policy change); and SMO certification of 
practices or products.6 Excluded from the definition of collaboration are any arms-length 
cooperative interactions or transactions, such as corporate contributions and gifts to the SMO, 
marketing affiliations (e.g., licensing of SMO name or logo), support for employee participation in 
                                                          
were coded as containing neither. Inter-coder reliability tests conducted half-way through the coding exercise 
demonstrated a high rate of agreement (95 percent average, three coders, random sample of 3,465 articles). 
6 SMO’s certification of firm products are classified as collaborations only in instances where evidence exists 
of the SMO and firm having worked together in a purposeful way with a commitment of resources. For 
example, some certification processes involve a preliminary period where the SMO advises the firm on 
changes needed in its processes for it to obtain certification, and the firm consults the SMO on its changes. 
In the absence of such evidence, SMO certification of products is treated as arms-length transactions that do 
not constitute collaborations, akin to logo licensing (Rondinelli and London 2003). 
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SMO activities, or market transactions, such as the purchasing of the SMOs’ products or services 
(e.g., airlines purchasing Carbonfund’s carbon credits). These are excluded because they either do 
not involve working together or do not involve the commitment of resources by both parties. 
Appendix A.1 details the procedures used to identify SMO-firm collaborations. 
SMO-firm collaborations were identified from the broader population of cooperative 
interactions found in the Factiva media and press release search described above, as well as firm’s 
financial filings by searching for each SMO name in firms’ 10-K filings. Each resulting media 
report, press release, or company filing was read carefully by the author to identify those 
interactions that conformed with the definition of ‘collaboration’ as such. Relying on media reports, 
press releases and company filings is consistent with methods employed by databases (e.g., SDC, 
MERIT-CATI, and CORE) commonly used for research on firm-firm alliances (Schilling, 2009). 
Further, I improve on most alliance databases, which sample on alliances rather than firms 
(Schilling, 2009), by first identifying a group of relevant companies and SMOs, and then searching 
for publicly disclosed collaborations within each SMO-firm dyad. Similar to commercial alliances 
with a for-profit firm (Schilling, 2009), firms are not required to report their collaborations with 
SMOs to any governing body. Although firms are often motivated to disclose collaborations with 
SMOs to build their legitimacy, my data does not capture any collaborations that are kept secret. 
As such, the findings are only generalizable to publicly-disclosed SMO-firm collaborations.  
I find that firms with the greatest number of SMO collaborations are concentrated in 
consumer-facing industries (e.g., retail, consumer products). Consistent with past research on 
contentious targeting, the greatest number of contentious challenges are concentrated amongst 
several large firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g., extractives or energy) 
and those that are consumer facing (e.g., consumer products manufacturers). Table 1 lists the top 
15 most contentiously targeted firms, and those with the greatest number of collaborations with 
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SMOs in the sample. While eight firms appear in both lists, the partial overlap suggests the positive 
radical flank effect does not operate in all circumstances or with all firms.  
Table 1: Top 15 firms by contentious challenges and SMO collaborations 
 
Note. Number of contentious challenges and SMO collaborations represent sum of unique events 
or collaborations from 1988 to 2012. Number of organizations may exceed 15 where two or more 
firms have experienced the same number of contentious challenges or have the same number of 
SMO collaborations (i.e., a tie). 
 
Social Movement Structures. To understand how the structure of a movement impacts the 
propensity to collaborate with firms, I first define movement populations by each SMO’s issue 
focus, and then collect data on relations between SMOs in a given movement. I follow Soule and 
King (2008) in classifying an SMO into a movement based on the issue they are advocating for or 
campaigning on in a given year. As environmental issues, such as greenhouse gases, water quality 
or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) gain and lose salience with different stakeholder 
groups, the use and effectiveness of tactics varies by the targeted issue (King and Soule, 2007) as 
does the population of SMOs involved in the issue. I read media reports and press releases 
Firm Firm
Exxon Mobil 126 Coca-Cola 18
Monsanto 123 Walmart 14
Shell Oil 113 General Electric 11
ChevronTexaco 81 Starbucks 11
Procter & Gamble 55 McDonald's 9
Entergy 50 Shell Oil 6
Smithfield Foods 42 Alcoa 5
Occidental Petroleum 41 Entergy 5
American Electric Power 37 Johnson & Johnson 5
Safeway 27 General Motors 4
Home Depot 26 Home Depot 4
General Electric 25 Johnson Controls 4
McDonald's 25 Procter & Gamble 4
Coca-Cola 24 Safeway 4
Staples 4
Whole Foods Market 4
No. of 
contentious 
challenges
No. of 
collaborations
37 
containing the name of the SMO in order to determine if an SMO mobilized either through extra-
institutional (e.g., protest, boycotts) or institutional means (e.g., lawsuit, proxy proposal) against 
any target (e.g., state government, private company, regulator) in a given year. Relying on the topics 
codebook developed by the Comparative Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002) each 
article or press release with evidence of mobilization is then coded according to the primary issue 
being advocated by the SMO (Appendix A.2 lists the 14 sub-categories of environmental issues). 
Some SMOs mobilize on multiple issues in a given year, and they are assigned membership in 
more than one movement accordingly. The Comparative Agendas Project codebook is used because 
its categories contain rich descriptions of what falls under each issue category, include 
contemporary issues, such as GMOs, which other issue typologies do not, and is a source of 
important control variables (e.g., congressional hearings on an issue).  
After identifying the population of SMOs belonging to a movement, I construct movement 
networks by manually coding interactions between SMOs reported in an article, press release or 
other public report. Over 73,000 documents, obtained from a search of Factiva where the names of 
two SMOs appear in the same document, were carefully read and coded by undergraduate student 
coders, and then by the author. The Factiva source list was expanded to be inclusive of all English-
language sources included in Factiva over the period to ensure that non-media and press release 
sources, such as Congressional Documents and Publications, and legal alerts were included for 
greatest comprehensiveness. Each resulting article or report was read to determine if two SMOs 
interacted cooperatively, and reports were de-duplicated to ensure only unique cooperative 
interactions were counted within a given SMO dyad-year. Cooperative interactions between SMOs 
that constitute the ties within the movement typically took the form of SMOs co-filing a lawsuit, 
co-organizing a rally or conference, joint testimony or statements at Congressional hearings, 
amongst others. Further, each interaction was coded by the author on the environmental issue on 
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which the two SMOs cooperated (e.g., GMOs, air quality, water quality, energy efficiency) using 
the definitions from the Comparative Agendas Project codebook.  
Measures 
Dependent Variable. The existence of a collaboration between a given SMO and firm – SMO-firm 
collaboration – is the dependent variable used to test the hypotheses. The dependent variable is 
coded as 1, if an SMO is collaborating with a firm in a given year, and 0 if it is not.  
Independent Variables. In hypothesis 1, I expect that the propensity of a firm and SMO to 
form a collaboration increases with the number of times the firm has been contentiously targeted. 
I obtain the number of contentious challenges (e.g., protests, boycotts, lawsuits) a firm received 
from the previously described coding of media articles and press releases from 1988 to 2012. 
Contentious challenges is the sum of all contentious challenges a firm received by any SMO in the 
previous year. The previous year’s contention is a conservative test of the hypothesis, and 
consistent with past approaches (McDonnell 2016); however, the results are robust to a rolling sum 
of contentious challenges (e.g., 2-year, 3-year).  
I test the attenuating effect of the movement’s segmentation along tactical lines 
hypothesized in H2, using Freeman's (1978) segregation index to measure the movement 
segmentation by tactic of each movement network described above. Freeman’s segregation index 
compares the proportion of observed between-group ties with the number expected under random 
mixing, accounting for the size and connectedness of the underlying network. I use Bojanowski 
and Corten's (2014) reformulation of the index that allows for between-group ties to exceed those 
expected under random mixing. As my interest is measuring the degree to which movements are 
segmented along the tactical repertoires of the SMOs, I classify all SMOs in a given year as having 
‘cooperative’ or ‘contentious’ tactical repertoires in relation to firms based on their interactions 
with firms in the sample. SMOs with cooperative tactical repertoires are those that have employed 
cooperative tactics (i.e., collaboration, logo licensing, accepted corporate donations etc.) in 
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preceding years, and SMOs with contentious tactical repertoires are those that exclusively employ 
contentious tactics. This classification best conforms with the ideological stances of moderate 
groups who believe that firms can be part of the solution, and radical groups who do not believe 
firms can be part of the solution (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Movement segmentation by tactic 
can take both positive and negative values. Negative values correspond to networks where 
interactions between cooperative and contentious SMOs (i.e., between-group ties) is higher than 
expected under random tie formation; a value of zero corresponds to networks where between-
group ties is exactly that expected under random tie formation; positive values correspond to 
networks where between-group ties are less than that expected to exist in a purely random network 
with the same group sizes and density as the observed one (Freeman, 1978).  
Hypothesis 3 is tested by interacting two variables – contentious challenges and firm 
receptivity to activism. Consistent with past research (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McDonnell and 
King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015), I rely on a firm’s history of responses to activists’ targeting 
them to identify ‘receptive’ firms as those that seek to address activists’ concerns. Firms’ responses 
to social and environmental issue shareholder proposals are one observable and unambiguous 
indicator of receptivity to activism (McDonnell et al., 2015). Firms respond to shareholder 
proposals in three distinct ways: positively (when the firm voluntarily cedes to the proposal leading 
to its withdrawal), neutrally (when the firm does nothing and the proposal is put to a vote at its 
annual meeting), or negatively (when the firm petitions the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission to exclude the proposal). Firm responses to environmental and social shareholder 
proposals are obtained from the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) and 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)7. I follow McDonnell et al. (2015) in measuring firm 
                                                          
7 ISS has data available from 1997 onwards, therefore, ICCR data was used from 1993 to 2007. Additionally, 
coverage of firms in the sample was inconsistent between the two sources (i.e., ICCR had some companies 
that ISS didn’t and vice versa), therefore, for overlapping years (1997 to 2007) observations were manually 
de-duplicated. 
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receptivity to activism using the Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of imbalance,8 where a JF coefficient 
of -1 (minimum value), indicates that a firm challenged all proposals in a given year, while a firm 
with a JF coefficient of 1 (maximum value) voluntarily implemented all proposals it received.9  
I control in the empirical estimation for a number of factors pertaining to the SMO-firm 
dyad, firm, SMO, and institutional environment which may influence the propensity of a given firm 
and SMO to collaborate.  
Dyad-level controls. The choice of collaboration partner is, among other things, influenced 
by the interactional history of the two parties. In a survey of Dutch firms, for instance, den Hond 
et al. (2015) found the frequency of contact a firm has with SMOs increases its propensity to 
collaborate with SMOs. Therefore, I include dyad-level controls to account for past interactions 
within the dyad. First, using the media and press release reports of cooperative interactions between 
an SMO and firm (e.g., donations, logo licensing), I sum the number of cooperative events between 
the SMO and firm in the preceding year, which I term dyad cooperative interactions. Similarly, a 
history of conflict within the dyad may attenuate the likelihood of collaboration. Therefore, I also 
control for the number of contentious challenges by the SMO of the focal firm in the preceding 
year. 
Firm-level controls. I include several firm-level covariates that past research has shown to 
drive contentious targeting that may also correlate with collaboration, to better isolate the additive 
effect of contention on collaboration beyond covariates that may be predictive of both. I control for 
a firm’s media attention, size, and public approval, based on McDonnell’s (2016) findings on the 
characteristics of firms allying with activists on boycotts. Firm media attention is the sum of all 
                                                          
8 JF coefficient = (P2-PN)/V2 if P>N; 0 if P=N; and (PN-N2)/V2 if N>P where P is the number of positive 
firm responses to social-issue proxy proposals (i.e., withdrawals), N is the number of negative responses (i.e., 
challenges), and V is the total number of social-issue proxy proposals submitted to a firm in a given year. 
9 If a firm did not receive a shareholder proxy proposal in a given year, I carry over the firm’s past receptivity 
because reputations for receptivity are sticky, and run robustness checks omitting firm-years with no proxy 
proposals. 
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articles containing the firm’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S. newspapers in the prior 
year (divided by 1,000 articles).10 To control for firm size I include a firm’s logged employees and 
logged assets in the previous year, obtained from the Compustat database. I follow McDonnell 
(2016) in operationalizing public approval using the affective valence of all articles published about 
the firm in USA Today. Each article is analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) 
program, which uses word dictionaries to calculate statistics of the extent of positively and 
negatively valenced emotional words within each article. I use the JF coefficient (described above), 
which is commonly employed to control for the emotional valence of media coverage (Pfarrer, 
Pollock, and Rindova, 2010; Pollock and Rindova, 2003), to obtain a public approval measure that 
varies from -1 (only negative coverage) to 1 (only positive coverage). I use a cut-off of 60% for the 
LIWC scores, following others (McDonnell, 2016; Pfarrer et al., 2010), to classify an article as 
positive or negative. The political liberalism of CEOs also increases the probability of activism 
(Briscoe et al., 2014) and may also influence which firms seek out collaborations. I account for this 
possibility by controlling for the fraction of a CEO’s contributions to electoral candidates that were 
to Republican candidates, based on data from Fremeth, Richter, and Schaufele (2013). CEO 
contributions to Republic candidates is the fraction of all contributions the CEO made to political 
campaigns that are to Republican candidates.  
I control for a firm’s environmental performance, as activists may be less willing to 
collaborate with firms with poor environmental records as this increases the risk of tarnishing their 
own reputations (McDonnell and Pontikes, 2017). Further, firms with greater commitments to 
corporate social responsibility have been shown to be more willing to collaborate with SMOs (den 
Hond et al., 2015) and may be more likely to be contentiously targeted (McDonnell et al., 2015). I 
rely on Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) environmental concerns rating 
                                                          
10 Focusing on the six largest newspapers — the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street 
Journal, the Chicago Tribune, USA Today, and the Los Angeles Times — reduces variability due to 
organizational survival of newspapers and changes in coverage of media outlets in Factiva over time.  
42 
to measure a firm’s environmental performance. In an assessment of the KLD environmental 
ratings, (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009) find that KLD “concern” ratings are “fairly good 
summaries of past environmental performance”, and are predictive of future pollution and 
regulatory compliance violations. A firm’s environmental performance is the sum of seven 
environmental “concern” variables provided by KLD in the prior year (e.g., hazardous waste).  
I control for the centrality of the firm within the board interlock network of U.S.-based 
public and private firms, as central firms may be more attractive collaboration targets because 
models of management diffuse from central firms (Fligstein 1990) thereby effecting institutional 
change. The firm’s centrality is the number of firms with whom it has a board interlock (e.g., degree 
centrality), using data from Boardex. I include all U.S.-based public and private firms because 
activists’ institutional change aspirations generalize across multiple industries, and practices 
diffuse across industries in response to activism (Briscoe and Safford, 2008).  
While the salience of contentious threats may be highest for targeted firms, firms operating 
in the same industry are also attuned to contentious targeting of their peers (Yue, Rao, and Ingram, 
2013) which raises the perceived risk of future targeting against the focal firm. Therefore, I control 
for industry contentious challenges, or the sum of contentious challenges that other firms in the 
same industry in which the focal firm operates (at the 3-digit NAICS level) received in the previous 
year. 
SMO-level controls. I include SMO-level covariates that may be predictive of a firm’s 
desire to collaborate with an SMO, and vice versa. One of the key motivations for firms to 
collaborate with SMOs is to benefit from the SMO’s legitimacy or status (Baron, 2012). Therefore, 
I expect that firms seek out collaborations with SMOs with high levels of legitimacy. I proxy for 
SMO legitimacy using the number of congressional appearances an SMO made before 
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congressional committee hearings.11 Public policy makers’ evaluations of an organization’s 
sociopolitical reputation affects the number of congressional committee hearing invitations 
extended to that organization (Werner, 2015) and therefore is an indirect proxy for an SMO’s 
legitimacy. Data on SMOs’ invited appearances before congressional committee hearings are 
collected from ProQuest’s Congressional Hearings data archives, searching for each SMO and 
recording the number of times a representative of a given SMO testified in congressional hearings 
in a given year. Firms may also seek out collaborations with SMOs that have experience partnering 
with firms, as these SMOs may have built up alliance capabilities (Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002) 
that could make the collaboration more successful. Therefore, I control for SMO collaboration 
experience, which is the cumulative sum of collaborations the SMO has had with firms in preceding 
years. Finally, SMOs may vary in the degree to which they resist pressures for conformity from 
their peers. Specifically, large well-resourced organizations “may be insulated from institutional 
pressures in a way that is unavailable to smaller, more resource-strapped organizations” 
(Greenwood et al., 2011: 319). As such, better-resourced SMOs may be more likely to collaborate 
with previously contentiously targeted firms, ceteris paribus. Therefore, I include a control for 
SMO resources, which are the SMO’s net assets at the end of the prior fiscal year (logged due to 
skewness), which I obtain from their tax filing data from NCCS.  
Institutional environment controls. Activists’ use of contentious or collaborative tactics is 
related to the openness of the state to regulate industry, as well as the degree to which a particular 
environmental issue is prominent in the public policy space. Similarly, the salience of 
environmental issues may be correlated with the tactical segmentation of movements (e.g., highly 
salient issues may attract more SMOs and collaborations). In order to minimize the effects of such 
biases, I use congressional hearings data from the Comparative Agendas Project described above, 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately, ratings commonly used as proxies for firm status, such as the Fortune America’s Most 
Admired Companies list, are unavailable for SMOs.  
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to control for the prominence of the environmental issue in the policy space. Public policy openness 
is the count of congressional hearings held on a given environmental issue (e.g., climate change, 
GMOs etc.) that is also the subject of the SMO-firm collaboration. To account for the possibility 
that resource partitioning within the movement (Soule and King, 2008) drives tactical 
segmentation, I control for the number of SMOs operating in a given movement. I also control for 
the party of the state governor in the headquarters state of the firm – headquarter state party – 
coded 0 if the governor is Republican, 1 for Democrat, and 0.5 for other.  
Table 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics, and correlations, respectively, for the variables 
in the sample. While contentious challenges of firms greatly outnumber collaborations, as would 
be expected, both events are rare overall. In total 1,316 contentious challenges took place and 272 
collaborations were formed over the 25-year period between 118 environmental SMOs and the 
random sample of 300 Fortune 500 companies. However, these interactions are far from distributed 
equally amongst either the SMOs or firms. Of the 118 SMOs, only 28 (23.7%) have collaborated 
with a firm, and while 118 firms have been contentiously targeted at least once, less than half (54) 
of those previously contentiously targeted had SMO collaborations. In total, 63 firms in the sample 
had collaborations with SMOs, and more than 85 percent of those firms had been contentiously 
targeted by activists in years preceding the collaboration. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Note. Number of SMO-firm-year observations is 148,605 corresponding to the instrumental 
variables probit model (i.e., non-collaborating SMOs dropped).  
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 SMO-Firm Collaboration (DV) 0.006 0.078 0 1
2 Contentious challenges 0.519 1.495 0 17
3 Movement segmentation 0.820 0.095 0.5 1
4 Firm receptivity to activism 0.254 0.611 -1 1
5 Dyad cooperative interactions 0.078 0.290 0 3
6 Contentious challenges by SMO 0.021 0.204 0 7
7 Firm media attention 2.007 3.655 0 33.002
8 Firm assets logged 10.038 1.405 6.327 13.929
9 Firm employees logged 3.780 1.175 0.642 7.696
10 Firm public approval 0.375 0.505 -1 1
11 CEO contributions to Rep. candidates 0.635 0.480 -3.067 1.235
12 Firm environmental performance 1.020 1.336 0 5
13 Firm centrality 26.491 13.203 0 75
14 Industry contentious challenges 2.278 4.409 0 27
15 SMO congressional appearances 4.576 6.213 0 40
16 SMO collaboration experience 3.728 5.911 0 23
17 SMO resources -3.206 2.195 -14.276 1.794
18 Public policy openness 8.251 11.195 0 61
19 Number of SMOs 28.926 13.311 2 64
20 Headquarter state party (Dem=1) 0.457 0.495 0 1
Instruments: 
21 EPA cases 1.079 2.790 0 60
22 Extreme weather events 3.234 4.091 0 22
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Methodology 
The key challenge in establishing causality between past contention against a firm, its receptivity 
to activism, and the probability it establishes a collaboration with an SMO is that neither 
contentious challenges against firms, nor their receptivity, are randomly assigned. As such, firm-
level unobservables that may correlate with either contentious challenges or firm receptivity, and 
collaborations with SMOs, may bias results. To deal with this concern, I use an instrumental-
variables (IV) analysis that exploits variation in the distribution of extreme weather events and 
legal cases brought by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against firms in the 
sample. In the absence of a plausible instrument for movement segmentation, I conduct 
supplementary analyses to explore possible mechanisms behind the results and to rule out alternate 
explanations. 
I use extreme weather events in the firm’s headquarters city to instrument for firm 
receptivity because when individuals experience extreme weather events they increase their 
behavioral intentions for sustainability related actions (Demski et al., 2017). The idea underlying 
this identification strategy is that the occurrence of extreme weather events provides an exogenous 
shock to firms’ key decision-makers’ sustainability intentions and, therefore, their receptivity to 
making changes to their environmental practices. Brandon and Krueger (2018), for instance, found 
that institutional investors headquartered in areas hit by extreme weather events held more 
sustainability-related investments in periods following the event. To construct the instrument, I 
match each firm’s headquarters county with data from SHELDUS (Spatial Hazard and Loss 
Database for the United States) on which counties in the United States were affected by 38 extreme 
weather disasters, defined as disasters lasting less than 30 days with total estimated damages above 
$1 billion (Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016).  
I instrument for contentious challenges against the firm using the number of cases brought 
by the EPA against a focal firm (EPA cases). Legal cases and proceedings against a firm on 
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environmental issues are likely to increase contentious targeting by environmental SMOs by 
making the firm a more salient target for activists. Although EPA legal cases are not randomly 
assigned to firms (as in the case of weather), they are unlikely to drive a firm’s propensity to 
collaborate with an SMO except through their effect on contentious challenges against the firm. 
The rationale lies in the costs, articulated above, that firms face in formal collaborations with 
SMOs. Those costs are unlikely to be offset by the legitimacy benefits of collaboration if EPA cases 
are not associated with increased contentious targeting. Because environmental SMOs frequently 
contentiously target the EPA itself, it is not clear a collaboration with an SMO will provide the firm 
significant sway with the EPA, given its generally acrimonious relationship with many 
environmental SMOs. A t-test of differences in EPA case outcomes valuable to the firm (e.g. dollar 
amount of penalties, duration of cases) suggests there is no difference in outcomes between those 
firms with and without an SMO collaboration (Table 4). In the absence of contentious targeting 
brought on by EPA legal cases then, the costs of collaborations are likely to outweigh non-existent 
or minimal benefits. As such, I argue that EPA legal cases are unlikely to drive a firm to collaborate 
with an SMO except through their effect on contentious targeting. This logic suggests that the 
exclusion condition is likely to be met.  
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Table 4: EPA Case Outcomes by Firms with and without SMO Collaborations 
Note. The table presents EPA case outcomes by firm-year for all firms that had at least one EPA case 
conclude during the sample period. Firm sample is split in columns 2 and 3 based on whether the firm had 
one or more SMO collaborations in the year preceding the EPA case concluding (column 2), and those that 
had no SMO collaborations (Column 2). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001 
of two-sided t-test of difference in means. Average case duration is the number of years between the case 
conclusion and when it was first brought by the EPA. Total cost is the sum of the dollar amounts of 
penalties assessed, cost recovery awarded, and the estimated cost of environmentally beneficial projects 
which the firm agrees to undertake as part of the settlement of a case. Total penalty assessed is the dollar 
amount of penalties assessed in the case. Cases withdrawn is the percent of all cases conclude in that year 
that were withdrawn by the EPA or otherwise dismissed. Cases completed without penalty is the percent of 
all cases concluded without a penalty, cost recovery or beneficial projects. Number of EPA cases is the 
number of all cases concluded in the firm-year.  
 
I use two specifications to test my hypotheses. First, in line with the predominant empirical 
approach in the literature on alliance formation (Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal, 2016), I use a 
discrete choice model to estimate the probability that an SMO and a firm form a collaboration, 
within the set of all firm-SMO dyads with realized and unrealized (counterfactual) collaborations. 
The dependent variable, SMO-firm collaboration, is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if 
an SMO is collaborating with a firm in a given year, and 0 otherwise. I use instrumental variable 
Variable All Firms With Without Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average case duration (years) 2.5584 2.7979 2.5251 0.2727
(0.0874) (0.2342) (0.0941) (0.2673)
Total cost ($millions) 2.3238 3.0549 2.2223 0.8325
(0.2119) (0.8694) (0.2090) (0.6476)
Total penalty assessed ($millions) 0.0798 0.0439 0.0848 -0.0409
(0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0177) (0.0479)
Cases withdrawn (% of cases) 0.0139 0.0104 0.0144 -0.0040
(0.0022) (0.0054) (0.0024) (0.0068)
Cases completed without penalty (% of cases) 0.0932 0.0965 0.0927 0.0038
(0.0056) (0.0151) (0.0061) (0.0172)
Number of EPA cases 2.5239 3.7056 2.3599 1.3457***
(0.0693) (0.2446) (0.0703) (0.2094)
Number of observations 1756 214 1542
Firms with and without SMO 
collaborations
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probit (IV-probit) regression at the SMO-firm-year level with year, industry and SMO fixed effects, 
and robust standard errors. The inclusion of SMO fixed effects minimizes confounding effects of 
unobserved time-invariant SMO heterogeneity, and effectively makes the analysis a within-SMO 
estimation. The second specification uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression which has the 
distinct advantage of avoiding selection on SMOs that have had at least one collaboration. Probit 
models with SMO fixed effects drop SMOs that lack variation in the dependent variable (i.e., have 
never collaborated with a firm). A linear probability model (LPM) retains all perfectly predicted 
groups (i.e., SMOs with no firm collaboration), thereby more accurately estimating the effect of 
covariates for the entire population of SMOs. This is critical in my setting given that 90 of 118 
SMOs never form a collaboration over the 25-year panel; therefore, the LPM captures meaningful 
variation in the propensity of SMOs to partner with firms, including potentially the level of 
segmentation of the movement they are a member of. The LPM also offers the ability to test for 
weak identification, and eases interpretation of interaction terms. I deal with the inherent 
heteroskedasticity in the LPM model by specifying robust standard errors. 12 
RESULTS 
Results using IV-probit and 2SLS regression with year, industry and SMO fixed effects are reported 
in Table 5. I begin by discussing the first stage results and relevant test statistics for IV regression, 
before moving to the models testing the hypotheses. Models 1 and 2 report the first stage of the IV-
probit regression for the two endogenous regressors, and Models 5 and 6 report the first stage of 
the 2SLS regression. Beginning with contentious challenges, a strong and significant relationship 
between EPA legal cases and the number of contentious challenges exists in both the IV-probit 
regression (Model 1: beta=0.0323, p=0.000), as well as the 2SLS regression (Model 5: 
                                                          
12 Results are also robust to a rare events logit model (King and Zeng, 2001) which adjusts explicitly for rare 
events bias, as well as simultaneous clustering of standard errors on both members of the dyad (Kleinbaum, 
Stuart, and Tushman, 2013), to account for correlation resulting from each firm and SMO appearing in 
numerous dyads.  
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beta=0.0264, p=0.000), suggesting the relevance of EPA cases as an instrument for contention. I 
also find a strong and significant relationship between extreme weather events in a firm’s 
headquarter city and the firm’s receptivity to activism in both the IV-probit regression (M2: 
beta=0.0133, p=0.000), as well as the 2SLS regression (M6: beta=0.0109, p=0.000). The Wald test 
for exogeneity in the IV-probit model was significant (chi2=39.21, p=0.000), suggesting that an IV 
regression is appropriate in this sample. From the 2SLS regression, the heteroskedasticity robust 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic equals 180.2, allowing rejection of the null that the equation is 
weakly identified (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006; Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
Models 3 and 7 report the second-stage with only the main effects of the endogenous 
regressors estimated (i.e., no interaction terms). Contrary to hypothesis 1, the results suggest that 
contentious challenges against the firm decrease the probability of a firm-activist collaboration 
forming (M3: beta=-0.591; p=0.000; M7: beta=-.00597, p=0.000). Interestingly, the main effect of 
movement segmentation (not hypothesized) is highly significant and negative (M3: beta=-1.442; 
p=0.000; M7: beta=-.00452, p=0.000), suggesting that in movements with fewer ties between 
contentious and cooperative activists, it is less likely a firm-SMO collaboration forms. At the same 
time, several other covariates are consistent with past research on cooperation between firms and 
activists. Consistent with den Hond et al. (2015), for example, the greater the number of times the 
firm and SMO cooperated in the previous year (e.g., donations), the greater the probability of a 
collaboration (M3: beta=0.106; p=0.000; M7: beta=.00701, p=0.000). Consistent with 
McDonnell’s (2015) findings on corporate-sponsored boycotts, the probability of a firm-SMO 
collaboration is positively and significantly associated with the firm’s media attention (M3: 
beta=0.0147; p=0.007), size (M3: beta=0.229; p=0.000; M7: beta=0.00212, p=0.000), and public 
approval (M7: beta=0.00062; p=0.002). 
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Models 4 and 8 report the second-stage of the full model with all hypothesized interaction 
effects, where endogenous regressors are instrumented using EPA legal cases and extreme weather 
events and their interactions instrument for the endogenous interacted regressors. In the full models, 
the coefficient for contentious challenges shifts to being positive and significant (M4: beta=0.234; 
p=0.042; M8: beta=0.00831, p=0.001), while movement segmentation is no longer significant, and 
the interaction of movement segmentation with contentious challenges has a large negative and 
significant effect (M4: beta=-0.429; p=0.009; M8: beta=-0.0148, p=0.000). The shifts in the sign 
of coefficients from the non-interacted models suggests that the effects of contentious challenges 
are contingent on the level of segmentation in the movement. Combined, the three coefficients 
suggest that at low levels of movement segmentation, contentious challenges at the firm level 
increase the probability that a firm-SMO collaboration forms, as would be predicted by the positive 
radical flank effect and hypothesis 1. As movement segmentation increases, however, the effect of 
contentious challenges on firm-SMO collaborations is attenuated, and in highly segmented 
movements contention has no significant impact on collaborations.  
To ease interpretation of the results, Figures 1 and 2 plot the predicted probability of a firm-
SMO collaboration at different levels of contentious challenges, and at three different levels of 
movement segmentation (Figure 1 corresponds to M4; Figure 2 corresponds to M8). A margins 
analysis of the IV-probit regressions, with all other variables held at their mean, suggests that for 
firms with no contention, a one standard deviation increase in contentious challenges corresponds 
to a 23% increase in the probability of a collaboration if the SMO operates in a movement in the 
10th percentile of movement segmentation observations, in comparison to 2% for SMOs that 
operate in movements in the 90th percentile of segmentation. These differences in probabilities 
across movement segmentation increase exponentially with the number of contentious challenges 
the firm faces. Comparing within the same level of contention, firms that experienced twelve 
contentious challenges in the previous year have 2.0 times greater probability of having a 
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collaboration with an SMO, if the SMO operates in a movement in the bottom decile of movement 
segmentation observations in comparison to SMOs that operate in the top decile. The preceding 
suggests contentious challenges against firms are more likely to drive collaborations with SMOs 
where those SMOs are members of movements with greater cooperative ties between radical and 
moderate activists. Conversely, in highly segmented movements, contention is not predictive of 
collaboration, in line with arguments advanced in hypothesis 2.  
Turning to hypothesis 3, I find support for a positive moderating effect of firm receptivity 
on the probability that a previously contentiously targeted firm collaborates with an SMO. In 
Models 3 and 7 with only the main effects of the endogenous regressors estimated (i.e., no 
interaction terms), firm receptivity does not have a significant effect on collaboration, suggesting 
more activism-receptive firms are not more likely to have collaborations. Conversely, when 
interacted with contentious challenges, firm receptivity has a positive and significant effect (M4: 
beta=1.044; p=0.000; M8: beta=0.0155, p=0.036), while its main effect is negative and significant. 
The shifts in the sign of coefficients from the non-interacted models suggests that firm receptivity 
to activism increases the probability of collaborations when firms face greater contentious 
challenges from the movement. Conversely, in the absence of contention, activism receptive firms 
are less likely to form collaborations with activists. This may be driven by the fact that such firms 
have reformed their practices in response to activism in the past and in the absence of a motivation 
to do so again (i.e., continuing contention) are less likely to seek out collaborations. Figures 3 and 
4 plot the predicted probability of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels of contentious 
challenges, and at three different levels of firm receptivity (Figure 3 corresponds to M4; Figure 4 
corresponds to M8). A margins analysis of the IV-probit regressions, with all other variables held 
at their mean, suggests for firms that experienced six contentious challenges in the previous year, 
the probability of a collaboration with an SMO is 1.7 times higher if that firm is in the 90th percentile 
of observations on receptivity, in comparison to a firm in the bottom 10th percentile of receptivity.  
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Figure 1: IV-Probit Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H2) 
 
Note. IV-probit regression (M4) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for 
movement segmentation and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at 
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic 
scale. When the SMO is part of a movement in the 10th percentile of movement segmentation or at the median 
value of segmentation, the probability of a firm-SMO collaboration increases with contentious challenges 
against them in the previous year. However, in highly segmented movements, contentious challenges do not 
drive firm-SMO collaborations. 
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Figure 2: 2SLS Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H2) 
 
Note. 2SLS regression (M8) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for 
movement segmentation and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at 
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic 
scale. When the SMO is part of a movement in the 10th percentile of movement segmentation, the probability 
of a firm-SMO collaboration increases with contentious challenges against them in the previous year. 
Conversely, in movements at median levels of segmentation and above, contentious challenges do not 
increase the probability of collaboration significantly. 
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Figure 3: IV-Probit Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H3) 
 
Note. IV-probit regression (M4) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for 
firm receptivity to activism and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at 
means). Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic 
scale. Firms in the 90th percentile of receptivity to activism have a higher probability of an SMO 
collaboration, the greater the contentious challenges against them in the previous year, while the probability 
falls for those firms resistant to activism (bottom decile). 
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Figure 4: 2SLS Predicted Probability of Firm-SMO Collaboration and Observations (H3) 
 
Note. 2SLS regression (M8) predicted probabilities of a firm-SMO collaboration at different levels for firm 
receptivity to activism and contentious challenges (95% confidence intervals; other variables held at means). 
Bottom graph presents the number of sample observations by contentious challenges on logarithmic scale. 
Firms in the 90th percentile of receptivity to activism have a higher probability of an SMO collaboration, the 
greater the contentious challenges against them in the previous year, while the probability falls for those firms 
resistant to activism (bottom decile) or at median levels of receptivity to activism. 
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The positive effect of firm receptivity increases with greater contention, as predicted in hypothesis 
3, so that firms in the top decile of receptivity that experienced twelve contentious challenges in 
the previous year have a probability 3.5 that of firms with the same level of contention but in the 
bottom decile of receptivity.  
Movement segmentation supplementary analysis 
I conduct supplementary analyses to further investigate the mechanism underlying the findings on 
movement segmentation, as well as investigating other possible explanations for the results. I begin 
by looking for evidence that the mechanism underlying my segmentation hypothesis – peer 
sanctioning risk – is plausible. First, I look for evidence of greater peer sanctioning in more 
segmented movements. While not common, I observe 72 instances where one SMO criticized 
another (i.e., peer sanctioning), collected using the method employed for cooperative ties between 
SMOs (i.e., coding of archival documents). Using SMO-movement panel count models of peer 
sanctioning, and panel logistic regression (where peer sanctioning is a dummy of 0 or 1), I find that 
the intensity (count model; p=0.002) and probability (logistic; p=0.005) of peer sanctioning is 
higher if the SMO is part of more segmented movements. Moreover, the probability of peer 
sanctioning is positively associated with the number cooperative interactions (e.g., collaborations, 
donations) the SMO has had with firms (p=0.005) on the issue in the previous year. 
Second, I investigate whether movement segmentation has a more pronounced effect on 
those SMOs for whom peer sanctioning risks are more salient. Peer sanctioning risks are most 
salient for SMOs that are in more precarious financial positions, because public peer criticisms 
could endanger their survival, as in the case of Pollution Probe and Greenpeace. Conversely, 
financially stable SMOs may be able to absorb peer criticism with less fear of dissolution. I 
calculate annual z-scores for each SMO, relying on (Keating et al., 2005) adaptation of Altman’s 
z-score to nonprofits, which they found to be a good predictor of insolvency risk. A split sample 
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analysis indicates that for SMOs in poorer financial health, the attenuating effect of movement 
segmentation is significantly higher than for SMOs in good financial health (p=0.0074).13  
  Third, I investigate whether firm preferences for less segmented movements may be 
driving the results. For example, firms may be motivated to form collaborations with moderate 
activists with more ties to radicals (i.e., those in less segmented movements) which they could 
indirectly exploit to quell conflict. I investigate this by including in my models the number of 
cooperative ties the focal activist has to radicals in the movement, as well as ties to radicals in any 
movement, and my results remain unchanged. Another possibility is that firms avoid collaborations 
on issues where there is more polarization amongst consumers (e.g., the public). To the degree that 
movement segmentation represents broader public polarization on an issue, this could bias my 
results. As such, I look for evidence that movement segmentation has a more pronounced 
attenuating effect on collaborations in the face of contention from radicals rather than moderates, 
which is consistent with activists’ fearing retribution from radicals, but shouldn’t affect a firm’s 
proclivity for more or less polarized issue areas. I compare results from two models, one with 
contentious challenges from radicals against the firm interacted with movement segmentation, and 
the other with contentious challenges from moderates similarly interacted. The attenuating effect 
of movement segmentation on contention is more significant and larger if the contention is from 
radical activists (LPM: beta=-0.258; p=0.000) than if moderate activists are the source of the 
contentious challenges against the firm (LPM: beta=-0.016; p=0.048).  
In the absence of an exogenous shock to movement social structures, my results may be 
biased due to the non-random assignment of SMOs into environmental issues and their choices in 
respect of which other SMOs to cooperate with on that issue (i.e., movement segmentation). One 
                                                          
13 I employ the suest command in STATA that allows for correlated errors across models allowing for cross-
model hypothesis testing, followed by test to test the null that the coefficient for the interaction term of 
contentious challenges and movement segmentation is higher for SMOs with greater insolvency risk (i.e., 
lower z-scores). 
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unobservable that may be biasing my results, is the possibility that in more socially cohesive 
movements, radicals and moderates may be cooperating to bring about positive radical flank 
effects. Baron et al. (2016) propose that given that moderates have greater bargaining power when 
firms experience contentious targeting, moderate activists have an incentive to fund their radical 
peers’ campaigns. It is plausible that in less segmented movements, moderates and radicals are 
more likely to exploit this positive externality either because of their pre-existing ties or because 
radicals are not opposed to their peers’ collaborations with firms. If such coordination exists, this 
would undermine the theoretical mechanism I advance. I look for evidence that moderate activists 
provide support to radical activists by reading their annual IRS tax filings,14 which I obtain from 
NCCS and other sources, available from 2001 onwards. In the subsample of SMOs that ever had a 
collaboration with a firm, I find no evidence that they provided cash or in-kind support to more 
contentious SMOs for contentious targeting campaigns. In the rare instances such grants do occur, 
they are described as research activities, federal award (i.e., grant disbursed as part of a broader 
program), or conservation activities. The absence of moderates funding radicals’ campaigns is 
consistent with Haines’ (2013) argument that purposeful cooperation between SMOs to bring about 
the radical flank effect is a risky strategy if exposed. Given the reliance of SMOs on donations, if 
such cooperation were exposed, donors may pull their support. As such, it is much more likely that 
“positive radical flank effects are almost always unintended.” (ibid., :1049)  
Another potential concern is that movements segment for reasons other than ideology that 
could also correlate with the propensity of activists or firms to collaborate. As such, I explore 
robustness of my results during a time when researchers have documented that is was ideological 
differences between moderates and radicals that created a split in the environmental movement. I 
do so by comparing SMO-firm collaborations formed during the negotiation of the North American 
                                                          
14 In Part IV of their 990 forms to the IRS, non-profits are required to disclose the name and amount of cash 
and non-cash assistance and its purpose to other organizations if the amount exceeds $5,000. 
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which produced a split between more ideologically radical and 
moderate SMOs (Dreiling and Wolf, 2001), in comparison to other periods in the panel. The 
ideological split began in 1993 when leaders of six moderate environmental organizations15 
publicly announced their support for NAFTA, and ended in 1999 with the Seattle protests against 
the World Trade Organization. Organizations opposing NAFTA were described as “activists who 
bear a deep distrust of corporations and regulators,” and included Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, 
and the Sierra Club (Behr, 1993). The NAFTA split in the environmental movement spilled over 
into multiple environmental issues (Dreiling and Wolf, 2001), and represents a quasi-exogenous 
shock to social movement relational structures that fractured on ideological lines. A t-test of means 
in movement segmentation confirms that between 1993 and 1998, movement segmentation was 
significantly higher than the preceding and following periods (p=0.000). Splitting the sample into 
the period representing the NAFTA split, and other periods, I rerun the baseline model and find 
that the number of contentious challenges and firm receptivity are insignificantly associated with 
collaborations during the NAFTA split. The null result, however, cannot be interpreted as evidence 
that ideological segmentation in the movement reduced the positive radical flank effect, because 
very few SMO-firm collaborations were formed during the NAFTA split. However, of those that 
were formed, none involved a firm that was contentiously targeted in the previous year. In 
comparison, in the post-NAFTA split period nearly 40% of firms that formed SMO collaboration 
had experienced contentious targeting. These results by no means establish causality in the effect 
of movement segmentation, but provide anecdotal evidence that during a period where movement 
segmentation was high due to ideological differences with few ties between radical and moderates, 
SMOs never partnered with previously contentiously targeted firms.  
                                                          
15 The Audubon Society, World Wildlife Fund, National Wildlife Federation, National Resources Defense 
Council, Environmental Defense Fund and Conservation International. 
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DISCUSSION 
Prior work in movements and markets focuses on features of a targeted firm that are exogenous to 
a social movement driving selection of firms for contentious targeting. While this argument is 
straightforward as applied to contentious tactics, its import into selection for collaboration is limited 
by the fact that firm-activist collaborations require a willing firm partner, and can result in 
allegations of activist co-optation and greenwashing. On the other hand, the analytical focus of 
emergent research examining firm-activist collaborations are the implementation activities 
underlying collaborations (Selsky and Parker, 2005), and the motivation of firms and activists to 
enter collaborations (den Hond et al., 2015). Importantly, both research streams tend to set to the 
background “the structural embeddedness of interactions in fields and networks” (de Bakker et al., 
2013: 580). In this paper, I argue and find that the embeddedness of firm-activist collaborations in 
different movement structures is an important determinant of the degree to which collaborations 
can form against a backdrop of contention (Haines, 1984, 2013). 
This paper speaks to several streams of research. First, it complements existing research at 
the intersection of social movements and markets by exploring the selection of partners for cross-
sector collaborations, a heretofore understudied phenomenon. In my theoretical development, I 
incorporate the objectives of both the firm and activist, with a particular focus on how contention 
between firms and social movements drive the respective costs and benefits they face in engaging 
in collaborations. In doing so, this paper answers a call made by Rucht (2004: 197) that activists’ 
cooperative alliances “and their interplay with conflict-ridden relationships, should become part 
and parcel of social movement studies.” I propose that while firms may be motivated to seek 
collaborations with activists to quell conflict, the disparate risks their potential partners’ face in 
collaborating with ‘enemies’ of the broader movement, can dampen the formation of such 
collaborations. In a 25-year panel of movement networks, and contentious and collaborative 
interactions between 118 social movement organizations and 300 of the largest firms in the U.S., I 
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find the formation of firm-activist collaborations is driven by both the pattern of contentious 
challenges by the movement more broadly and firms’ receptivity to activism, but is diminished in 
movements with few cooperative ties between radical and moderate factions of a movement. As 
such, contrary to existing research on target selection for contention, which focuses on firm 
characteristics exogenous to the movement, I find that partner selection for collaboration is driven 
by the dynamics and structure of the social movement itself. 
In accounting for both contention and collaboration, this paper is one of the first empirical 
tests of the positive radical flank effect in the context of movements and firms (see Hiatt et al., 
2015 for an exception). By problematizing firm-activist collaborations as potentially contested 
practices, this research uncovers an important boundary condition on a concept regaining popularity 
in both movements research (Hiatt et al., 2015; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2018) and organizational 
theory more broadly (Truelove and Kellogg, 2016). Building on the idea that the legitimacy of 
practices is context bound (Ingram and Yue, 2008) and fields have a shared understanding of what 
practices are legitimate (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012), I highlight that the relational configurations 
of movement fields can constrain activists from collaborating with contentiously targeted firms. 
Specifically, in the absence of social bonds between radical and moderate activists, where open 
conflict is more likely and inter-activist negotiation is hampered by few prior ties, the positive 
radical flank does not materialize and social movements and firms fail to “transform contestation 
into collaboration” (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008: 422). This does not challenge past findings on 
the positive radical flank where firms’ responses to contention are unilateral (McDonnell 2016), 
but instead suggests that complications arise where firms respond with bilateral efforts that require 
the voluntary cooperation of activists. 
In focusing on partner selection, a central question in cooperative strategy, this paper also 
complements an emerging stream of research on firms’ cooperative strategies with nonmarket 
stakeholders (Bhanji and Oxley, 2013; Dorobantu, Kaul, and Zelner, 2017; Dorobantu and 
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Odziemkowska, 2017; King, 2007). While a considerable body of evidence points to firms actively 
managing threats from nonmarket stakeholders through unilateral actions, such as concessions to 
boycotts (King 2008) or prosocial claims (McDonnell and King, 2013), one strategic response that 
has garnered considerably less scholarly attention is the use of bilateral formal cooperative 
relationships. This is surprising given one of the best ways for firms to actively manage threats in 
their external environments is by establishing a formal relationship with sources of that threat 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This paper highlights that firms’ use of formal relationships to manage 
stakeholder threats is complicated by conflict crowding out subsequent collaboration (Sytch and 
Tatarynowicz, 2014), not only within a dyad, but also the broader field of stakeholders that the 
counterparty is a member of. While building cooperative relationships with well-connected 
stakeholders is valuable (Dorobantu et al., 2017a), those same networks can constrain the 
stakeholder in engaging in cooperation.  
To cooperative strategy research, the findings draw attention to a unique risk that 
counterparties can face – peer sanctioning – when counterparties are embedded in broader 
organizational fields with their own understandings of what is appropriate or common enemies. 
This has implications for interorganizational relationships in market settings where members of an 
organizational field define their identity in opposition to another field, or where there is a history 
of acrimonious relations between two organizational fields. The ability of a microbrewer to contract 
with Budweiser, for example, may be constrained by its membership in the microbrewery 
organizational field, which not only resembles a social movement but whose members define their 
identity in opposition to macro-brewers (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). In such organizational 
fields, the logic underlying partner selection may not be focused on partner capabilities or 
bargaining power, but instead driven by the social acceptability of the partner to the organizational 
field.  
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That said, the scope of the research question and reliance on a large quantitative data set 
has also exposed the paper to certain limitations. Chief among these, firm-activist collaborations 
have been conceptualized without attention to the political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986) 
in which these interactions take place. While I empirically control for public policy openness to 
environmental issues, the significant positive association between policy openness and 
collaborations suggests opportunities for future research to shed light on how political opportunity 
structures and regulatory threats (Hiatt et al., 2015; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000) influence 
collaboration between firms and activists. Additionally, in focusing on partner selection, this paper 
does not consider the outcomes of collaborations that do materialize. It is unclear, therefore, if firms 
succeed in quelling contention from the broader movement, or if activists achieve their goal of 
changing the firms’ practices and broader institutional change. This offers opportunities for future 
research to explore the performance outcomes of cross-sector collaborations, for the firm, activist, 
and more broadly, society. As the advancement of firms’ social and environmental performance is 
a product of both contention and collaboration, this paper is a first step in eliminating blind spots 
in our understanding of institutional change.  
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CHAPTER 2: Co-opting Contention: Field-level Effects of Firm-Activist Collaborations 
(This chapter is co-authored with Mary-Hunter McDonnell) 
 
Market contention, or private politics, refers to the efforts of social activists to promote corporate 
reform by targeting firms directly with tactics like protests, boycotts, and negative media campaigns 
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King and Pearce, 2010; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Soule, 2009). Prior work 
has demonstrated that contentious campaigns can reduce a targeted firm’s profits (Luders, 2006), 
damage its reputation (King, 2008; McDonnell and King, 2013), provoke shareholder divestment 
(King and Soule, 2007), and degrade its relationship with core nonmarket constituencies (Hiatt and 
Park, 2012; McDonnell and Werner, 2016). Recognizing the considerable damage that contention 
can do, a growing body of research explores how firms defend themselves from the threats of 
contentious challenges. Targeted firms might attempt to allay contention by taking curative steps 
through concession and reform (Bartley, 2003; King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015) or employ 
more aggressively defensive tactics like attempting to co-opt threatening activists through cross-
sector collaborations or alliances (McDonnell, 2016). Co-optation refers to a firm’s attempt to 
“manage an external threat by establishing a formal relationship… that to some extent internalizes 
the threat…” (McDonnell, 2016; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Selznick, 1949). Providing activists a 
voice in the firm’s decision-making process or activities may reduce contentious threats by 
demobilizing social movements (Piven and Cloward, 1979; Utting, 2005). As direct empirical 
evidence of this, McDonnell (2016) found that firms that allied with activists by co-sponsoring a 
social campaign experienced an average 56% reduction in the number of times they were targeted 
by contentious activists in the following year. 
While collaborations with social activists appear to reduce the threat of contentious 
challenges, the precise pathways by which this occurs remain unclear. To date, co-optation in this 
context has typically been conceptualized as a direct, or dyadic phenomenon: firms ally with 
potentially hostile activists in order to avoid being targeted by those same activists. In response to 
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Greenpeace’s hydrofluorocarbon campaign waged against it in the late 1990s for example, Coca-
Cola began working collaboratively with Greenpeace on refrigeration technology. Coca-Cola’s 
collaboration resulted in an end to Greenpeace’s mobilization against it on issues of air emissions 
and climate change. Coca-Cola’s experience is echoed in scholarly research on elite-sponsorship 
of movements (Coy and Heeden, 2005; Jenkins, 1998; Mohavi, 1996) and cross-sector 
collaborations (Baur and Schmitz, 2012; Burchell and Cook, 2013b; Trumpy, 2008), which points 
to the demobilizing effects of such ties on the focal activist through the moderation of its goals, 
tactics, and independence.  
However, in its dyadic focus, existing literature has largely ignored the potential indirect 
effects of firms’ co-optive tactics on the broader activist field. For instance, one untold story about 
Coca-Cola’s collaboration with Greenpeace, is that following its announcement, Coca-Cola saw a 
dramatic decrease in contention from other activist organizations including the Earth Island 
Institute, Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club, all of 
whom had mobilized against it in preceding years. Given growing evidence of the indirect effects 
of mobilization on untargeted organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016), in this paper, we seek to 
uncover the pathways by which firm-activist collaborations indirectly co-opt or demobilize 
activists outside the collaboration. Does a firm’s collaboration with one social activist ameliorate 
contentious threats from other activists in the field? And if so, how? This research question is 
particularly important to explore given that direct co-optation may not always be an option, such 
as when a firm’s strained relationship with a particular activist raises the cost of, or prevents, a 
collaboration (Gargiulo, 1993).  
Further, given social activists’ sensitivity to the risks of co-optation, it is not clear that the 
broader activist field should always evaluate firm-activist collaborations as positive. In fact, the use 
of such tactics by firms has from time to time resulted in criticisms of cross-sector collaboration 
(Lucea, 2010), and increased mobilization. So while in Coca-Cola’s case its collaboration with 
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Greenpeace reduced the contentious challenges it faced from other environmental activists from an 
annual average of four to one-half, in the four years preceding and following its collaboration, not 
all firms have been so lucky. Weyerhaeuser’s collaboration with the Nature Conservancy and 
Conservation International to conserve forests produced no drop in contention (see Figure 5). In 
fact, while on average firms with collaborations experience a drop from an average of 0.96 
contentious challenges in the four years preceding a collaboration to 0.81 in those after 
collaboration, considerable variation exists. Even in the presence of a firm-activist collaboration, 
therefore, other activists’ propensity to be indirectly co-opted is likely to vary, but the factors that 
determine this variation are not well understood.  
Figure 5: Contentious challenges against firms with activist collaborations 
 
Note. Number of contentious challenges faced by firms with collaborations (y-axis) in the four years 
preceding the collaboration, and the four years after a collaboration is formed (i.e. 1 on x-axis denotes the 
first year of the collaboration). Extreme values above 10 excluded to ease readability. Firms with activist 
collaborations experience an average of 0.96 contentious challenges in the four years preceding a 
collaboration, in comparison to 0.81 contentious challenges on average after the collaboration is formed. 
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We seek to address this gap in the literature by drawing from research on 
interorganizational networks to theorize two mechanisms by which firm-activist collaborations lead 
to indirect co-optation, or demobilization, of the broader activist field. Given our focus on the 
effects of interorganizational collaborations on actors outside the collaborating dyad, this 
perspective is particularly useful because of its emphasis on the embeddedness of actors and ties 
within broader structures of social relations (i.e., fields). From this perspective, the outcomes of 
interorganizational collaborations are a function of the fields in which they are embedded (Gulati, 
1998). Interorganizational collaborations wield influence on the broader field through their role as 
pipes (conduits of information and resources) or prisms (signals that influence the perceptions of 
field participants) (Podolny, 2001). We adapt and extend these mechanisms to build theory about 
the indirect effects of firm-activist collaborations on the broader activist field.  
We conceive of inter-activist networks as pipes of information that can reduce contentious 
threats from individual members of the movement field that are indirectly tied to the firm via a 
collaborating activist. As information flows are dependent on the sender of information being 
motivated and perceived as reliable (Ghosh and Rosenkopf, 2014), we propose that bilateral 
collaborations, where activists have more information about the firm and are more motivated to use 
it, to have the greatest impact. Further, we propose that contentious threats from the broader 
movement field can be reduced even in the absence of inter-activist ties. Firm-activist 
collaborations also act as public signals for belief updating by the broader field where the firm 
associates with activists with more desirable characteristics such as legitimacy or those most likely 
to prompt belief updating such as activists for whom collaboration deviates from their normal 
repertoire. We test our theorized mechanisms using a unique, large-scale and self-constructed 
quantitative panel analysis of 1,823 contentious and collaborative interactions between 110 
environmental social movement organizations (SMOs) and a sample of 179 of the largest firms in 
the United States. Using variation in the types of collaborations formed by firms and activists, we 
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also show that our results are unlikely to be driven by collaborations acting as a promise of future 
improvements in firms’ environmental performance, but instead the mechanisms we propose.  
Our paper contributes to social movement and organizational theory by crafting an account 
of how firm-activist collaborations lead to the indirect co-optation of the members of the broader 
activist field. Our findings complement a burgeoning research stream on the indirect effects of 
activism on organizational fields (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) by being the first to consider the field-
level effects of cooperative interactions between activists and firms. In the same way that social 
activists influence each other’s mobilization and tactics (Strang and Soule, 1998), our research 
highlights that they can also influence each other’s de-mobilization. We additionally contribute to 
non-market strategy research by shedding light on the mechanisms by which firms can allay market 
contention, not by force or coercion, but by exploiting the social networks and identity of a 
collaborating social activist. In so doing, our research provides insight into the mechanisms by 
which organizations exploit ties across fields as they attempt to foster more favorable 
environments.  
FROM DIRECT TO INDIRECT CO-OPTATION 
In her typology of strategic responses to institutional pressures, Oliver (1991: 157) notes that an 
“intended effect of co-optation tactics is to neutralize institutional opposition.” A long-running 
body of research in non-profit and social movement research has concerned itself with how elites 
can co-opt non-profits and social movement organizations (Coy and Hedeen, 2005; Jenkins, 1998; 
Modavi, 1996). Collaborating with elites or external sponsorship (e.g., elite grants via foundations) 
is thought to moderate social movement organization (SMO) goals and tactics, thus reducing 
disruptive forms of activism (Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1979), effectively 
demobilizing the movement.  
Accordingly, firms’ increasing collaboration with and support of activist organizations 
may be associated with “a decline in confrontational activism and advocacy for radical alternatives” 
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(Utting, 2005: 382). Researchers of firm-activist collaborations (i.e., cross-sector social 
partnerships or alliances) have suggested that collaborations can compromise an activist’s 
independence (Baur and Schmitz, 2012), distract it from its ultimate goals (Trumpy, 2008), and 
dissuade it from challenging its partnering firm (McDonnell, 2016). To date, most discussion of 
co-optation in the context of firm-activist collaborations focuses on the dyad (Baur and Schmitz, 
2012; Burchell and Cook, 2013b; Trumpy, 2008). Co-optation in the dyadic setting is direct: firms 
support or ally with potentially hostile activists in order to avoid being targeted by them. However, 
the growing attention paid by research on the indirect effects of movements onto untargeted 
organizations (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) orients our attention to the complementary question of 
whether firm-activist collaborations can have indirect co-optation effects on the broader activist 
field.  
While co-optation has clear, direct effects on the actor immediately targeted, a review of 
the literature suggests that it also has more diffuse effects insofar as the co-opted actor holds sway 
over others in the environment. For instance, Selznick (1948: 34) notes that cooptation usually 
brings in actors that possess the confidence of the relevant public to “lend respectability or 
legitimacy” to the organization. Similarly, Oliver (1991:158) suggests that relational ties 
“demonstrate the organization's worthiness and acceptability to other external constituents.” 
Scholars of interorganizational relations point out that an allies’ ties can produce diffuse 
legitimation effects (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1985) as well as indirect access to 
resources and leverage over external sources of constraint (Burt, 1983; Gargiulo, 1993; Mizruchi, 
1996). 
There are a number of reasons to believe that indirect co-optation might be a particularly 
useful strategy in the context of firms’ management of contentious social activism. First, 
relationships between firms and activists have historically been strained and some activists will 
never collaborate with firms, which limits the availability of direct co-optation (Baron et al., 2016; 
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Bertels et al., 2014). Further, a strained relationship between two actors is likely to raise the cost 
of building a direct co-optive tie (Gargiulo, 1993). Therefore, direct co-optation may be restrained 
to activists that are already positively pre-disposed to firms, limiting its additive effects. Indirect 
co-optation, on the other hand, offers the firm the possibility of exploiting the status (Oliver, 1991) 
and social networks (Mizruchi, 1996) of its activist partners to block the capacity of dissidents to 
actively oppose it (Gargiulo, 1993). The idea of indirect co-optation has not gone unnoticed by 
private sector and public sector leaders. For example, Steven W. Percy, former chairman and CEO 
of BP America Inc., notes that one of the key things companies want from their association with 
activists is “the halo effect that the NGO’s reputation brings to a partnership,” (Percy, 2010: 235). 
A representative of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) noted that Procter & Gamble “needed WWF 
to ensure that they're not attacked by NGOs,” in their pulp purchasing program (Stecklow, 2006). 
And an executive quoted in McDonnell (2016:56) suggests that firms seek out collaborations with 
activists to increase their social capital and networks within the activist arena to ensure that “when 
the rocks get hurled, they’ll be hurled at someone else and not at us.”    
While a review of extant literature suggests that interorganizational collaborations may 
have spillover effects outside the collaborating dyad, and may be a particularly effective strategy 
in the context of firm-activist relations, it is not clear that such a strategy will always effectively 
allay ongoing contention. Similar to other organizational practices, interorganizational linkages are 
subject to evaluations of their legitimacy and authenticity (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Although firm-
activist collaborations are growing in prevalence (Yaziji and Doh, 2009), for some they continue 
to be an emergent practice that has not achieved a taken for granted status. Some activists’ 
collaborations with firms are dismissed by peer activists as ‘greenwashing,’ resulting in criticism 
of the collaboration (Lucea, 2010) and ostracism of the participating activist by its peers (Baur and 
Schmitz, 2012). The Organic Consumers Association, for instance, dismisses Starbucks’ work with 
groups like Conservation International as "greenwash" (Maitland, 2002). The acceptance of a 
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donation by Sierra Club from Chesapeake Energy drew criticisms from other environmentalists 
who criticized it for “sleeping with the enemy” on Twitter (Barringer, 2012). In some instances, 
firm-activist collaborations have been met with mobilization rather than demobilization of other 
activists. A collaboration between environmental activist Pollution Probe and a Canadian grocery 
retailer to certify its products, was met with a public attack from Greenpeace shortly after its 
announcement. Rather than demobilizing Greenpeace, the announcement galvanized Greenpeace 
to hold demonstrations and distribute satirical leaflets at the retailer’s outlets (Stafford and 
Hartman, 1996). Thus, despite both theoretical and empirical support for indirect co-optation in 
this context, the relationship between firm-activist collaborations and co-optation of the broader 
movement remains unclear.  
To understand that relationship better, we draw from the broader literature on 
interorganizational networks, which suggests that ties have dispersed effects across organizational 
fields through two mechanisms that are summarized in two metaphors: pipes and prisms (Podolny, 
2001). The former emphasizes the role of interorganizational relations as pipes for information and 
resource flows, while the latter highlights their role as prisms through which the qualities of actors 
are inferred by others (ibid.). We use these two pathways of influence to conceptualize firm-activist 
collaborations as providing private information (pipes) and public signals (prisms) for belief 
updating by SMOs within the activist field. In evaluating which firms to target contentiously, SMOs 
have prior beliefs about the degree to which a firm presents a good opportunity for targeting (e.g., 
the firm’s social and environmental performance, the probability that the firm will concede, or the 
probability other SMOs will support the action). We propose that SMOs’ prior beliefs about a firm 
may be updated through private information gleaned from activists that collaborate with the firm 
(pipes) or through inferences made about the firm from its public association with other activists 
(prisms). Viewed from this perspective, firm-activist collaborations have more dispersed effects on 
activists outside of the collaboration by providing information that activists use when making their 
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assessment of the firm and deciding whether to contentiously target it. We elaborate on each of 
these mechanisms below.   
INDIRECT CO-OPTATION THROUGH RELATIONAL PIPES 
In his critique of the dyadic focus of early alliances research, Gulati (1998) asserts that the 
performance effects on organizations of an alliance are a function of the network in which the 
alliance is embedded. As such, the departure point for our inquiry into indirect co-optation is the 
role played by the inter-activist network in which a firm-activist collaboration is embedded.  
Research that characterizes networks as pipes focuses on social networks as “influential 
information conduits because they provide salient and trusted information” (Brass et al., 2004: 
805), particularly where the sender of information is both motivated and reliable (Ghosh and 
Rosenkopf, 2014). While most ‘networks as pipes’ research has explored information sharing about 
organizational practices (e.g., poison pills), interorganizational ties can also be conduits of 
information about other organizations. Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989: 454) first brought 
attention to the fact that managers use information gleaned from interorganizational ties “to make 
decisions on how to relate to other organizations in their task environment.” They found that 
interlocked directors at non-profit organizations were conduits of information about prospective 
private-sector funders (ibid.). Despite there not being a direct relationship between the private-
sector funder and the focal non-profit, the focal non-profit was able to learn about the firm due to 
its directors sitting on the board of another non-profit that did have a relationship with the firm. 
Indirect ties (two parties connected via a third) enable information gleaned from one 
interorganizational relationship to transfer to a third party outside the relationship. 
 Similarly, inter-activist networks can act as pipes of information that demobilize indirectly 
linked activists in one of two ways. First, in the same way that narratives of mobilization can 
energize other activists (Polletta, 1998), we expect that narratives of collaborations with a firm may 
quell contention. That is, an activist with which the firm collaborates can transfer private 
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information about the firm that it gleans from its collaboration to other activists, which can 
influence their perceptions of the firm’s motives and the authenticity of its support for their cause. 
Secondly, activists that are collaborating with a firm may protect it by reaching out to their 
connections to advocate on its behalf. One executive quoted in McDonnell (2016:57) illustrates 
this mechanism, saying:  
“[T]he Greenpeace guys, they know the PETA guys… [I]f we are working with PETA on 
something that might make a big difference in the animal rights world, and then, if we get 
a call from Greenpeace threatening to put the heat on us, well, we’d expect PETA to call 
and say ‘back off, they are one of the good guys.’”   
 
Activists might attempt to advocate on the firm’s behalf in this way in order to ensure its continued 
dedication to their collaboration and to protect its reputation, given that their open association with 
the firm could expose them to adverse reputational spillovers if it is scandalized (McDonnell and 
Pontikes, 2017).  
All this suggests that firms should benefit more from collaborating with activists that are 
embedded in a highly connected network of activists, as these activists can reach a broader 
population of activists in the field to share positive information about the firm and intervene on its 
behalf when necessary. Accordingly, we expect that a firm that collaborates with an activist is likely 
to reap the benefits of fewer contentious challenges not just from its activist partner, but also from 
those to whom they are connected.  
Hypothesis 1: A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer 
contentious challenges from activists directly tied to their partner activist.  
 
Recent research on interorganizational networks also highlights that the actual transmission of 
information via networks varies and may depend on the sender of information (Ghosh and 
Rosenkopf, 2014). Because information is more likely to flow when senders are more motivated 
and perceived as reliable (ibid.), we expect bilateral collaborations between a firm and activist to 
have a greater impact on the calculus of indirectly tied activists than multilateral collaborations. 
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Bilateral collaborations refer to collaborations that include only a focal firm and focal activist, 
whereas multilateral collaborations involve consortiums of activists and firms. Ring and Van de 
Ven’s process model of cooperative interorganizational relationship formation suggests that trust 
and goodwill of other parties is a cumulative product of repeated past interaction (1994). Bilateral 
firm-activist collaborations offer greater opportunities for the repetitive sequences of negotiation, 
commitment and execution events that underlie the building of goodwill between actors (Ring and 
Van De Ven, 1994). Conversely, in a multilateral alliance, reciprocal exchange events are 
supplanted with generalized social exchange (Li et al., 2012). The removal of the reciprocity 
between the exchange partners will undermine the building of goodwill. As such, the information 
that an activist relays to its network about its corporate collaborator is likely to be more specific 
and affirming in the case of bilateral collaborations, and may be perceived as more reliable due to 
the depth of interaction in a bilateral collaboration. Secondly, bilateral collaborations involve a 
more overt and clear connection between an activist and a firm, given that both had to willingly 
enter the collaboration in order for it to exist. Accordingly, the associative reputational risks are 
likely greater for an activist engaged in a bilateral collaboration with a firm, such that their 
reputations are more tightly coupled. Thus bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, collaborations 
produce greater incentives for an activist to intervene to discourage its peers from targeting its ally.  
Hypothesis 2. The decrease in contention in H1 will be more pronounced for 
bilateral collaborations. 
INDIRECT CO-OPTATION THROUGH RELATIONAL PRISMS 
An alternative pathway by which a tie between two organizations influences other actors in the 
field is the informational cue the tie provides “on which others rely to make inferences about the 
underlying quality of one or both of the [tied] actors.” (Podolny 2001:34). This notion of 
interorganizational relations as ‘prisms’ has received support in numerous contexts ranging from 
investment banking syndicates (Podolny, 1994), to entrepreneurial ventures (Stuart, Hoang & 
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Hybels 1999), to day care centers (Baum and Oliver, 1991). The perspective holds that actors in an 
organizational field can be influenced by relationships between two organizations even when they 
are not directly tied to either actor in the relationship. This is because salient signals like the 
category (Zuckerman, 1999) or status (Podolny 1994; Stuart et al. 1999) of one party to the 
relationship heuristically inform the inferences that field participants make about the characteristics 
and quality of the other party to the relationship. We propose that the perceptual consequences of 
firm-activist collaborations operate through the activist partner’s differentiation on vertical 
orderings (e.g., legitimacy, status) and along horizontal categories. Differentiation of activists in 
the field influence the degree to which other field member’s update their beliefs about the firm as 
a result of its tie to an activist. We begin by discussing how the categorization of activists based on 
their tactical repertoire influences indirect co-optation, and conclude with the influence of vertical 
orderings of activists in the field.  
Perhaps one of the most salient and observable dimensions on which social activists are 
typically categorized is their tactical repertoire (Clemens, 1993), or the degree to which they 
employ contentious tactics like protests or boycotts versus more collaborative tactics like cross-
sector partnerships (Bertels et al., 2014). Reflecting this distinction, organizations comprising a 
social movement field are referred to variously by scholars as ‘radicals’ versus ‘moderates’ 
(Haines, 1984), ‘confrontational’ versus ‘cooperative’ (Baron et al., 2016), or ‘dark greens’ versus 
‘light greens,’ in the environmental movement (Hoffman and Bertels, 2010). Such cognitive 
classifications are based on the actions of activists in the context of prior movements, and have 
been shown to be salient signals to field participants where relational ties between activists are thin 
(Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McAdam and Rucht, 1993). Repertoire-based categorizations are not 
only constructed implicitly from media reports of activist tactics, but also explicitly in media reports 
and by the organizations themselves. Greenpeace, for instance, has a fairly strong reputation for 
using a contentious repertoire when interacting with firms. It has been described in the media as 
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“known for its over-the-top efforts to draw attention to various causes,” (Bostedt, 2017) and self-
describes its work as “us[ing] peaceful protest” and is careful to note that it “never takes any money 
from corporations or government” in order to stay independent (Greenpeace 2017). Conversely, 
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), whose collaborations with firms such as McDonald’s and 
Walmart have received much media attention, describes its work as “partner[ing] with leading 
companies to achieve environmental results.” (Environmental Defense Fund 2017).  
Categorization of activists as ‘confrontational’ or ‘cooperative’ create heuristic 
expectations amongst observers, including other activists, about the means by which an activist 
engages firms. These heuristic expectations will, in turn, inform how observers interpret the firm-
activist collaboration as a signal. The announcement of a firm’s collaboration with a ‘cooperative’ 
activist such as the EDF conforms to existing expectations, and as such, is likely to produce little 
new information. Conversely, a firm’s collaboration with a ‘confrontational’ activist violates 
expectations and creates a strong stimulus for observers to re-evaluate their own beliefs (Kernahan, 
Bartholow, and Bettencourt, 2000).  
 The public actions of activists provide valuable information to other activists because they 
reveal “something about their private information and beliefs” (Dorobantu et al., 2017: 565). 
Because confrontational activists don’t often engage firms collaboratively, other activists are likely 
to infer a large swing in the private information or beliefs the confrontational activist has about the 
firm. This information is used by other activists to update their beliefs about which firms to target 
and how, and should have a particularly pronounced effect on activists that are similarly 
contentious, insofar as these activists are likely to be more attuned to the actions of activists that 
they see as peer referents (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2016). Thus, a 
collaboration with a primarily contentious activist not only creates a stronger signal by violating 
expectations, but it also may be particularly important in reducing contention through its effect on 
the most contentious segments of a movement. As one director at Coca-Cola said of its 
81 
collaboration with Greenpeace: “It's very powerful for a company to be associated with an NGO, 
especially if it's an activist one,” (Financial Times, 2007). Greenpeace’s recognizable brand as a 
contentious campaigner acts as a strong stimulus for belief updating, suggests a change in its beliefs 
about the firm, and is likely to be most influential with the subset of activists who are most prone 
to employ contentious tactics. 
In summary, the tactical repertoires of movement activists delineate lines within social 
space that become salient boundaries or categories that are used by others in the movement when 
interpreting firm-activist collaborations as informational cues. Firm collaborations with historically 
contentious activists provide a strong stimulus for belief updating, relay information about the 
collaborating activist’s private beliefs, and are influential on the most contentious segments of a 
movement. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3. A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer 
contentious challenges from other activists the more their partner activist has a 
history of using contentious tactics. 
 
Another way in which a firm-activist collaboration may demobilize other activists is through the 
firm’s symbolic association with respected activists (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Interorganizational relationships can serve a ‘legitimating 
function’ with audiences (Dacin et al., 2007), and organizations facing a legitimacy deficit can 
benefit by borrowing from the legitimacy of their more esteemed partners (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Oliver, 1990; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Stuart, 2000). This holds even 
when the entities to a partnership are categorically distinct, as audience members transpose their 
affective response to one organization when making intuitions about its associates (Haack, Pfarrer, 
and Scherer, 2013). In the context of firm-activist collaborations, moral legitimacy reflects a 
prosocial logic (Suchman, 1995) that for-profit firms may struggle to build on their own, but may 
nevertheless be endowed with, through their association with organizations reflecting such logic. 
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Accordingly, firms facing contention seek out collaborations with social activists in order to 
“borrow from the superior social legitimacy of these organizations” (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). 
Of course, the symbolic value of an alliance depends on the legitimacy of the alliance 
partner. Activists vary in their legitimacy, and accordingly in their ability to provide external 
legitimacy to a partnering firm as a function of their credibility within the broader field (Baron, 
2012). Suchman (1995:588) implies this notion by characterizing co-optation as a moral strategy 
“to associate the organization with respected entities in its environment.” (emphasis added). A firm 
can only benefit from positive affective legitimacy spillovers in the broader field to the extent that 
its activist partner is itself seen as legitimate by field participants. Thus the extent to which a 
collaboration results in indirect co-optation depends on the legitimacy of the activist partner to the 
collaboration. A collaboration with an estimable activist may win the firm positive affect and 
legitimacy in the eyes of other activists, decreasing their likelihood of targeting it in the future, but 
firms are unlikely to reap significant legitimacy spillovers from collaborations with lesser-known 
or lesser-respected activists in the field. Therefore, we propose:  
Hypothesis 4: A firm that collaborates with a social activist will face fewer 
contentious challenges from other activists the greater the legitimacy of its partner 
activist. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
We test our hypotheses using a unique panel database that tracks all contentious and collaborative 
interactions between 110 U.S.-based environmental SMOs and a random sample of Fortune 500 
companies in the United States between 2002 and 2012. We begin our in panel in 2002 because it 
is the first year when SMOs’ IRS tax filings are available consistently, from which we construct 
SMO board interlocks. The sample of SMOs was created by analyzing Factiva archives of US 
newspapers for all organizations described in media as an “environmental activist organization,” 
“conservation activist organization,” “environmental activist group,” or “conservation activist 
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group,” and matching the organization names that this search produced with formal nonprofit tax 
filings made available by the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). Because we are 
interested in the indirect effects of one type of tactic (collaboration) on the use of another 
(contention) by other SMOs, we define the boundary of the movement around an issue 
(environment) rather than sampling on tactics. We employ the term ‘activist’ in the searches 
because activism is a key function of an SMO and is necessary to classify an organization as 
belonging to a social movement (Soule and King, 2008). This enables us to distinguish ‘activist’ 
SMOs from other non-advocacy non-profits listed in the NCCS database (e.g., non-profits that are 
more service oriented).16  
We generated the company sample by randomly drawing 250 companies from the pool of 
all companies that appeared in the Fortune 500 at any point during the sample period. The Fortune 
500 list was sampled because prior research has shown that activists tend to contentiously target 
large, high-status firms (King, 2008; McDonnell et al., 2015). Similarly, large, visible firms are 
more likely to be selected for collaborations because they are most likely to propagate new practices 
to bring about field-level change, the ultimate goal of activists (den Hond and Bakker, 2007). In 
commenting on the increasing prevalence of firm-SMO collaborations, the head of EDF's corporate 
partnerships suggested that they are especially common amongst Fortune 500 companies 
(Economist, 2010).  
Data on SMO-Firm Interactions 
Following common practice in social movements research (Earl et al., 2004), we rely on media 
reports to code contentious and collaborative interactions between an SMO and firm. Our list of 
possible sources includes all North American English-language sources included in Factiva’s 
                                                          
16 We also considered archival directories such as the Encyclopedia of Associations (Minkoff, 1999) or the 
Yearbook of International Associations (e.g., (Smith and Wiest, 2005), however, were concerned that such 
sampling would lead to underrepresentation of protest organizations (Minkoff, 1999) and small 
organizations (Larson and Soule, 2009) because such directories rely on self-reporting by the SMO. 
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categories of major news and business publications and press release wires17, which includes major 
wire sources providing corporate press releases. Relying on media reports can create two forms of 
bias: selection bias (i.e., ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events) and description bias 
(i.e., the veracity of the coverage) (Earl et al., 2004). Our sample mitigates ideological selection 
biases by including multiple major news and business publications rather than relying on one media 
outlet. We also mitigate the selection bias introduced by the media’s over-reporting of negative 
events (e.g., protests may be over-reported in comparison to collaborations), by including press 
releases in our source list, which tend to report more positive news. To mitigate description bias, 
we rely only on the “hard facts” of the event (e.g., who, what, when), which is relatively accurate 
in media reports (Earl et al. 2004: 65).  
We restrict our search to North America for two reasons. First, the impact of SMOs and 
their tactics vary by institutional setting (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), therefore, SMOs’ decision-
making on campaign strategy is often geography specific. Secondly, the environmental 
performance of firms, which we expect to be one driver of contentious targeting, may vary across 
countries (e.g., due to the pollution haven hypothesis) and comparable environmental performance 
data is not available across countries for the same firm. Within this source list, we searched for any 
articles or press releases where the firm name and SMO name appear in the same report.18 In total, 
this search yielded approximately 34,720 unique media articles and press releases. Each resulting 
article or press release was read by undergraduate student coders, and then reviewed again by the 
authors,19 selecting instances where the SMO contentiously interacted with a firm (e.g., protests, 
                                                          
17 The major news and business publications category includes over 100 print and online sources from 
outlets such as ABC News, The Boston Globe, and the Wall Street Journal, while the press release wire 
category includes over 200 press release wires such as Business Wire, Canada Newswire and 
Nasdaq/Globenewswire.  
18 To ensure comprehensiveness, we searched using multiple spellings of the same SMO (e.g., ForestEthics 
or Forest Ethics) and firm name (e.g., Walmart or Wal-mart). 
19 During the training period, which spanned one month and approximately 2,000 articles coded by each 
coder, we read every article that the undergraduate students coded and provided feedback. Once each coder 
was trained to a performance level of at least 95% correct coding, we continued to read and enter into a 
database every article that was coded as containing either a contentious or cooperative interaction, but not 
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boycotts, shareholders’ proposals, lawsuits), or cooperatively interacted with a firm (e.g., monetary 
or in-kind donations, board interlock, collaboration). All contentious and cooperative interactions 
between a firm-SMO dyad are recorded by the authors with unique identifiers, allowing for 
deduplication of a single event (e.g., SMO A protested against firm B) reported multiple times in 
the media.  
Consistent with past research, the greatest number of contentious challenges are 
concentrated amongst several large firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries (e.g., 
extractives or energy). Table 6 lists the top 10 most contentiously targeted firms, and the SMOs 
that engaged in the greatest number of contentious challenges over the sample period. On the 
opposite end of the distribution, over half of the firms in our sample have never been contentiously 
targeted, while 45 of the SMOs have never mobilized against any firm in our sample.  
Table 6: Top 10 firms contentiously targeted and SMOs using contentious tactics 
 
Identifying Firm-SMO Collaborations. In identifying firm-SMO collaborations we 
concentrate on relationships aligned with Selznick's (1949: 34) conception of elements absorbed 
into “into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization,”  through “a formal 
relationship or alliance …” (McDonnell, 2016: 4). We define a collaboration between an SMO and 
                                                          
those that were coded as containing neither. Inter-coder reliability tests conducted half-way through the 
coding exercise demonstrated a high rate of agreement (95 percent average, three coders, random sample of 
3,465 articles). 
Firm Social Movement Organization
Monsanto 63 Sierra Club 130
Exxon Mobil 62 Greenpeace 92
ChevronTexaco 56 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 70
Entergy 48 Ceres 43
American Electric Power 30 Rainforest Action Network 43
Smithfield Foods 27 Natural Resources Defense Council 39
Procter & Gamble 22 Amazon Watch 38
Occidental Petroleum 19 Friends Of The Earth 30
ConocoPhillips 18 Earthjustice 20
Ameren 17 Environmental Integrity Project 19
No. of contentious 
challenges
No. of contentious 
challenges
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firm as ‘organizations working together by committing resources to produce a common set of 
outcomes.’ Included are what Rondinelli and London (2003) describe as interactive collaborations 
and intensive environmental management alliances. Intensive environmental management alliances 
are collaborations aimed at improving environmental performance within the firm, such as when 
the EDF and McDonald’s created a task force to study ways in which McDonald’s can reduce waste 
in its operations. Interactive collaborations are similarly purposeful and interactional but are more 
externally focused and include: targeted project support (e.g., development of eco-preserves on 
company property); environmental awareness and education collaborations (e.g., co-sponsorship 
of education programs, producing research in support of policy change); and interactive 
certification of practices or products.20 Excluded from our definition of collaboration are any arms-
length interactions or transactions such as corporate contributions and gifts to the SMO, marketing 
affiliations (e.g., licensing of SMO name or logo), support for employee participation in SMO 
activities, or market transactions such as the purchasing of the SMOs products or services (e.g., 
airlines purchasing Carbonfund’s carbon credits).  
Firm-SMO collaborations were identified from the broader population of cooperative 
interactions found in the Factiva media and press release search described above. Each resulting 
media report and press release was read carefully by the first author, to code only those interactions 
that conformed with the definition of ‘collaboration’ as such. Each report was used to code the 
collaboration as bilateral (i.e., one SMO and one firm) or multilateral (i.e., one or more firms or 
SMOs), as well as the year in which the collaboration began.  
                                                          
20 We classify SMO’s certification of firm products as collaborations only instances where we observe 
evidence of the SMO and firm having worked together in a purposeful way with a commitment of resources. 
For example, some certification processes involve a preliminary period where the SMO advises the firm on 
changes needed in its processes for it to obtain certification, and the firm consults the SMO on its changes. 
In the absence of such evidence, we treat SMO certification of products as arms-length transactions that do 
not constitute collaborations, akin to logo licensing (Rondinelli and London 2003). 
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Similar to the concentration of contention, we find that firms engaging SMOs in 
collaborations are concentrated in consumer facing industries (e.g., retail and consumer products). 
Table 7 lists the firms and SMOs with the greatest number of cross-sector collaborations in our 
sample. A comparison of the population of SMOs appearing in Table 6 and 7 suggests that the most 
contentious SMOs (e.g., Sierra Club, Greenpeace) have fewer collaborations with firms than their 
more moderate counterparts.  
Table 7: Top 10 firms and SMOs with cross-sector collaborations 
 
Note. Number of organizations may exceed ten where two or more organizations have the same number of 
cross-sector collaborations (i.e., a tie). 
 
Modeling Approach 
To test our hypotheses of indirect co-optation resulting from firm-SMO collaborations we use count 
models of contentious challenges against a firm by all SMOs that have no collaboration with the 
firm. We exclude SMOs that have directly collaborated with the firm since we are interested in 
indirect, rather than direct, co-optation. In all our models we control for a one-year lagged version 
of the dependent variable (contentious challenges) to account for the serial correlation between past 
and present activist contention.21 By controlling for the previous year’s contentious challenges, we 
are estimating the effect of firm-SMO collaborations on changes in contentious targeting from the 
previous year.  
                                                          
21 Our results are substantively unchanged with the exclusion of the lagged dependent variable. 
Firm Bilateral Multilateral Social Movement Organization Bilateral Multilateral
Coca-Cola 8 7 Environmental Defense Fund 15 11
WalMart 9 5 Nature Conservancy 8 15
General Electric 1 10 Conservation International 11 7
Starbucks 6 3 World Wildlife Fund 10 7
DuPont 1 6 World Resources Institute 1 10
Entergy 2 3 Natural Resources Defense Council 2 6
Alcoa 1 4 Global Green 3 1
McDonald's 4 0 Rainforest Alliance 1 3
Johnson & Johnson 1 3 National Recycling Coalition 1 2
Whole Foods 1 3 Ceres 0 3
Staples 0 4 National Wildlife Federation 0 3
No. of collaborations No. of collaborations
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Because our two hypothesized pathways of indirect co-optation, relational and signaling, 
operate at different levels of analysis, firm-SMO dyad, and SMO field, respectively, we estimate 
their effects using separate models. We test our relational indirect co-optation hypotheses (H1 and 
H2) at the firm-SMO-year level to test the effects of indirect ties between the firm and SMO. Our 
signaling hypotheses (H3 and H4) are tested using a firm-year panel, as we expect signaling to 
operate at the SMO field level, regardless of whether the firm has indirect links to SMOs. In 
additional analyses presented below, we also consider the interactive effects of these two pathways, 
but we believe them to be theoretically different mechanisms that operate at different levels, and 
so we model them separately in our main models.  
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the number of times a firm has been contentiously challenged via 
protests, boycotts, lawsuits, etc. by an SMO in a given year (contentious challenges). We sum the 
number of contentious challenges from the previously described coding of media articles and press 
releases.  
Independent Variables 
We test our relational co-optation hypotheses using board interlocks because they serve as 
“conduits for the flow of information and norms” (Davis and Greve, 1997: 12) between 
organizations, and have been repeatedly shown to influence organizational behavior (Mizruchi, 
1996). In a setting similar to ours, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) showed interlocked 
directors at non-profit organizations were conduits of information about private-sector funders. We 
obtain SMO board of directors data from their IRS tax filing. The names of each board member 
appearing in Part VII of each SMO’s Form 990 was recorded for each filing year and then matched 
computationally on last name and first initial to directors of other SMOs in that year. Each resulting 
match was inspected visually using additional information such as the full given name and other 
identifiers such as “Jr.”, to remove any false matches. In instances of ambiguity (e.g., different 
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spellings of given names) further internet and media searches were used to confirm that the board 
interlock existed.  
To test whether a firm faces fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied to the 
SMO with whom they are collaborating (H1), we capture each indirectly tied SMO with a variable 
coded as 1 for any SMO-firm dyad in which the SMO is connected via a board interlock to an SMO 
that is directly collaborating with a focal firm, and 0 for all other firm-SMO dyads. For example, 
Starbucks’ 2007 collaboration with Global Green results in an indirect tie to the National Recycling 
Coalition because the two organizations share a director (Scott Seydel) in 2007. Figure 5 depicts 
the 2007 interlock network of the SMOs in our sample that shared directors. To test whether the 
decrease in contention is more pronounced for bilateral firm-SMO collaborations, we create two 
corresponding dummy variables. Indirectly tied SMO bilateral collaboration, is coded 1 for all 
firm-SMO dyads that are indirectly connected via a bilateral collaboration, and 0 otherwise. 
Correspondingly, indirectly tied SMO multilateral collaboration, is coded 1 for all firm-SMO 
dyads that are indirectly connected via a multilateral collaboration, and 0 otherwise.  
To test hypothesis 3, we use the number of contentious challenges mounted against any 
firm in the previous year by the SMO with which the firm collaborates (SMO contentious 
repertoire). Because some firms collaborate with more than one SMO in a given year, we take the 
maximum value of contentious challenges across all SMOs with which the firm collaborates, as the 
maximum is theoretically consistent with our ‘signal’ mechanism.  
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To test the effect of the collaborating SMO’s legitimacy (H4) we use the number of 
appearances an SMO made before congressional committee hearings (SMO legitimacy). 
Unfortunately, ratings commonly used as proxies for the status or legitimacy of private sector 
organizations, such as the Fortune America’s Most Admired Companies list, are unavailable for 
SMOs. Further, using the emotional valence of media coverage as others have done for firms 
(McDonnell, 2016) to capture general public approval is unlikely to get at the underlying construct 
when applied to SMOs, as the linguistic coding of articles would be confounded by the tactical 
repertoire of the SMO (e.g., articles mentioning Greenpeace are likely to have relatively high 
negative valence due to its use of contentious tactics). We therefore instead rely on congressional 
committee hearing appearances, as invitations extended to an organization is driven by public 
policy makers’ evaluations of that organization’s sociopolitical reputation (Werner 2015), an 
indirect proxy for an SMO’s legitimacy. We collect data on SMOs’ invited appearances before 
congressional committee hearings using ProQuest’s Congressional Hearings data archives, 
searching for each SMO and hand-collecting and aggregating the number of times that a 
representative of a given SMO testified in congressional hearings in a given year. Similar to the 
approach used for the collaborating SMO’s contentious repertoire, SMO legitimacy is the maximum 
value of congressional appearances among all SMOs with which the firm collaborates in a given 
year.  
Control Variables 
We control for the previous year’s contentious challenges against the firm in all our models, to 
account for the serial correlation between past and present activist contention. This is the dependent 
variable lagged by one year in each of the respective panels: contentious challenges against a firm 
by an SMO in the firm-SMO-year panel; and, sum of all contentious challenges against the firm by 
any SMO in the firm-year panel. We also include time-varying firm-level controls that may drive 
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contentious challenges in the following period, as well as SMO and dyad-level controls, in our 
relational co-optation models.  
At the firm-level, we control for a firm’s environmental performance, media attention, size, 
market performance, and receptivity, based on past findings on the characteristics of firms 
contentiously targeted by activists (Lenox and Eesley 2009; McDonnell 2016). We control for a 
firm’s environmental performance, as activists are more likely to target firms with poor 
environmental records, and commitments to environmental performance may also drive which 
firms collaborate with SMOs (den Hond et al., 2015). In doing so, we also effectively control for 
the improvements in environmental performance that may follow collaboration which could 
demobilize other activists. We rely on Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) 
environmental concerns rating to measure a firm’s environmental performance. In an assessment 
of the KLD environmental ratings, Chatterji et al. (2009: 25) find that KLD “concern” ratings are 
“fairly good summaries of past environmental performance”, and are predictive of future pollution 
and regulatory compliance violations. A firm’s environmental performance is the sum of seven 
environmental “concern” variables provided by KLD in the prior year (i.e., hazardous waste, 
regulatory problems, ozone-depleting chemicals, substantial emissions, agricultural chemicals, 
climate change, and other concern). 
We also expect the degree of media attention a firm receives, and its size, to be a driver of 
both collaborations and contentious targeting. Firm media attention is the sum of all articles 
containing the firm’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S. newspapers—the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, USA Today, and the Los 
Angeles Times—in the prior year (divided by 1,000 articles).22 We control for firm size by including 
a firm’s logged assets and its logged employees in the previous year, obtained from the Compustat 
                                                          
22 We focus on the six largest newspapers to reduce variability due to organizational survival of newspapers 
and changes in coverage of media outlets in Factiva over time.  
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database. We control for a firm’s market-to-book value, because we expect firms competing on 
more differentiated products to have higher environmental performance (Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), which could influence contention. Additionally, managerial 
willingness to engage in novel pro-social strategies like collaborations with SMOs, might be greater 
in firms with higher market valuations.  
We control for the possibility that firm ‘receptivity’ to contentious challenges not only 
drives contention (McDonnell 2016), but also more contentious or legitimate SMOs’ propensity to 
collaborate with such firms. Consistent with past research (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; McDonnell 
and King, 2013; McDonnell et al., 2015), we rely on a firm’s history of responses to activists’ 
targeting them to identify ‘receptive’ firms as those that seek to address activists’ concerns. We use 
firms’ responses to social-issue shareholder proposals, because this provides an observable and 
unambiguous indicator of receptivity to social activism (McDonnell et al., 2015). Firms respond to 
shareholder proposals in three distinct ways: positively (when the firm voluntarily cedes to the 
proposal leading to its withdrawal), neutrally (when the firm does nothing and the proposal is put 
to a vote at its annual meeting), or negatively (when the firm petitions the U.S. SEC to exclude the 
proposal). We obtained data on firm responses to social-issue shareholder proposal from the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) and Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS)23. We follow McDonnell et al. (2015) in measuring firm receptivity to activists using the 
Janis-Fadner (JF) coefficient of imbalance,24 where a JF coefficient of -1 (minimum value), 
indicates that a firm challenged all proposals in a given year, while a firm with a JF coefficient of 
                                                          
23 ISS has data available as far back as 1997, therefore, we supplemented with ICCR data from 1993 to 2007. 
A preliminary investigation indicated that coverage of firms in our sample was inconsistent between the two 
sources (i.e., ICCR had some companies that ISS didn’t in early years, and vice versa), therefore, we rely on 
both sources and manually de-duplicat observations in overlapping years (1997 to 2007). 
24 JF coefficient = (P2-PN)/V2 if P>N; 0 if P=N; and (PN-N2)/V2 if N>P where P is the number of positive 
firm responses to social-issue proxy proposals (i.e., withdrawals), N is the number of negative responses (i.e., 
challenges), and V is the total number of social-issue proxy proposals submitted to a firm in a given year. 
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1 (maximum value) indicates that it voluntarily implemented all proposals it received.25 After 
observations with missing values (e.g., privately-held companies, KLD measures) were dropped, 
179 companies comprised our final sample. 
We include in our specification an indicator variable capturing the presence of an SMO 
collaboration in the previous year. In so doing, we seek to isolate our hypothesized mechanism as 
operating through the micro-level effects of the characteristics of a specific collaborating SMO on 
indirect co-optation as distinct from the more macro-level impact of the mere presence of an SMO 
collaboration. We also control in our firm level models for the collaborating SMO degree centrality 
in the SMO board interlock network to ensure our results capture effects above and beyond those 
resulting from indirect co-optation via relational channels.  
In addition to the above, in our firm-SMO-year models testing our relational indirect co-
optation hypotheses (H1 and H2) we control for the contentious repertoire and legitimacy of the 
SMO with whom the firm has a collaboration to isolate the effect of board interlocks above and 
beyond the field-level effects of hypothesis 3 and 4 (i.e., collaborating SMO contentious repertoire 
and collaborating SMO legitimacy). Additionally, we include several SMO controls that may 
correlate with contentious challenges against the firm by the non-collaborating SMO. First, we 
control for the contentious repertoire of SMO, or the number of contentious challenges mounted 
against any firm in the previous year by the focal SMO. We control for the size of the SMO, using 
the SMOs assets (logged) at the end of the prior fiscal year from their tax filings data. We control 
for the focal SMO’s legitimacy, using the number of appearances a SMO made before congressional 
committee hearings. We also control for the degree centrality of the SMO in the board interlock 
network, because highly connected SMOs may be less likely to succumb to indirect co-optation. 
We include a control for SMO media attention, constructed identically to a firm’s media attention, 
                                                          
25 If a firm did not receive a shareholder proxy proposal in a given year, we carry over the firm’s past 
receptivity, and run robustness checks omitting firm-years in which no social proxy proposals were received 
by a given firm. 
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or the sum of all articles containing the SMO’s name that appeared in the six largest U.S. 
newspapers listed previously.  
Finally, the inclusion of year fixed effects accounts for time-specific events, such as 
dramatic changes in government policy, which may affect SMO targeting in a given year. The 
inclusion of industry fixed effects accounts for industry-specific characteristics, such as greater 
environmental externalities, that may drive greater contention. We also check the robustness of our 
results to firm fixed effects models that control for firm-level time invariant unobservables. Across 
all models, all independent and control variables are lagged one year to avoid temporal 
endogeneity.  
Tables 8, and 9, present summary statistics and correlations for all variables in the dyad-
level, and firm-level, models, respectively. 
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RESULTS 
The dependent variable, contentious challenges, is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 7 in the 
dyad-level models, with the vast majority of firms never experiencing contention from a given 
SMO. We use zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression in our dyad-level models of 
indirect cooptation via inter-activist board interlocks because there is theoretical reason to believe 
that there is a certain (probably large) proportion of firm-SMO dyads that would never experience 
contention, and some other proportion that might or might not, depending on circumstances 
(Greene, 2014). Although zero contentious challenges occurs frequently (Lenox and Eesley, 2009; 
McDonnell, 2016), it may be that a given SMO will never mobilize against a firm, and so zero 
values do not necessarily mean indirect co-optation, but may instead be constrained by the tactical 
repertoire of the SMO. For example, an SMO that has never protested or boycotted any firm, is 
very unlikely to do so in the future. Therefore, we use ZINB regression which allows for the 
realization of zeros in the outcome variable from two separate processes, the first from a logistic 
model of the binary process, and a negative binomial count model if the binary process takes on a 
value of 1 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). A comparison of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) 
and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) likelihood-based measures of model fit, and the Vuong 
statistic for nonnested models (Vuong, 1989) confirmed that a ZINB model better fit our data than 
a negative binomial model. We also show robustness of our results to a negative binomial (NB) 
model. We model firm fixed effects in the NB model using dummies, in line with the approach 
recommended by Allison and Waterman (2002) in their assessment of solutions to the inability of 
the conditional fixed effects estimator for NB to control for stable covariates. 
Results for models testing indirect co-optation, or the reduction of contentious challenges 
against a firm by an SMO, via relational means (H1 & H2) are shown Table 10. Consistent with 
past research (McDonnell, 2016), we observe among the control variables that a firm faces greater 
contentious challenges from an SMO if that SMO has targeted it in the previous year (Model 1). 
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An SMO with a more contentious repertoire, greater degree centrality in the interlock network and 
greater media attention is also associated with a greater number of challenges against the firm.  
Turning to our hypothesized pathways of indirect co-optation, we find that firms do not 
face significantly fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied to their collaborating 
activist (Model 2, p=0.214). Instead, in line with H2, we observe that indirect relational co-optation 
only operates in instances where the firm-SMO collaboration is bilateral (Model 3, p=0.000). 
Marginal effects analysis shows that a firm that has experienced one contentious challenge from 
the focal SMO faces 0.20 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) the following year if that SMO 
is indirectly tied to it via a bilateral collaboration (all other variables held at their means). 
Conversely, indirect co-optation is not significant for multilateral firm-SMO collaborations 
(p=0.307). In Model 4, we show the robustness of our results to a firm fixed effects specification. 
Absent firm-specific effects, there may be some unobserved attribute that varies across firms and 
leads firms with an ability to indirectly link to SMOs to also have a disproportionate drop in 
contention (e.g., social skill of its managers). The effect size is commensurate in the firm fixed 
effects estimation; a firm faces 0.16 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) from an SMO that has 
targeted it once previously if that SMO is indirectly tied to it via a bilateral collaboration. Finally, 
in Models 5, and 6, we show robustness of our results to a negative binomial model with industry, 
and firm fixed effects, respectively.  
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Table 10: Regressions Exploring the Relationship Between Board Interlocks to SMOs with a 
Firm Collaboration and Future Activist Challenges Against the Firm 
 
Note. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Models 1 through 3, and 5 include year 
and industry fixed effects, while Models 4 and 6 include year and firm fixed effects. 
∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001. 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Independent variables
Indirectly tied SMO (H1) -0.621
(0.499)
Indirectly tied SMO bilateral collab. (H2) -16.08*** -16.44*** -19.45*** -18.00***
(0.328) (0.424) (0.346) (0.393)
Indirectly tied SMO multilateral collab. (H2) -0.644 -0.556 -0.488 -0.383
(0.630) (0.696) (0.651) (0.661)
Dyad Control
Contentious challenge (prev. yr) 1.495*** 1.495*** 1.494*** 1.285*** 0.359*** 0.392***
(0.174) (0.177) (0.177) (0.147) (0.089) (0.101)
Firm control variables
Environmental performance 0.0445 0.0405 0.0392 0.0959 0.0231 0.0798
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.131) (0.103) (0.128)
Firm media attention 0.0731 0.0749 0.0757 0.0854 0.0868* 0.0788
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.052) (0.040) (0.052)
Logged assets 0.287 0.285 0.283 -0.262 0.485* -0.131
(0.239) (0.240) (0.240) (0.408) (0.218) (0.391)
Logged employees 0.435 0.437 0.438 1.019+ 0.384+ 0.824
(0.271) (0.272) (0.272) (0.597) (0.218) (0.529)
Market-to-book value 0.00877 0.00879 0.00906 0.0114 0.00809 0.00914
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Receptivity to activism 0.0888 0.0897 0.0878 -0.182 0.0148 -0.183
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.161) (0.163) (0.161)
SMO collaboration 0.101 0.131 0.140 -0.0944 0.222 0.0213
(0.197) (0.205) (0.202) (0.155) (0.168) (0.175)
Collaborating SMO contentious repertoire -0.0910 -0.0893 -0.0911 -0.173+ -0.130 -0.178+
(0.091) (0.088) (0.089) (0.097) (0.091) (0.092)
Collaborating SMO legitimacy -0.00489 -0.00393 -0.00462 0.0134 0.0144 0.0196
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
SMO control variables
SMO contentious repertoire 0.0426** 0.0413** 0.0413** 0.0463** 0.0701*** 0.0763***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
SMO size - logged assets -0.0761* -0.0727* -0.0725* -0.0699+ 0.111*** 0.106***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.027) (0.027)
SMO legitimacy -0.0801*** -0.0791*** -0.0778*** -0.0794*** -0.0837*** -0.0880***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
SMO degree centrality 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.168*** 0.278*** 0.279***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
SMO media attention 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.281*** 0.277***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Fixed effects Yr, Ind Yr, Ind Yr, Ind Yr, Firm Yr, Ind Yr, Firm
Constant -25.33*** -24.92*** -24.40*** -8.452* -32.72*** -12.75***
(1.504) (3.733) (2.697) (3.506) (4.835) (3.660)
N 131921 131921 131921 131921 131921 131921
ll -2037.4 -2036.3 -2035.2 -1934.0 -1996.5 -1923.7
Zero-inflated negative binomal regression of activist 
challenges
Negative binomial regression 
of activist challenges
101 
Table 11 presents firm level models of indirect co-optation via signals or relational prisms 
(H3 and H4). The dependent variable, contentious challenges, ranges from 0 to 17 at the firm-year 
level and exhibits overdispersion (variance=1.867; mean=0.438). Therefore, we use a negative 
binomial model.26 Models 7 to 10 are estimated using year and industry fixed effects with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. We check the robustness of our results to a firm fixed effects 
negative binomial model (Model 11) to ensure firm-level, time-invariant potential sources of 
endogeneity are not biasing our random effects estimation results.  
We find support for our hypothesis that a firm that collaborates with a social activist will 
face fewer contentious challenges from other activists if their SMO partner has a history of using 
contentious tactics (Models 8, 10 and 11). An increase of one contentious challenge in the repertoire 
of the collaborating activist is significantly associated with a 0.17 decrease in the expected count 
of contentious challenges against the firm (p=0.024 in Model 10). Overall in our sample, firms 
collaborating with activists that had a non-contentious repertoire (i.e., no contentious challenges in 
the previous year), experienced on average 1.38 contentious challenges themselves, compared to 
0.62 contentious challenges against firms collaborating with an activist with 1 or more contentious 
challenges in the previous year.  
  
                                                          
26 While being contentiously targeted remains a rare occurrence for most companies, nearly half of the 
companies in our sample (48.6%) have been contentiously targeted at least once, and a comparison of 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) likelihood-based measures 
of model fit suggest that the negative binomial model is a better fit than a zero-inflated model. Our results 
are robust to a zero-inflated negative binomial (results available from authors). 
102 
Table 11: Regressions Exploring the Relationship Between Collaborating SMO’s Characteristics 
and Future Activist Challenges Against the Firm 
 
Note. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Models 7 through 10 include year and 
industry fixed effects, while Model 11 includes year and firm fixed effects. 
∗p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001.  
 
Conversely, we find the legitimacy of the activist with which the firm collaborates has no 
significant effect on the contentious challenges it receives from other activists (p=0.201). We 
explored two possible explanations for this insignificant finding. First, we explored if the 
legitimacy of the collaborating activist matters more for firms with little media attention because 
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legitimacy spillovers are most likely where there is little knowledge of the entity (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999). Interacting the firm’s media attention with the legitimacy of the collaborating 
activist yielded no significant results. Secondly, we explored an alternative measure of activist 
legitimacy since our measure of legitimacy reflects public policy makers’ evaluations rather than 
that of field peers. To the extent that our proxy is uncorrelated with the legitimacy of the activist in 
the eyes of other activists, our results may be biased. We relied on scores from Charity Navigator, 
an independent charity watchdog organization, which evaluates non-profits on financial health and 
accountability. Once again, we observe no significant difference in the contention that firms face 
following a collaboration with a more legitimate SMO.  
Additional Analyses 
We perform several supplemental analyses to investigate possible interactions between our 
hypothesized effects and alternative explanations for our results. First, while we believe indirect 
co-optation through relational pipes and prisms operate via theoretically different mechanisms, we 
also explore the possibility of their interactive effects. We investigate how the repertoire of the 
collaborating SMO affects indirect relational co-optation via the inter-SMO interlocks. While the 
contentiousness of the collaborating SMO is associated with a marginally significant fall in the 
number of challenges the firm faces from the focal SMO (p=0.076, Model 4), its interaction with 
relational co-optation produces an attenuating effect (p=0.053, results available from authors). 
Specifically, as the contentiousness of the collaborating SMO increases, the influence of indirect 
ties to the focal SMO in reducing contention is decreased. This suggests that indirect co-optation 
via relational pipes and prisms may be partial substitutes.  
We also conduct supplementary analyses to attempt to rule out other possible explanations 
for our findings. While the inclusion of lagged contentious challenges against the firm as well as 
firm fixed effects help us to rule out bias resulting from firm-level time invariant unobservable 
variables or those changing in the preceding year, our indirect relational co-optation results may 
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suffer from simultaneity bias. Specifically, if some SMOs chose to leave the boards of SMOs that 
are mulling a collaboration with a firm, our relational co-optation effects may be a result of SMOs 
selecting out of board-interlocks. While the fact that multilateral firm-SMO collaborations do not 
result in indirect co-optation gives us some confidence in our results, we explore the possibility of 
SMOs selecting out of boards by comparing the number of board interlocks that SMOs with a 
bilateral firm collaboration have before and after the collaboration is announced. While we do 
observe a differences in means between the board interlocks of SMOs with bilateral firm 
collaborations before and after the announcement of the collaboration (t=-5.9631 for two-tailed test 
of means, p=0.000), that difference is in the opposite direction than would suggest simultaneity 
bias (i.e., the number of board interlocks is higher in the first year of the bilateral firm-SMO 
collaboration).  
We also investigate the possibility that our results are driven by activists’ belief that the 
firm is more likely to improve its environmental performance in the future if it collaborates with a 
more contentious SMO (H3) or one with whom it has a bilateral collaboration (H2). To do so, we 
re-estimate our models disaggregating our key independent variables across two different types of 
collaborations: intensive collaborations, aimed at improving environmental performance within the 
firm; and, interactive collaborations, which are more externally focused (Rondinelli and London, 
2003). If our results are driven by the belief that firms will improve in the future, our results should 
be more pronounced for intensive collaborations which focus on improving the firm’s 
environmental performance, and attenuated for interactive collaborations. In our relational prisms 
models, we find that firms face fewer contentious challenges from other activists the greater the 
contentious repertoire of their SMO in interactive collaborations (p=0.035, and p=0.045 in cross-
firm and within-firm models). Conversely, the repertoire of SMO partners in intense collaborations 
is not significantly associated with a drop in contentious challenges against the firm. We also find 
that overall, SMOs involved in intense alliances are on average less contentious than those that 
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participate in interactive collaborations. This suggests that our results are likely driven by the 
identity of the partner SMO as contentious rather than that identity providing an assurance of better 
environmental performance by the firm in the future.  
In our dyad-level models where we test the effects of indirect ties between the firm and 
SMO, we find that firms face significantly fewer contentious challenges from SMOs directly tied 
to their collaborating activist in both bilateral intensive and interactive collaborations. Further, the 
magnitude of the effects are similar across intensive and interactive collaborations (t-test of equality 
of coefficients yields a p=0.667). A firm that has experienced one contentious challenge from the 
focal SMO faces 0.201 fewer contentious challenges (p=0.000) the following year if that SMO is 
indirectly tied to it via a bilateral intense collaboration, and 0.200 fewer contentious challenges if 
they are indirectly tied via a bilateral interactive collaboration (p=0.000). 
DISCUSSION 
A growing body of research is concerned with the indirect effects of social movements on firms 
(Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) showing that activists can influence change beyond the organization 
they target. In this article, we shift the directionality of inquiry to the indirect effects of interactions 
between activists and firms on the broader social movement in which activists participate. We 
expand on a long-standing concept in social movements research, co-optation, and draw on 
interorganizational network research to theorize and develop two mechanisms by which firm-
activist collaborations lead to the indirect co-optation of the movement. Our theoretical framework 
suggests firms can indirectly co-opt the broader activist field by exploiting the social networks and 
identity of their partner activist.  
Using data on both contentious and collaborative interactions between 19,690 dyads 
representing annual interactions between 110 environmental SMOs and 179 of the largest firms in 
the United States over 10 years, we find support for our theorized mechanisms of indirect co-
optation. Specifically, we find that the activists who share directors with an activist that collaborates 
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bilaterally with a firm are less likely to mobilize against that firm. This adds a new perspective on 
the interconnectedness of stakeholders in the firm’s environment, which has been conceptualized 
as a source of pressure and mobilization against the firm (Rowley, 1997; Wry et al., 2013). Our 
findings suggest that an interconnected stakeholder environment may be more susceptible to 
indirect influence by a firm that succeeds in allying with a well-connected stakeholder. 
Secondly, we find that the collaborating activist’s identity as a ‘contentious’ activist helps 
demobilize others. This is correlative to Briscoe and Safford’s (2008) finding that identities of 
target organizations affect activists’ likelihood of indirectly affecting other organizations in the 
field. We argue that this operates via inferences activists make about the private information or 
beliefs the confrontational activist has about the firm. We find no evidence for the alternative 
mechanism of the collaborating activist’s contentious identity acting as an assurance mechanism 
that the firm will improve its environmental performance in the future via the collaboration.  
 This paper contributes to both social movements research as well as organizational theory. 
First, our findings inform a long-running stream of literature exploring the tactical repertoire of 
activists. Although the role of networks in social movement mobilization and tactic choice has long 
been acknowledged (e.g., Larson and Soule, 2009; Osa, 2003; Diani, 2003), movements, and their 
tactics, have typically been studied as self-contained fields or in relation to the state. Our paper 
highlights that networks are equally operative as pathways by which the tactical repertoire of 
activists can be altered by actors outside the field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). Moreover, in 
tracing how firm-activist collaborations impact contentious private politics, our research highlights 
the importance of accounting for cooperative private politics in future research on interactions 
between social activists and firms. By taking account of both contentious and cooperative private 
politics, as well as the interconnections between the activists, we respond to the need articulated by 
McAdam and Scott (2005: 12) that a “field-level conception becomes indispensable to tracing the 
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complexities of contemporary changes” as the boundaries of fields blur and new linkages across 
fields form. 
Further, by theorizing and empirically testing the concept of indirect co-optation, we 
highlight an alternative strategy by which firms can manage threats from their environment, a 
question central to organizational theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Indirect co-optation is likely 
to be a theoretically and empirically meaningful oversight, as managing constraint via direct co-
optation may be limited where firm-stakeholder relations are strained by prior conflict (Gargiulo 
1993). However, this does not negate the possibility of co-optation, or blocking the capacity of 
dissidents to actively oppose the firm, of a broader swathe of stakeholders by exploiting the social 
networks and identity of a collaborating stakeholder. By theorizing the mechanisms underlying 
indirect co-optation, our framework complements and extends prior work showing firms’ 
cooperative engagement of one stakeholder produces positive spillovers onto others (Dorobantu et 
al., 2017; Werner, 2015).  
Despite its potential contributions, our research has several limitations that offer 
opportunities for future research. First, we only observe the indirect effects of firm-activist 
collaborations within a single movement (i.e., environmental movement), rather than between 
multiple movements. However, McDonnell (2016) suggests that movements can effect each other 
and McDonnell, King and Soule (2015) find that firms’ interactions with one movement can be 
used as signals by other movements. Future research could explore whether indirect co-optation 
can operate across movement fields, or on other stakeholders central to firm performance, such as 
the state. Secondly, our inquiry stops short of evaluating the degree to which the firm-activist 
collaboration results in changes in the firm’s operations and strategy. In line with Selznick’s (1949) 
original conceptualization of co-optation as bi-directional, Van Wijk et al. (2013) find that co-
optation may be mutual. Therefore, an important question remains to what extent and under what 
circumstances firm-activist collaborations result in changes within the firm. Finally, despite our 
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findings on co-optive effects of firm-activist collaborations, such cross-sector collaborations are 
not always viewed favorably by external observers. Negative evaluations may be particularly acute 
when new interorganizational forms first emerge, as was the case in the early 1990s for cross-sector 
collaborations, when it was “heresy to say that companies and NGOs could work together” 
(Economist, 2010). Constrained by the availability of SMO board interlock data dating back to 
2002, we were unable to consider how the legitimacy of cross-sector collaborations may attenuate 
co-optation. We believe this is an important, and largely overlooked, direction for future research. 
Despite the ubiquity of the ‘legitimacy’ construct in organizational theory, few studies have 
considered how the legitimacy of interorganizational relationships or linkages (Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Dacin et al., 2007) impacts interorganizational strategies and outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3: Webs of Influence: National Stakeholder Fields and Corporate Social Performance 
(This chapter is co-authored with Witold J. Henisz) 
 
In the past decade, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received increasing attention among 
practitioners and academics, with more than 8,000 companies from more than 150 countries now 
signatories to the United Nations’ Global Compact, covering human rights, labor standards, and 
the environment (Wang et al., 2016b). Despite this globalization of CSR, large differences remain 
across countries in the magnitude and efficacy of firms’ CSR activities. Recent research analyzing 
heterogeneity in corporate social performance (CSP) across countries (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; 
Matten and Moon, 2008), has relied on either comparative legal or comparative institutional 
analysis (Williams and Aguilera, 2008). For example, cross-country differences in corporate 
governance arrangements (Aguilera et al., 2006) and political, labor and cultural institutions 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) have been shown to explain differences in firms’ CSP across 
countries.  
 At the same time, stakeholders occupy a central role in many single-country studies of CSR 
as catalysts for corporate investment in environmental and social performance improvement 
(Arenas, Lozano, and Albareda, 2009; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kim and Lyon, 2015). 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) uncover and publicize environmental or labor violations; 
workers picket for fair wages; governments legislate, regulate and disseminate best practices; 
investors demand ‘social impact’ funds or funds focused on strong Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) performers; and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) set up voluntary 
organizations such as the UN Global Compact where companies pledge to principles. From a 
stakeholder theory perspective, CSP is a strategic response to pressure from stakeholders 
(McDonnell et al., 2015; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008; Yang and 
Rivers, 2009). Improvements in CSP may be farsighted attempts by firms to pre-empt or mitigate 
stakeholders’ pressure which may otherwise result in institutional change forcing even higher or 
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more costly CSP or, alternatively, stakeholders’ direct threats to the firm (Jones, Harrison, and 
Felps, 2018).  
In this article, we bring stakeholders into comparative of accounts of CSP by drawing on 
field theory, which explains how change is effected by social actors, such as stakeholders, in 
circumscribed social arenas, such as countries (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011, 2012). Moving 
beyond dyadic treatments of stakeholder pressure and influence, we conceptualize stakeholder 
pressure within a country emanating from the set of interconnected government actors, IGOs, labor 
unions, NGOs, and communities, that populate a stakeholder field within that country and seek to 
influence corporate practices (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Rowley, 1997). The stakeholders that 
populate a country’s stakeholder field, their engagement with other socio-political actors within a 
country, and their use of direct pressure tactics on a country’s private sector jointly determines 
corporate practices by influencing managerial perceptions of their salience (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
and in turn, responsiveness to issues advocated by the stakeholder field. In countries where 
stakeholder fields are populated by prominent stakeholders which can wield influence on 
regulations or norms, and draw on a heterogeneous base of adherents, managers are more likely to 
be responsive to the issues advocated by the field. Managers are equally attuned to extra-
institutional mobilization (King and Pearce, 2010) by influential stakeholders on peer firms in their 
country, responding with expressions of the organization’s commitment to socially acceptable 
norms and activities (McDonnell and King, 2013) in the hopes that they can avoid becoming a 
target. Further, the characteristics of stakeholder and business fields vary across countries which 
alters firms’ susceptibility to direct or indirect stakeholder channels of influence.  
Our work thus represents a significant theoretical shift in comparative CSP research, 
stakeholder theory, as well as in research on organizational fields. Cross-national variation in 
institutions has been shown to strongly influence CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010; Matten and Moon, 2008), and cross-national variation in internal stakeholder 
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(i.e., shareholders, creditors, employees) influence has been shown to influence corporate 
governance and reputation (Schneper and Guillen, 2004; Soleimani, Schneper, and Newburry, 
2014). Conversely, cross-national variation in external stakeholder (i.e., governments, NGOs, 
IGOs, communities) influence has not previously been linked to CSP, arguably due to an inability 
to objectively compare external stakeholders’ influence across nations. A stakeholder field 
perspective can enrich comparative CSP research by addressing this gap and incorporating 
mechanisms shown to impact firm behavior within the stakeholder literature. It also offers a more 
dynamic view of how once ‘latent’ stakeholders can quickly transform into ‘definitive’ 
stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) through their relational ties, raising the salience of CSR issues 
and performance across countries. Secondly, conceptualizing stakeholder influence as operating 
more broadly via country-level business fields in which firms are embedded, relaxes the assumption 
that firms are responsive to direct stakeholder pressures alone. Instead a field-theory perspective 
on stakeholder influence recognizes that stakeholders strive to “bring about field-level change” 
(den Hond and Bakker, 2007: 918) and answers calls to include non-targeted firms in research on 
stakeholder influence (Briscoe et al., 2015). Relative to existing work in organizational fields, we 
broaden the scope of inquiry beyond the treatment of fields as “self-contained, autonomous worlds” 
(Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 18), highlighting that changes in a focal field can emanate from 
changes in the dynamic structural and compositional characteristics of the complex webs of fields 
surrounding it.  
Finally, our work represents an important empirical contribution to the literature on CSP, 
stakeholder networks, and fields. Using 250 million machine-coded media-reported interactions 
among economic, political and social actors, we introduce to management a novel source of data 
capturing the shifting structure of interconnected fields within which organizations operate (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). While manual coding of media-reported events have been employed within 
social movement scholarship (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell and King, 2013), the 
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dataset we employ expands the scope of media coverage by several orders of magnitude, and allows 
us to study not just contentious interactions but the full scope of interactions related to 
environmental and social issues in each country for a decade. From this corpus, we collect directed 
and valued networks of relations between CSP stakeholders (de Bakker, 2012; Lucea and Doh, 
2012; Rowley, 1997), and other business and socio-political actors within a country. To our 
knowledge, our construction of stakeholder, business, and socio-political fields across 42 countries, 
represents the first cross-national study of fields of this scale. 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND FIELD THEORY 
Stakeholder theory posits that strategic management involves consideration of stakeholders who 
can affect, or are affected by, the accomplishment of an organization’s purpose (Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar, 2004). However, not all stakeholders are created equal. Stakeholder 
influence on corporate practices is mediated by the salience of stakeholder groups, or the degree to 
which managers give priority to stakeholder claims (Mitchell et al., 1997). Hence, one prominent 
area of inquiry in stakeholder theory is how managerial perceptions of stakeholder attributes 
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Yang and Rivers, 2009) or their relationship with the organization (Agle 
et al., 1999) can “explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention,” (Mitchell et al., 
1997: 854). Most research on stakeholder salience has focused on arguments derived from dyadic 
resource dependence (Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997).  
However, resource dependence theory also emphasizes the interconnectedness of actors as 
an important structural characteristic of environments in which an organization is embedded 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The interconnectedness of organizations and actors creates “webs of 
power” that affect the level of influence associated with different interests (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978: 65–71; Wry et al., 2013). In other words, organizations are not perceiving, and responding 
to, atomistic stakeholders, but rather the interaction of multiple inter-connected influences from 
their entire stakeholder environment (Rowley, 1997). Therefore, a growing stream of research 
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argues for a relational perspective on stakeholder salience that takes account of inter-stakeholder 
ties (Rowley, 1997) and of ties to other actors in an organization’s external environment.  
More recently, stakeholder influence on firm’s practices has been further complicated by 
findings that managers take action on issues in response to stakeholder pressure on other firms in 
the business field (Briscoe et al., 2015). In other words, in making judgements on stakeholder 
salience, managers are attuned not only to stakeholder pressure directed at them but, more broadly, 
stakeholder interactions with other firms (Yue et al., 2013). This perspective is particularly 
important for secondary stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, regulators) which are typically interested in 
effecting field-level change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007; Van Wijk et al., 2013). As such, 
researchers have called for research to acknowledge stakeholders wield influence beyond a single 
point of interaction (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) and adopt a field level perspective because 
“substantial economic change does not stay contained within organizational or industry 
boundaries,” (Davis and Marquis, 2005: 341).  
We bring together and extend these three perspectives to develop a theoretical framework 
of stakeholder influence operating through managerial perceptions of country-level stakeholder 
fields to explain differing levels of firm responsiveness to stakeholder interests which manifest in 
observable patterns of practices across countries (i.e. CSP). Field theory suggests that social actors 
are embedded in fields, or meso-level social orders, where actors interact with knowledge of one 
another under a set of common understandings about the field’s purposes, the relationships in the 
field, and the field's rules (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). Fields can form around issues (Hoffman, 
1999; Zietsma et al., 2017), specific industries or sectors (e.g. state field), or geographies (Fligstein 
and McAdam, 2012; Zietsma et al., 2017). Critically, the field of which an organization is a member 
is, in turn, embedded in complex webs of other fields (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) which 
influence practices in the focal field. For example, the European Union (EU) moratorium on 
genetically modified (GM) products which affected firms across a multitude of industries (e.g. 
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agriculture, biotechnology, retail) was the product of complex interactions between NGOs, 
producers, policy makers and consumers. Doh and Guay (2006) contrast the EU outcome with that 
of the U.S. where no such consensus on GM products emerged as the issue failed to gain 
prominence because of a lack of news-grabbing biotechnology accidents that would create political 
space, NGOs’ failure to use the judicial system, and elite capture by the biotech industry. In a 
separate case, the comparatively lower involvement of U.S. firms in the Publish What You Pay 
initiative in comparison to their U.K. peers has been attributed to considerably less NGO, 
institutional investor, and policy maker’s pressure in the U.S on revenue transparency (Aguilera et 
al., 2007).  
We thus share with field theory a conception of a set of stakeholders concerned with 
collective strategic action to achieve tangible change in CSP outcomes in the business field, 
working or embedded within a broader societal field (Bansal, 2005). CSP stakeholders can include 
regulatory or government agencies whose mandates comprise environmental, labor, or human 
rights issues (Aguilera et al., 2007; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008), 
IGOs (Aguilera et al., 2007; Williams and Aguilera, 2008), NGOs (Arenas et al., 2009; Doh and 
Guay, 2006; Eesley and Lenox, 2006), and communities and residents (Henriques and Sadorsky, 
1996; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008) identifying or concerned with those 
same issues. A field perspective on stakeholder influence and salience relaxes the focus on 
stakeholder power as a discrete organizational characteristic operating at the organization-
stakeholder dyad level. Instead, it shifts analytical focus to how the constellation of interconnected 
stakeholders with interests in bringing about field-level change (den Hond and Bakker, 2007) in 
corporate performance on environmental, human rights and labor issues, and their relations with 
other fields within countries condition firm responsiveness to their interests. Re-conceptualizing 
stakeholder salience across countries as operating through cross-field influence acknowledges that 
stakeholder influence is not limited to, or even focused on, any one firm (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). 
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A framework that brings to the fore the interconnectedness of heterogeneous stakeholders 
interested in field-level change is particularly important in the context of CSP, where some of the 
greatest pressure for firms to adopt environmentally or socially responsible practices have come 
from interconnected networks of activists, inter-governmental efforts, or cross-sectoral efforts. 
STAKEHOLDER FIELDS 
We propose that stakeholder salience in a given country, and in turn CSP, is informed by managerial 
perceptions of the stakeholder field’s ability to leverage two mechanisms to influence practices in 
the business field: institutional change and extra-institutional tactics (Aguilera et al., 2007; Hiatt et 
al., 2015; King and Pearce, 2010). The first focuses on stakeholders as institutional entrepreneurs 
that effect change by leveraging the state to exert coercive influence (Hiatt et al., 2015), providing 
normative support for alternative practices (Durand and Georgallis, 2018), or propagating cognitive 
frames regarding appropriate behavior for corporations. A stakeholder field whose members are 
prominent within the broader socio-political network and one composed of heterogeneous actors, 
signals to managers that CSP has gained legitimacy with a broad constituency within their country 
and that stakeholders can draw on a multitude of sources of influence (i.e., regulative, normative, 
and cognitive) to foster institutional change. In countries where the business field does not enjoy 
privileged access to elites to impede institutional change, managers will be particularly responsive 
to these stakeholder field characteristics.  
The second mechanism for cross-field influence emphasizes the role of secondary 
stakeholders as ‘extra-institutional entrepreneurs’ (King and Soule, 2007) that employ direct, 
contentious targeting of select firms to bring about change in the broader business field (Briscoe et 
al., 2015; den Hond and Bakker, 2007). Contentious targeting of firms in a country attunes 
managers to issues advocated by the stakeholder field, and may result in practice change where 
stakeholders articulate specific proscriptions for alternative practices and can mobilize in a 
coordinated and repeated manner. The mechanisms underlying our framework of stakeholder 
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salience find parallels in Zietsma et al.'s (2017) review of literature on field-level change, where 
business field members are drawn into issues when the state field imposes a change or a social 
movement pressures for one. Importantly, our framework does not address the determinants of 
different stakeholder and business field structures that emerge across countries nor how they 
evolve. 
Stakeholder Field Prominence 
Prominent actors within and across fields disproportionately “influence the rules of the game and 
the cultural norms and belief systems” (King and Walker, 2014: 135) that govern corporate 
practices. The prominence of members of a stakeholder field within the broader socio-political 
network is material to observers because it is associated with potential subsequent shifts in formal 
state policies, informal norms or values influencing perceptions of appropriate behavior (Bansal, 
2005; Briscoe et al., 2015; Sharfman, Shaft, and Tihanyi, 2004) or cultural-cognitive belief systems 
as to practices that must be followed (i.e. institutional change). Mitchell et al. (1997: 865) suggest 
that a stakeholder “has power to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or 
normative means, to impose its will.” Prominent stakeholders are more likely to be perceived as 
being able to gain access to influence over the business field via indirect channels afforded by other 
fields to which the business field is connected. For example, influence in domestic policy networks 
and ties to legislators are important to CSR outcomes (Hiatt et al., 2015), as stakeholders often turn 
to the state because of its capacity to regulate industry (King and Pearce, 2010).  
Generally, “actors with greater access to authority, resources, and discursive legitimacy” 
(Hardy and Phillips, 1998: 219) are those with the best chance of influencing other fields. In 
countries where members of the stakeholder field are more prominent they are more likely to have 
a larger impact either on government policy or on norms, values and cultural-cognitive beliefs that 
influence behavior. In policy networks consisting of many different actors, actors with prominent 
positions can “set agendas, frame debates, and promulgate policies that benefit them,” (Beckfield, 
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2003: 404). In cultural networks, prominent actors are key influencers that define attributes of 
products or practices that are desirable for or expected of peers and lead cascades of adoption 
(Centola, 2015). The prominence of Greenpeace in the solar photovoltaics industry, for example, 
increased private sector commitment to this ‘greener’ technology because it acted as a signal of 
shifting public preferences, reflected active advocacy for an alternative technology, and defined 
new contours for reputation building (Durand and Georgallis, 2018). Being well-connected within 
the socio-political network allows stakeholders to leverage the network to propagate their ideas and 
“may even create the actual or virtual ‘space’ for the creation of new norms.” (Aguilera et al., 2007: 
853). The foregoing suggests that managerial attention and action will be most attuned to issues 
advocated by prominent stakeholders because such stakeholders can draw on a multitude of sources 
of influence (i.e., regulative, normative and cognitive) to foster institutional change. Therefore, we 
propose that managers’ evaluations of stakeholder salience, and in turn their CSP, will be greater 
in countries where the members of the stakeholder field are prominent within the broader socio-
political network. 
Hypothesis 1: The prominence of members of the stakeholder field within a country 
is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance. 
 
Relative Strength of Business Ties to Elites 
Characteristics of the business field can alter managerial perceptions of the likelihood that a given 
level of stakeholder prominence will generate institutional change (King and Walker, 2014). In 
some countries, the business field may enjoy a blocking position between even prominent 
environmental or social stakeholders and their goals of regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive 
institutional change. Of particular importance in any process of institutional change whether 
through policy, norms and values or culture, is the support of elites (Greenwood and Suddaby, 
2006; Seo and Creed, 2002).  
 In many institutional change processes, shifting positions among elites play a critical role 
in the process of transformation from one set of rules, values and norms or culture to another. 
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Where businesses enjoy privileged or superior access to these elites relative to public sector or civil 
society stakeholders, they are more likely to be able to use lobbying, framing battles or cultural 
tropes to impede the passage of new laws, push back against the growing acceptance of new norms 
and prevent any change in what environmental and social practices are seen as expected. Prakash 
and Kollman (2003), for example, highlight the critical role played by the relative connectedness 
of the biotechnology industry to key U.S. regulators in attenuating regulative and normative threats 
to GM products.  
 Businesses with strong ties to elites can use their resources to impact legislation or 
regulation directly by controlling or shaping the agenda of legislative debate and regulatory 
implementation. Their advertising or discourse also shapes stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
appropriateness of improved environmental or social practices. In cases where incumbent business 
interests are particularly well connected, it is hard to imagine how a cultural-cognitive belief that 
strong environmental and social practices are expected could emerge. Even in cases where 
environmental and social stakeholders are actively influencing regulation, values and norms and 
culture, the relative strength of business ties to elites will undermine the efficacy of such efforts at 
institutional change, sowing competing forms of targets for regulation, alternative interpretations 
of causal mechanisms underlying beliefs, and even confusion over the facts themselves. Given this 
ability to block, confuse or obfuscate, business fields that enjoy relatively strong connections to 
national elites should be less sensitive to stakeholder prominence. 
Hypothesis 2: The positive relationship between stakeholder prominence and a 
firm’s corporate social performance decreases in the relative strength of business 
ties to elites.  
 
Stakeholder Field Heterogeneity 
Fields are constructed on a situational basis, as shifting collections of actors come to define new 
issues and concerns as salient (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). The constellation of actor types (e.g. 
international NGOs, local NGOs, regulators) that identify with a particular issue is material to 
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observers assessing the likelihood of institutional change. Where a stakeholder field includes 
NGOs, government, IGOs, organized labor etc., managers see that the issue has gained legitimacy 
with a broad base of constituents within their country. Such diversity in support enhances the 
receptivity of policymakers to regulative policy change (Henisz and Zelner, 2005) as well as the 
pressure for conformity with norms, values and beliefs guiding appropriate or necessary behavior 
(Oliver, 1991) through the reduction of complexity in the external environment (Greenwood et al., 
2011). Organizations surrounded by fields where the constellation of stakeholders identifying with 
an issue is heterogeneous are more likely to acquiesce to institutional pressures because stakeholder 
field heterogeneity suggests that an institutional expectation has diffused more widely (Oliver, 
1991).  
Heterogeneity of stakeholders also enhances the sources of influence and resources that 
stakeholders can wield in support of these objectives (Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl, 1988). Political 
or regulatory stakeholders can deploy coercive pressure via legislation or regulation. NGOs can 
exert normative pressures through issue framing. Organized labor has avenues for pressure directly 
into firms through its membership. Similarly, levers for institutional change may vary by the 
geographic breadth of stakeholders. Stakeholders with international reach, for example, may have 
greater access to financial or political resources than national or more regional groups (Eesley and 
Lenox, 2006), and can make issues more visible to a geographically broader swath of audiences 
(Lucea and Doh, 2012).  
For both these reasons, we expect managers to perceive a stakeholder field composed of 
connected heterogeneous actors, each possessing different influence tactics, levers and resources, 
and representing broad-based issue support to be more likely to influence political actors’ 
deliberations and the shared construction of values, norms and beliefs, increasing a firm’s CSP. 
Hypothesis 3: The heterogeneity of members in the stakeholder field within a 
country is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance. 
 
120 
While managers are in tune with the potential material impact of institutional change resulting from 
the prominence and heterogeneity of stakeholder fields, the influence of stakeholder fields can also 
be more direct. Stakeholders can also deliver “an exogenous shock to change the frame of 
discussion and potentially shift norms of acceptable social conduct” (Aguilera et al., 2007: 857) by 
directly mobilizing against the business field in a country. In other words, stakeholder fields can 
also influence CSP where members of those fields apply direct pressure on business through extra-
institutional tactics (e.g., boycotts, protests). 
Proselytizing Stakeholder Pressure 
Stakeholders can promote corporate reform by pressuring firms directly with tactics like protests, 
boycotts, and negative media campaigns (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; King and Pearce, 2010; Soule, 
2009). Firms respond by adopting new policies and practices and increasing prosocial disclosures 
(McDonnell and King, 2013). The responsiveness of firms to contentious targeting is not limited 
only to instances when they are targets. Firms are responsive to contentious targeting of other firms 
in the business field (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016; Briscoe et al., 2015; Yue et al., 2013) including, 
but not limited to, those operating in sectors to whom they are linked through supply chains (Bartley 
and Child, 2014). Protests and boycotts send informational signals to non-targeted firms about the 
preferences of stakeholders (e.g. proscriptions for practices) and increase the risk of them becoming 
targets in the future. If non-targeted firms fail to proactively change practices they risk becoming 
targets themselves. PETA’s campaign for improved treatment of animals in the U.S. in the early 
2000s, for instance, began with McDonald’s, but spread quickly to others, including Burger King, 
Wendy’s, and key suppliers (e.g. Smithfield Foods). While contentious targeting typically focuses 
on a select few, visible firms in a country, it must be understood in light of stakeholders’ ambitions 
“to bring about field-level change,” (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007: 901). As such, following 
contentious targeting of the business field by stakeholders, the salience of issues they advocate is 
heightened for all firms in the country.  
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Stakeholders that frame the discussion of acceptable social conduct (Aguilera et al., 2007) 
are most likely to elicit concrete responses in CSP because they articulate proscriptions for practices 
that replace existing frames rather than just deinstitutionalizing existing frames (den Hond and 
Bakker, 2007). Den Hond and Bakker (2007), illustrate this point with the animal rights movement, 
which is populated by organizations that categorically oppose raising animals for consumption, as 
well as those that focus their campaigns on improving conditions under which animals are raised. 
Practice change in response to pressure from the former is circumscribed by their challenge to the 
very existence of an industry, while response to the latter is enabled by their championing of 
concrete proscriptions for practice change. Powell et. al. (2017) refer to actors who champion 
proscriptions as proselytizers. Within a stakeholder field, proselytizing stakeholders are those 
actors who organize and champion information about an alternative means of engaging with 
environmental and social challenges, providing guidance and orientation to both corporate targets 
of their efforts at conversion as well as corporate (and government) observers. 
When proselytizers engage not only in verbal framing within their field but also apply 
direct pressure on the business field through extra-institutional tactics, they send an important 
signal to managers. Such behavior highlights a focus not only on institutional change, but also 
extra-institutional change where success depends upon perceptions of a material risk to 
organizational performance. Such a strategy may directly target the performance of the manager’s 
firm or simply attune the manager to a threat of future stakeholder attacks. In either event, pre-
emption or mitigation of the emergent threat can be achieved through increasing CSP.  
Hypothesis 4: Pressure from proselytizing stakeholders towards the business field 
in a country is positively associated with a firm’s corporate social performance.  
 
Proselytizing Stakeholder Density 
Not all contentious targeting of the business field by proselytizers is equally salient to managers. 
Isolated one-off incidents by unconnected or peripheral proselytizing stakeholders will elicit less 
responsiveness than contentious targeting of members of the business field by a tightly connected 
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group of mainstream organizations. In general, managers will look for indications of the ease with 
which stakeholders can deploy pressure directly (as opposed to indirectly through institutional 
change) against them in a coordinated and repeated manner. Such stakeholders pose a more credible 
and sustained threat to the firm (Coff, 1999). Therefore, we propose that managerial responsiveness 
to proselytizing stakeholder pressure will be informed by their evaluations of the degree to which 
proselytizing stakeholders can coordinate for future collective action.  
Stakeholders face substantial collective action challenges in achieving their objective of 
changing firms’ environmental, human rights, or labor practices. Dense social relations or ties 
among actors deter free-riding in collective action, and facilitate the diffusion of norms and 
expectations (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003), both of which increase the probability of future 
collective action. Dense networks of ties between proselytizing stakeholders can also reduce 
variation in their evaluation and framing of issues and the number of competing issue resolution 
coalitions that form (Mahon et al., 2004), translating into more sustained efforts at issue resolution. 
The sustainability of pressure is also more likely within dense networks where there are limits on 
firms’ ability to use ‘divide-and-conquer’ tactics (Mahon et al., 2004), and relational ties enable 
the sharing of resources, frames and tactics (Soule, 2012). Given the link between dense social 
relations and sustained collective action, it is perhaps unsurprising that protesting organizations 
that participate in coalitions are also more likely to have higher levels of success (Larson and Soule, 
2009). Scholars studying the influence of social movements on public policy also emphasize cross-
organizational ties, suggesting success in influencing policy depends on the strength and density of 
the network (Keck and Sikkink, 1999).  
The preceding suggests managerial attention to contentious targeting by proselytizing 
stakeholders, and therefore a firm’s CSP, will increase with the density of cooperative ties among 
proselytizers in the country in which the firm is headquartered. 
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Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between pressure from proselytizing 
stakeholders towards the business field and a firm’s corporate social performance 
increases in the density of cooperative ties between proselytizing stakeholders.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Constructing Stakeholder Fields 
Since the salience of CSP issues is determined by managerial perception of stakeholders (Mitchell 
et al., 1997) within the corresponding field, our operationalization of these fields must be readily 
observable by managers. Consistent with this objective, we identify membership based upon the 
population of stakeholders identified with CSP issues in a country (e.g., environmental, human 
rights and labor issues) connected by actions or statements reported in the media. Media is an 
information intermediary that provides stimuli that affect impression formation (Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003) and “influences decision makers by identifying the topics, issues, activities, and 
events that are perceived as notable and salient,” (Aharonson and Bort, 2015: 313). Acknowledging 
sources of bias in media-reported events (e.g. ideological biases, over-reporting of negative events), 
we do not claim all stakeholder ties will be reported by media. Instead, we suggest an approach that 
relies on media conforms with stakeholder salience being a 'socially constructed' reality (Mitchell 
et al., 1997). Organizational researchers have shown what stakeholders know about organizations 
is largely shaped by what the media reports about them (Deephouse, 2000; Petkova, Rindova, and 
Gupta, 2013; Pollock and Rindova, 2003). Therefore, while other studies have relied on archival 
data, such as the financial resources at the disposal of an NGO, to measure stakeholder salience 
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006), we believe studying media-reported stakeholder fields better reflects the 
limited perceptual energy managers can devote to understanding their stakeholder environment 
(Mitchell et al., 1997).  
Archival media data has been used in analyses of firm response to stakeholder pressures 
(Eesley and Lenox, 2006), and social movement research to identify boycotts, the size of protests, 
the number of organizations involved and issues (King, 2008; King and Soule, 2007; McDonnell 
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and King, 2013). In political science, scholars leverage automated linguistic coding algorithms and 
exponentially increasing computational power to construct geographically coded datasets of media-
reported events. An “event” is a discrete interaction between two actors that can be located at a 
single time and geography (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). We introduce one such dataset, the Global 
Database on Events, Location and Tone (GDELT) to the management literature and use it to 
construct stakeholder fields, business fields, as well as the broader national socio-political networks 
in which they are embedded (http://www.gdeltproject.org/). GDELT is arguably the largest event 
data collection in social science with over a 250 million events reported in print, broadcast, and 
web news media across the world. GDELT data are coded using the Textual Analysis by 
Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI) system. GDELT’s reliance on both domestic and 
international news sources reduces the likelihood of bias due to varying levels of domestic press 
freedom because an event is likely to be reported to the extent that foreign correspondents 
representing foreign news wires are present in the country. In Appendix A.3, we provide a 
description of media sources included in GDELT, and tests we conducted to address concerns 
regarding media bias. 
Each event record in GDELT includes information on the time and location of a media-
reported event, the “source” (i.e., who said the expression or took the action) and “target” (i.e., 
towards whom the expression or action was directed or taken) actors, and the characteristics of the 
interaction between them. The interactions vary from cooperative, such as “express intent to 
cooperate” or “engage in material cooperation,” to conflictual, such as “demand,” “threaten,” and 
“protest” and are coded according to whether the interaction was verbal or material. GDELT de-
duplicates events by collapsing multiple references to the same event across one or more articles 
into a single event record (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013), while separately recording the number of 
articles carrying the event.  
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Using GDELT allows us to address Rowley’s (1997) recommendations for constructing 
stakeholder networks or fields. First and foremost, events capture (media-reported) interactions 
(i.e., ties) between actors that are both directed and classified according to positive versus negative 
affect. Second, ties can be valued by number of occurrences and media mentions, which is 
important for understanding the intensity of each relation as represented by the number of possible 
media impressions. Finally, event databases capture the census of actors that appear in the media 
and, by geographically locating where the event took place, enable construction of national 
stakeholder fields, business fields, as well as socio-political networks. Despite the advantages in 
using event databases, mindful of their documented shortcomings, we take several steps to 
minimize possible bias due to measurement error. Efforts at validating GDELT against other event 
databases like the Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) and the Dynamics of 
Collective Action dataset, have yielded two cautions: over-reporting of false positives (i.e. more 
events) and increase over time in events (Ward et al., 2013). Although high cross-sectional 
correlations between protests events in GDELT in comparison to ICEWS (r=0.84) (Ward et al., 
2013) and DCA (r=0.83) (Claassen and Gibson, 2018), give us confidence in GDELT’s reliability, 
we still normalize our key constructs by corresponding country-level measures for all actors to 
account for any changes in over-reporting of events over time. In Appendix A.3, we discuss in 
greater detail the issue of event count bias, how we address it in the calculation of our measures, 
and additional validation tests we perform.  
All actors in GDELT are assigned role codes, which indicate broader functional categories 
to which they belong (e.g. government, NGO, business, media) and their specialty or area of interest 
(e.g. actors whose primary area of operation or expertise is human rights) (Leetaru and Schrodt, 
2013). Actor role and specialty codes facilitate our categorization of GDELT actors as CSP 
stakeholders. First, we used GDELT role codes to identify stakeholders classified as national or 
international political or regulatory actors (including government, judiciary, opposition, or 
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legislative role codes), labor organizations, IGOs, NGOs and communities or residents. We chose 
this subset of roles (i.e., excluding such roles as insurgents, military, rebels and intelligence 
services) due to their association with advocacy for environmental and social issues of relevance 
to firms. Second, we used GDELT specialty codes to identify actors with interests or mandates in 
issues corresponding to our outcome of interest, CSP. Specifically, CSP stakeholders are all actors 
in roles described above whose primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is ENV (i.e., 
environment), HRI (i.e., human rights) or LAB (i.e., labor). Appendix A.3 describes the process of 
stakeholder identification, and provides a mapping of GDELT role and specialty codes to 
stakeholder categories, as well as illustrative examples of actors included in each category. The 
population of these actors then constituted the members of the CSP stakeholder field. GDELT role 
codes also enabled us to identify the business field within a given country as all private sector 
actors, both domestic and multinational, that participated in events occurring in a given country. 
Business fields consist of both prominent organizations identified by name (e.g. Starbucks, Toyota 
and Boeing) and organizations identified by the sector in which they operate (e.g. computer maker, 
car manufacturer, and airline). 
Sample 
The initial sample of firms used in our analysis is defined by the coverage of the ASSET4 database 
(Thomson Reuters), which provides CSP scores on 4,600 companies headquartered in 58 countries, 
from 2004 to 2013, for which we obtained accounting data from Thomson Reuters WorldScope. 
After case-wise deletion of observations with missing data at the firm-level (e.g. accounting 
measures) and country-level (e.g. laws encouraging competition), we are left with 20,047 firm-year 
observations from 3,566 firms, headquartered in 42 countries over ten years.  
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is firm-level CSP, which we obtain from ASSET4. With growing 
importance placed on CSP, several independent organizations provide firm-level CSP metrics or 
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rankings (e.g. Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini). We follow others (Hawn and Ioannou, 2016; 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) in choosing the ASSET4 database due to the breadth of coverage 
across firms and time as well as the methodological rigor it employs drawing information from 
“objective, comparable and transparent data” sources and subjecting each data point to a “multi-
step verification and quality control process” (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012: 846), and most 
importantly, the geographic breadth of the companies it evaluates.  
CSP scores are calculated based on a firm’s performance on several key environmental, 
human rights and labor performance indicators gathered from public sources. The indicators 
evaluate the policies or principles to which the firm subscribes (e.g. emissions reduction policy or 
employment quality policies), the implementation of those policies (e.g. environmental R&D 
spending or employment awards), and finally, the observable outcomes (e.g. CO2 emissions or 
employee turnover). We follow Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) in constructing the CSP composite 
as the equally weighted average of social (i.e., human rights and labor) and environmental 
performance for each firm-year observation (scale of 0 to 100) as well as separately analyzing 
results for the two sub-indexes. 
Independent Variables 
Stakeholder prominence. In hypothesis 1, we propose managers’ evaluations of stakeholders’ 
influence on regulative, normative and cognitive institutions will increase in the prominence of 
those stakeholders in the country socio-political network. We equate stakeholder prominence with 
the number of media-reported out-going and in-coming ties stakeholders have with other actors 
within the country. Actors with high prominence enjoy influence and access to resources via their 
plentiful relations (Mahon et al., 2004). We calculate prominence using both cooperative and 
conflictual ties, since stakeholder influence bases include coercive and normative power. While a 
stakeholder’s number of cooperative ties provides managers with signals as to how many possible 
alters an actor can influence or get resources from, conflictual ties are salient to managers because 
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they are an indicator of the exercise of stakeholders’ voice and power against enemies. In 
calculating prominence, we also weight ties by the number of media mentions each tie garnered 
(Durand and Georgallis, 2018). We calculate stakeholder prominence by summing the mentions-
weighted prominence of all members of the stakeholder field, and then normalize this sum by the 
sum of mentions-weighted prominence of all actors in the country’s socio-political network. This 
ensures we are not privileging stakeholder fields in countries with greater media coverage, while 
accounting for any changes in the universe of source documents and, by extension, media-reported 
events over time.  
Business ties to elites. To capture the relative extent of business ties to elites, we compare 
the network constructed from the full set of media-reported events in a given country-year to the 
sub-network constructed from media reported events in which a member of the business field 
undertakes the action on another actor or speaks about another actor. Specifically, we follow Neal 
(2008) in using the Herfindahl index of stakeholder degree centrality as a measure of hierarchy in 
the two networks and then compare (normalizing for the relative size of the two networks), the 
degree of hierarchy in business outbound events to that in the overall network:  
At the extreme, if each business were connected to a single actor, that network would form a perfect 
hierarchy. The greater the concentration of connections among business actors to different alters 
within the business outbound network as compared to the overall network, the stronger are the 
business field’s relative ties to elites. 
Stakeholder heterogeneity. We classify heterogeneous stakeholders based upon 
differences in the organizational forms or purposes (e.g. government versus non-governmental 
organization), issue interests (e.g. environmental versus labor issues), and locations (e.g., domestic, 
foreign or multinational) of the members of each country-year stakeholder fields. We use the raw 
Where: 
𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of ties between stakeholder 𝑛 and other 
stakeholders within country 𝑖 in year 𝑡  
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of ties between stakeholders within country 
𝑖 in year 𝑡 
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count of unique actor types in each stakeholder field to measure heterogeneity. Although we 
explored more complex heterogeneity measures such as Blau’s (1977) index, these measures 
reward equal balance of actors in each category while our arguments center on variety in 
stakeholders.  
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure. We follow Powell et al. (2017) in identifying 
proselytizing stakeholders as those whose ties to other stakeholders (i.e., outbound) are twice their 
incoming ties (i.e., inbound). These stakeholders proselytize new practices and ideas by spreading 
to others the attention that they receive (ibid.). After identifying proselytizers in the stakeholder 
field, we count the number of times proselytizer stakeholders engaged in material conflict (e.g., 
protests, boycotts) aimed at the business field in a given year. Proselytizing stakeholder pressure 
is the sum of proselytizer material conflict directed at the business field in a country-year, 
normalized by the relative number of media-reported conflictual events to all media-reported events 
in the country to account for differing degrees of media bias across countries (e.g., media in some 
countries may over-report negative news). 
 Proselytizing stakeholder density. We calculate the relative density of cooperative ties 
among proselytizer stakeholders as a ratio of the density of cooperative ties in the socio-political 
network of the country as a whole. The density of media-mentions-weighted cooperative ties 
between proselytizing stakeholders is calculated as follows:  
𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡(𝑛𝑖𝑡 − 1)
 
 
 
Since our network is directed, our denominator (number of possible ties) is not divided by two as 
in an undirected network. We then divide by the analogous measure of density in the national socio-
political network as a whole to ensure we account for the secular increase in the corpus of source 
documents and resulting increase in density of media-reported events over time. 
Where: 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = # of media mentions of cooperative ties between proselytizing 
stakeholders within country 𝑖 in year 𝑡  
𝑛𝑖𝑡 = # of proselytizing stakeholders in country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
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Country institutional controls. While our arguments are stakeholder-centered, we 
acknowledge a country’s institutions condition firm behavior, and control for those shown to 
influence CSP. We control for institutions encouraging competition in a country (competition 
laws), laws protecting minority shareholders (anti-self-dealing index), the political ideology of 
legislators (left/center ideology), and perceptions of corruption (absence of corruption) (Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2012). We control for cultural institutions (Williams and Aguilera, 2008) with 
measures of power distance and individualism (Hofstede 1997 2001). CSP improves firms’ 
attractiveness to employees (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012), therefore we control for the 
competitiveness of the country’s labor market (skilled labor availability). Similarly, we control for 
union density, as unions typically advocate for health and safety related performance included in 
our CSP measure and may influence practices at non-unionized firms (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). Financial institutions influence companies’ CSP because capital providers are important 
stakeholders, therefore we control for the degree to which the financial system is credit- or market-
based (country debt over assets), the size of the capital market (market capitalization) and whether 
a socially responsible market index exists (SRI index). We also control for the competitiveness and 
openness of the national economy (balance of trade and trade) and the quality of its basic 
infrastructure (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). We control for the degree of press freedom because 
our stakeholder field measures are based on media reports and media may improve institutional 
compliance (Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou, 2016) by increasing firm and issue visibility to 
stakeholders. Finally, an alternative explanation for cross-country heterogeneity in CSP may be 
that firms experience varying degrees of external pressure from the degree of attention given to 
environmental, human rights and labor issues across countries (Flammer, 2013). To the extent this 
correlates with the attention media gives stakeholders interested in such issues, our results would 
be biased. Therefore, following Flammer (2013), we control for the percent of media articles 
mentioning “environment” or “human rights” or “labor” and “corporate social responsibility” in a 
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given country-year (issue prevalence), and rely on Factiva media reports to construct this measure, 
to reduce single-source bias. 
 Firm-level controls. We control for several firm characteristics shown to be associated 
with CSP. We expect more profitable (ROA) firms (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson and 
Apostolakou, 2010), larger firms (firm size) (Campbell, Eden, and Miller, 2011; Chih, Chih, and 
Chen, 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012) and those competing on more differentiated products 
(market to book ratio and R&D expenses) to have higher CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). CSP may also be higher in more diversified firms (number of 
segments), those more visible, proxied by whether the firm trades an American Depository Receipt 
(ADR company) (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), and multinational enterprises (foreign assets). We 
also control for a firm’s stock volatility as CSP may change with firm risk, as well as the degree to 
which shares are closely held (closely held shares), and its leverage (leverage) (ibid.). Table 12 
describes all independent and control variables in detail and their sources. All independent and 
control variables are lagged one year, unless otherwise noted.  
We include industry fixed effects to account for systematic differences in CSP across 
industries (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) and year fixed effects to account for patterns of 
institutionalization of CSR norms (Flammer, 2013). Appendix A.3 presents the distribution of 
observations by country, the average CSP score of firms headquartered in the country, and the 
prominence and heterogeneity of stakeholder fields, and proselytizing stakeholder pressure across 
all years. Summary statistics and correlations are presented in Table 13. 
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Table 12: Variable Definition and Source 
 
 
Variable Measurement (annual unless noted otherwise) Source
Independent Variables
Stakeholder prominence 
(H1)
Sum of all stakeholder outgoing and incoming ties divided by outgoing 
and incoming ties of all actors (ties weighted by media mentions); 
measure is logged due to skewness
GDELT
Business ties to elites 
(H2)
The ratio of the herfindahl index of degree centrality for actors in the 
sub-network of business initiated statements or actions to that of the 
overall socio-political network
GDELT
Stakeholder heterogeneity 
(H3)
Count of unique actor types in the stakeholder field GDELT
Proselytizing stakeholder 
pressure (H4)
Frequency-weighted material conflict brought by proselytizing 
stakeholders against business field. Proselytizer stakeholder are those 
with outdegree twice their indegree in the stakeholder field. Measure 
normalized by relative number of conflictual events in country. 
GDELT
Proselytizing stakeholder 
density (H5)
Mentions-weighted cooperative ties between proselytizers as a ratio of 
number of possible ties, normalized by the density (calculated in the 
same manner) of all actors
GDELT
Controls: Country
Competition laws Laws encourage competition in the country World Competitiveness Report
Anti-self-dealing index Laws limit self-dealing of insiders (measured as of 2001) La Porta et al. (2006)
Left/center ideology Chief executive and largest party have left/center political orientation (% 
of years between 1928 and 1995)
Botero et al. (2004)
Absence of corruption Inverse of average corruption perceptions score World Bank
Power distance “The extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and 
institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally”
Hofstede (1997, 2001)
Individualism “The degree to which individuals are integrated into groups” Hofstede (1997, 2001)
Skilled labor availability Skilled labor is readily available in a country World Competitiveness Report
Union density Employees are densely organized in unions (measured as of 1997) Botero et al. (2004)
Country debt over assets Average debt over assets ratio for all firms within a country-year pair Worldscope
Market Capitalization Log of total market capitalization World Competitiveness Report
SRI index Indicator variable for country-years where a socially responsible stock 
market index exists (1/0)
World Federation of Exchanges
Balance of trade (Exports-Imports)/Gross Domestic Product World Competitiveness Report
Trade (Exports+Imports)/Gross Domestic Product World Competitiveness Report
Basic infrastructure Quality of basic infrastructure in a country World Competitiveness Report
Press freedom Composite score of the legal, political and economic environment for 
press freedom (0 to 100, where lower values indicate more freedom)
World Press Freedom Index, 
Freedom House
Issue prevalence in media Percent of articles in a country mentioning environmental, human rights, 
labor issues in a given year.
FACTIVA
Controls: Firm
ROA Net income over total assets - logged due to skewness Worldscope
Firm size Logarithm of total assets Worldscope
Market to book ratio Market value of equity over book value calculated at fiscal year-end Worldscope
R&D expenses Research and development expenses over sales Worldscope
Number of segments Logarithm of number of four-digit SIC codes the firm operates in Worldscope
ADR company Company trades an American Depositary Receipt Worldscope
Foreign assets (%) Percentage of assets in foreign (non-headquarters) countries Worldscope
Stock volatility Daily stock return volatility over the fiscal year Worldscope
Closely held shares (%) Percentage of shares held by investors owing more than 5% Worldscope
Leverage One minus the ratio of shareholder’s equity over total assets Worldscope
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RESULTS 
We use panel linear regression to estimate our models with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level, and industry and year fixed effects (Table 14). In line with past research 
on institutional determinants of CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), in Model 1, laws promoting 
shareholder protection, a leftist political ideology, and skilled labor availability are negatively and 
significantly associated with CSP. Conversely, firms in countries with lower corruption, higher 
union density, and higher power distance and individualism indices have higher CSP. Turning to 
financial institutions, credit-based financial systems and a socially responsible market index are 
positively and significantly associated with CSP, while the size of a country’s capital market has 
the opposite effect. We also obtain results consistent with past findings that more profitable, larger, 
more diversified and visible firms have higher CSP, while those with higher stock volatility have 
lower CSP.  
We focus our discussion of results on Model 2, the fully saturated industry and year fixed 
effects model with robust standard errors (Table 15 contains results with each hypothesis added 
individually in Models 4 to 8). The prominence of members of the stakeholder field in the national 
socio-political network is positively and significantly associated with CSP (p=0.000), as predicted 
in hypothesis 1. Comparisons across countries suggest that, all else equal, a firm that is 
headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of stakeholder prominence, relative to the 75th 
percentile, will have 4.1% higher CSP. This equates to between 40% and 5% of a standard deviation 
difference in CSP, depending on the year and industry in which the firm operates. To put the 
magnitude of the effect of stakeholder prominence in context, the impact on CSP of a one standard 
deviation increase in stakeholder prominence is greater than a one standard deviation increase in 
firm profitability (ROA). Past research has repeatedly shown firm profitability to be a significant 
predictor of CSP (Campbell et al., 2011; Chih et al., 2010; Hartmann and Uhlenbruck, 2015; 
Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). We also find support for hypothesis 2, that the effect of stakeholder 
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centrality is attenuated in countries where the business field is well connected to elites (p=0.008). 
In countries two standard deviations below the mean in business ties to elites, a one standard 
deviation increase in the relative prominence of stakeholders is associated with a 5.5% increase in 
CSP (p=0.000), while in countries two standard deviations above the mean in business ties to elites, 
stakeholder centrality is not significantly associated with CSP (p=0.419). In support of hypothesis 
3, we find that heterogeneity of stakeholders is positively associated with CSP (p=0.011). All else 
equal, a firm that is headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of stakeholder heterogeneity, 
relative to the 75th percentile, will have almost 3.8% higher CSP. This equates to between 38% 
and 5% of a standard deviation difference in CSP, depending on the year and industry. 
Turning to the direct influence wielded by stakeholders via extra-institutional tactics on 
CSP, we find that proselytizing stakeholder pressure is positively and significantly associated with 
CSP (p=0.002). All else equal, a firm that is headquartered in a country in the 25th percentile of 
proselytizing stakeholder pressure, relative to the 75th percentile, will have almost 5.7% higher 
CSP. This equates to between 62% and 8% of a standard deviation difference in CSP, depending 
on the year and industry in which the firm operates. We also find support for hypothesis 5, that the 
effect of proselytizing stakeholder pressure is higher in countries where proselytizing stakeholders 
are densely connected (p=0.008). The positive impact of proselytizing stakeholder pressure on CSP 
more than triples between those countries two standard deviations below and above the mean of 
proselytizing stakeholder density. In countries where proselytizing stakeholder density is two 
standard deviations above the mean, a one standard deviation increase in proselytizing stakeholder 
pressure is associated with an increase of 14.4% in CSP (p=0.000).  
In Model 3, we replicate our results controlling for time-invariant, firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity with the inclusion of firm fixed effects, in addition to year fixed effects, with robust 
standard errors. A firm fixed effects model provides the most stringent test of our propositions by 
reducing the impact of difficult to observe firm and country level variables influencing CSP. 
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Evidence suggests firms vary in their stakeholder responsiveness (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996) 
for various reasons that are not easily measurable, such as dynamic capabilities (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010; Julian et al., 2008) or the issues’ alignment with organizational and individual values 
(Bansal, 2003) and perceptions (Crilly, Zollo, and Hansen, 2012). As none of the firms in our 
sample change their headquarters country, a firm fixed effects estimation also controls for time-
invariant country characteristics, such as differences in managerial responsiveness across countries 
due to sticky cultural institutions (Williams and Aguilera, 2008). Our hypothesized results are 
robust to firm fixed effects estimation, suggesting stakeholder field characteristics have explanatory 
power with respect to CSP across countries, as well as within countries over time. While several 
country and firm level controls become insignificant, stakeholder prominence (p=0.000), 
heterogeneity (p=0.020) and proselytizing stakeholder pressure (p=0.005) remain positively and 
significantly associated with CSP, as does the attenuating effect of business ties to elites (p=0.004) 
and increased effect of pressure where proselytizing stakeholders are more densely connected 
(p=0.003).  
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Table 14: Panel Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance 
 
Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 
include year and industry fixed effects; Model 3 includes year and firm fixed effects.* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001. a denotes within firm R-squared. 
 
Stakeholder prominence H1 3.254 *** (0.673) 3.005 *** (0.696)
Stakeholder prominence H2 -4.809 ** (1.799) -5.269 ** (1.834)
x Business ties to elites
Stakeholder heterogeneity H3 0.155 * (0.061) 0.146 * (0.063)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H4 3.098 ** (1.010) 2.887 ** (1.019)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H5 84.763 ** (31.034) 96.272 ** (32.246)
x Proselytizing stakeholder density
Country control variables
Business ties to elites 4.082 * (1.678) 10.630 *** (3.016) 8.460 ** (3.037)
Proselytizing stakeholder density 7.375 (4.133) 1.843 (4.459) 0.803 (4.168)
Competition laws 0.546 (0.343) 0.373 (0.362) 0.291 (0.388)
Anti-self-dealing index -7.588 * (3.059) -8.810 ** (3.081)
Left/center ideology -13.681 *** (1.901) -12.807 *** (1.918)
Absence of corruption 2.244 ** (0.841) 0.420 (0.852) 1.296 (1.270)
Power distance (Hofstede) 0.172 ** (0.062) 0.181 ** (0.062)
Individualism (Hofstede) 0.318 *** (0.038) 0.258 *** (0.039)
Skilled labor availability -1.533 *** (0.314) -1.823 *** (0.312) -1.464 *** (0.348)
Union density 14.531 ** (4.613) 14.444 ** (4.586)
Country debt over assets 0.163 *** (0.046) 0.187 *** (0.048) 0.251 *** (0.050)
Market capitalization -3.239 *** (0.441) -3.463 *** (0.448) 0.654 (0.934)
SRI index 2.317 *** (0.647) 2.410 *** (0.650) 3.074 *** (0.739)
Balance of trade -9.729 (6.556) -14.194 * (6.480) -13.609 (8.690)
Trade -0.038 * (0.016) -0.048 ** (0.017) -0.051 (0.037)
Basic infrastructure -0.038 (0.032) -0.018 (0.034) -0.043 (0.039)
Press freedom -0.135 * (0.056) -0.138 * (0.056) 0.065 (0.133)
Issue prevalence in media 21.452 * (10.694) 28.050 ** (10.726) 24.366 * (11.276)
Firm-level controls
ROA 0.911 *** (0.176) 0.916 *** (0.176) 0.598 *** (0.177)
Firm size 7.585 *** (0.355) 7.639 *** (0.355) 3.189 *** (0.619)
Market to book ratio 0.167 *** (0.036) 0.167 *** (0.036) 0.119 ** (0.041)
R&D expenses 0.106 (0.074) 0.102 (0.073) 0.010 (0.090)
Number of segments 1.394 *** (0.422) 1.352 ** (0.420) 0.854 (0.489)
ADR company 11.728 *** (1.178) 11.563 *** (1.177)
Foreign assets (%) 0.008 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007) 0.003 (0.007)
Stock volatility -0.185 *** (0.037) -0.179 *** (0.037) -0.139 ** (0.049)
Closely Held Shares (%) -0.017 (0.010) -0.016 (0.010) -0.009 (0.011)
Leverage 0.015 (0.017) 0.015 (0.017) -0.017 (0.020)
Constant -97.224 (10.855) -98.996 (10.887) -20.302 (15.872)
Observations
R-squared
Model 1
20,047
0.436
Model 3
20,047
0.193
a
Model 2
20,047
0.439
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Table 15: Individual Hypotheses Panel Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Stakeholder prominence H1 1.816*** 3.238***
(0.419) (0.652)
Stakeholder prominence H2 -5.676**
x Business ties to elites (1.785)
Stakeholder heterogeneity H3 0.205***
(0.058)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H4 2.080* 1.849
(0.996) (0.964)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H5 78.66**
x Proselytizing stakeholder density (29.934)
Country control variables
Business ties to elites 4.108* 12.44*** 3.903* 3.712* 3.888*
(1.657) (3.030) (1.660) (1.657) (1.657)
Proselytizing stakeholder density 7.857 8.126 4.847 8.089 2.948
(4.172) (4.178) (4.200) (4.169) (4.443)
Competition laws 0.331 0.101 0.515 0.769* 0.703
(0.340) (0.337) (0.343) (0.370) (0.371)
Anti-self-dealing index -8.915** -7.843* -8.416** -7.353* -7.709*
(3.077) (3.089) (3.061) (3.065) (3.063)
Left/center ideology -13.68*** -12.67*** -13.97*** -13.35*** -13.62***
(1.896) (1.921) (1.901) (1.892) (1.899)
Absence of corruption 2.080* 1.878* 1.815* 1.776* 1.414
(0.850) (0.858) (0.866) (0.807) (0.805)
Power distance 0.140* 0.154* 0.168** 0.188** 0.196**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Individualism 0.302*** 0.288*** 0.308*** 0.304*** 0.303***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Skilled labor availability -1.660*** -1.708*** -1.645*** -1.542*** -1.549***
(0.313) (0.313) (0.313) (0.313) (0.314)
Union density 13.80** 13.42** 14.77** 14.99** 15.12***
(4.617) (4.619) (4.617) (4.595) (4.592)
Country debt over assets 0.187*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.127*** 0.173***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.038) (0.047)
Market capitalization -3.030*** -3.124*** -3.377*** -3.296*** -3.467***
(0.441) (0.444) (0.441) (0.442) (0.448)
SRI index 2.257*** 2.230*** 2.222*** 2.342*** 2.540***
(0.646) (0.646) (0.647) (0.645) (0.645)
Balance of trade -11.83 -11.06 -9.495 -10.44 -12.10
(6.545) (6.503) (6.541) (6.546) (6.548)
Trade -0.0365* -0.0415* -0.0329* -0.0425** -0.0461**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Basic infrastructure -0.0390 -0.0442 -0.0206 -0.0244 -0.0344
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Press freedom -0.119* -0.146** -0.132* -0.142* -0.133*
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Issue prevalence in media 21.32* 21.26* 24.33* 23.79* 24.59*
(10.686) (10.673) (10.677) (10.721) (10.746)
Table continued on next page
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Table 15 (Continued): Individual Hypotheses Panel Regression Models of  
Corporate Social Performance
 
Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. All 
models include year and industry fixed effects. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
Robustness Checks 
We perform additional analysis to check the robustness of our results to alternate specifications, 
sub-samples, and disaggregated environmental and social performance scores. The full results of 
these analyses are presented in Table 16. First, we replicate our results controlling for time-
invariant, country-level unobserved heterogeneity with the inclusion of country dummies, in 
addition to year and industry fixed effects, with robust standard errors (Model 9). Our results remain 
substantively unchanged. We also replicate our full model excluding the United States (Model 10), 
to address any potential bias in our results due to the over-representation of the United States, which 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Firm control variables
ROA 0.903*** 0.906*** 0.899*** 0.923*** 0.922***
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.177)
Firm size 7.594*** 7.591*** 7.585*** 7.612*** 7.615***
(0.355) (0.355) (0.354) (0.355) (0.354)
Market to book ratio 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
R&D expenses 0.109 0.107 0.108 0.103 0.102
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Number of segments 1.371** 1.366** 1.381** 1.390*** 1.394***
(0.421) (0.421) (0.421) (0.421) (0.421)
ADR company 11.60*** 11.67*** 11.69*** 11.71*** 11.69***
(1.179) (1.179) (1.178) (1.178) (1.178)
Foreign assets (%) 0.00727 0.00736 0.00768 0.00828 0.00845
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Stock volatility -0.185*** -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.182*** -0.182***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Closely held shares (%) -0.0177 -0.0179 -0.0173 -0.0175 -0.0161
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Leverage 0.0165 0.0170 0.0160 0.0143 0.0133
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Constant -96.53*** -96.18*** -96.75*** -99.97*** -98.84***
(10.832) (10.830) (10.832) (10.863) (10.912)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
N 20047 20047 20047 20047 20047
R-squared 0.437 0.437 0.437 0.437 0.437
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accounts for 33% of our observations. Again, our results remain substantively unchanged except 
for the influence dense ties between proselytizing stakeholders no longer exerts an upward effect 
on the influence of proselytizer pressure. We also explore the robustness of our results for the 
subsample of firms that are multinational. While we control for foreign assets in our main models, 
our models identify stakeholder field effects off the country in which a firm is headquartered. For 
firms operating in multiple countries and subject to the influence of multiple national-level 
stakeholder fields and institutions, the influence of the headquarters country may be attenuated. 
Replicating our model only on the subsample of firms whose foreign assets constitute at least 5 
percent of total assets, we find our hypothesized effects are consistent for multinational firms 
(Model 11).  
Further, past research suggests that the responsiveness of firms to extra-institutional 
mobilization may vary in the size of the firm (Bartley and Child, 2012; King, 2011) or its financial 
performance (King, 2008). We explore this in Model 12 (Table 16) by interacting proselytizing 
stakeholder pressure with firm size and the change in net sales from two years prior (2-period 
decline in net sales). In line with King’s (2008) finding that performance declines make firms more 
responsive to extra-institutional mobilization, we find that the effect of mobilization by 
proselytizing stakeholders against the business field is greater for firms that have experienced sales 
declines (p=0.000). Conversely, for larger firms the effect is attenuated (p=0.011). Although our 
theoretical inquiry focuses on stakeholder field characteristics, the preceding suggest opportunities 
for future research on how firm-level characteristics may moderate the effects of stakeholder fields.  
Finally, we disaggregate our dependent variable into its respective component 
environmental and social scores from ASSET4, and estimate the models constructing our 
stakeholder variables on only environmental or social stakeholders (Table 16, Models 13 and 14). 
The prominence and heterogeneity of environmental and social stakeholders are positively and 
significantly associated with the disaggregated social and environmental scores, and the 
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magnitudes of the stakeholder field effects are higher for the social performance score. The 
attenuating effect of business ties to elites on stakeholder prominence is only marginally significant 
(p=0.083) for environmental performance. Turning to the direct influence wielded by stakeholders, 
proselytizing stakeholder pressure is positively associated with environmental performance 
(p=0.000), but is not significantly associated with social performance of a firm (p=0.129). In 
supplementary analysis (not shown) we find that a 2-year lag of proselytizing social stakeholder 
pressure in a country is positively and significantly (p=0.003) with a firm’s social performance 
score. It is plausible that the social performance score is temporally less responsive than the 
environmental score to extra-institutional mobilization as it includes several indicators related to 
the firm’s supply chain where it may take longer for the firm to implement changes (while the 
environmental score does not). Particularly, indicators measuring performance on issues where 
extra-institutional mobilization is common, such as child labor and human rights, all include an 
assessment of supplier performance.  
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Table 16: Robustness of Panel Linear Regression Models of Corporate Social Performance 
 
 
 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Enviro Score Social Score
Stakeholder prominence H1 2.960*** 2.839*** 3.873*** 3.197*** 1.045* 3.806*** 3.255***
(0.700) (0.697) (0.930) (0.674) (0.489) (0.687) (0.677)
Stakeholder prominence H2 -5.614** -3.871* -4.946* -4.680** -2.055 -4.814* -4.815**
x Business ties to elites (1.855) (1.843) (2.350) (1.803) (1.186) (1.894) (1.826)
Stakeholder heterogeneity H3 0.130* 0.176** 0.221* 0.152* 0.223* 0.405*** 0.155*
(0.063) (0.066) (0.089) (0.061) (0.104) (0.098) (0.061)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H4 2.783** 2.763* 5.827*** 29.53** 8.418*** 1.702 3.093**
(1.019) (1.261) (1.620) (10.429) (2.226) (1.120) (0.981)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure H5 106.8*** -24.02 162.3*** 98.95** 76.90 64.88 84.25***
x Proselytizing stakeholder density (32.299) (30.857) (46.878) (31.094) (87.184) (38.875) (24.725)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure -1.152*
x Firm size (0.451)
Proselytizing stakeholder pressure 0.688***
x 2-period decline in net sales (0.188)
Country control variables
Business ties to elites 9.296** 5.441 12.25** 10.49*** 4.819* 8.001** 10.65***
(3.068) (3.125) (3.966) (3.021) (1.898) (2.911) (3.128)
Proselytizing stakeholder density -0.0474 8.017 -4.786 1.219 0.439 -2.530 1.858
(4.402) (8.092) (3.828) (4.507) (0.681) (4.863) (4.432)
Competition laws 0.484 0.644 0.492 0.440 -0.397 1.046** 0.372
(0.386) (0.378) (0.532) (0.362) (0.412) (0.396) (0.361)
Anti-self-dealing index 266.7*** -9.357** -20.42*** -8.670** -6.741* -9.031** -8.806**
(48.837) (3.206) (3.916) (3.085) (3.212) (3.328) (3.081)
Left/center ideology 217.2*** -5.491* -16.48*** -12.91*** -16.35*** -10.29*** -12.81***
(51.544) (2.183) (2.645) (1.919) (2.059) (2.088) (1.943)
Absence of corruption 0.893 0.820 -2.333 0.569 1.183 0.151 0.417
(1.265) (0.985) (1.195) (0.855) (0.900) (0.974) (0.863)
Power distance 3.701*** 0.182** 0.218** 0.180** 0.133* 0.245*** 0.181**
(0.792) (0.062) (0.077) (0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062)
Individualism -0.359 0.281*** 0.243*** 0.256*** 0.231*** 0.314*** 0.258***
(0.187) (0.040) (0.054) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039)
Skilled labor availability -1.350*** -1.614*** -1.570*** -1.892*** -1.424*** -2.132*** -1.822***
(0.349) (0.338) (0.432) (0.313) (0.355) (0.360) (0.313)
Union density 381.7*** 9.072 21.39*** 14.76** 16.04*** 12.12* 14.44**
(90.206) (4.764) (5.502) (4.589) (4.831) (4.972) (4.587)
Country debt over assets 0.266*** 0.558 0.290*** 0.203*** -0.0354 0.268*** 0.186***
(0.050) (0.354) (0.074) (0.048) (0.047) (0.061) (0.044)
Market capitalization -0.605 -1.443* -2.076*** -3.472*** -2.867*** -4.489*** -3.467***
(0.928) (0.561) (0.618) (0.449) (0.481) (0.507) (0.471)
SRI index 2.483*** 2.851*** 2.323** 2.348*** 1.554* 3.645*** 2.413***
(0.723) (0.670) (0.870) (0.650) (0.769) (0.745) (0.650)
Balance of trade -7.016 -16.27* -23.60** -13.24* -0.898 -25.19*** -14.23*
(8.474) (7.102) (8.640) (6.500) (7.449) (7.052) (6.735)
Trade -0.0282 -0.0308 -0.0740*** -0.0467** -0.0465** -0.0490** -0.0479**
(0.036) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Basic infrastructure -0.0618 -0.0208 0.00809 -0.0220 -0.0391 -0.0110 -0.0183
(0.039) (0.036) (0.047) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034)
Table continued on next page
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Table 16 (Continued): Robustness of Panel Linear Regression Models of 
Corporate Social Performance
 
Note. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Model 9 includes 
country fixed effects. Model 10 excludes firms headquartered in the United States. Model 11 includes only 
firms with greater than 5% of total assets in foreign countries (i.e., multinational firms). In Model 12, we 
interact proselytizing stakeholder pressure with firm size and the change in net sales from two years prior. 
The dependent variable in Model 13 is the firm’s environmental score, and all stakeholder field covariates 
are constructed using environmental stakeholders. The dependent variable in Model 14 is the firm’s social 
score, and all stakeholder field covariates are constructed using social stakeholders. Model 15 includes the 
sum of all GDELT reported events in a given country-year as a control. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Enviro Score Social Score
Country control variables
Press freedom 0.0325 -0.170** 0.0656 -0.142* -0.231*** -0.0598 -0.138*
(0.132) (0.062) (0.094) (0.056) (0.061) (0.062) (0.057)
Issue prevalence in media 25.37* 25.95* 16.40 28.44** 28.63 44.49 28.04**
(11.267) (10.787) (16.360) (10.737) (17.537) (26.833) (10.719)
GDELT media-reported events 0.0019
(0.000)
Firm control variables
ROA 0.847*** 0.735*** 0.765** 0.929*** 0.780*** 1.140*** 0.916***
(0.176) (0.204) (0.267) (0.179) (0.213) (0.194) (0.176)
Firm size 7.527*** 7.633*** 7.589*** 7.865*** 8.373*** 7.604*** 7.641***
(0.355) (0.445) (0.505) (0.379) (0.369) (0.370) (0.355)
Market to book ratio 0.200*** 0.119** 0.194*** 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.176*** 0.167***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.036) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036)
R&D expenses 0.105 0.0634 0.00497 0.0961 0.118 0.130 0.102
(0.073) (0.079) (0.088) (0.073) (0.083) (0.082) (0.073)
Number of segments 1.335** 1.098* 1.030 1.352** 1.794*** 1.079* 1.353**
(0.420) (0.490) (0.642) (0.420) (0.477) (0.449) (0.420)
ADR company 9.618*** 11.33*** 11.89*** 11.46*** 9.681*** 12.43*** 11.56***
(1.133) (1.229) (1.335) (1.180) (1.222) (1.235) (1.177)
Foreign assets (%) 0.00423 0.00399 -0.00806 0.00800 0.0113 0.00731 0.00815
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Stock volatility -0.186*** -0.151*** -0.206*** -0.175*** -0.147*** -0.225*** -0.179***
(0.037) (0.045) (0.052) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) (0.037)
Closely held shares (%) -0.0193* -0.00205 -0.0314* -0.0149 -0.0135 -0.0229* -0.0163
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Leverage 0.0000208 -0.00560 0.0303 0.0139 0.0400* -0.00381 0.0147
(0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017)
2-period decline in net sales -0.152
(0.087)
Constant -610.8*** -113.1*** -112.1*** -103.5*** -106.1*** -101.3*** -99.02***
(100.674) (12.940) (14.855) (11.161) (11.509) (11.586) (10.886)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
N 20047 13333 8938 20047 20047 20047 20047
R-squared 0.495 0.432 0.460 0.437 0.445 0.409 0.439
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DISCUSSION 
Our study was motivated by the desire to explicitly incorporate stakeholders and stakeholder theory 
in comparative analysis of corporate social performance (CSP), which to date has largely advanced 
institutional explanations. Our conceptualization of stakeholder influence moves beyond dyadic 
resource dependence to stakeholder influence operating through cross-field influence mechanisms, 
drawing and building upon calls for a field theory perspective that accounts for the 
interconnectedness of actors and fields in driving organizational behavior (Davis and Marquis, 
2005; McAdam and Scott, 2005; Rowley, 1997). We develop field-level constructs that embody 
two mechanisms by which stakeholders influence corporate behavior: institutional vs. extra-
institutional change. In the former case, stakeholders influence corporate behavior by increasing 
the likelihood of government legislation or regulation, the diffusion of values or norms regarding 
appropriate behavior for corporations or the cultural-cognitive belief that certain behaviors or 
actions by corporations are necessary. In the latter case, managers respond to the threat of protests 
or boycotts that threaten to directly impact business revenues or costs. We hypothesize that 
managers perceive the risk of institutional change to increase in stakeholder field prominence and 
heterogeneity while the adoption of direct material pressure by proselytizing stakeholders increases 
perceptions of a risk of extra-institutional change. The relative ties the business field enjoys with 
elites moderates the threat of institutional change whereas proselytizer density aggravates the risk 
of extra-institutional change.  
Using a panel dataset of firms headquartered in 42 countries between 2004 and 2013, we 
find support for each of these arguments. The impact of stakeholder prominence within a country 
on CSP reinforces the importance of indirect influence strategies for stakeholders (Frooman and 
Murrell, 2005), whereby stakeholders who target change via indirect avenues (i.e., public politics) 
can dramatically affect corporate practice adoption (Hiatt et al., 2015). In line with Oliver’s (1991) 
prediction that firms acquiesce to consistent demands and pressures exerted by multiple means, we 
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also find that in countries where stakeholder fields are composed of heterogeneous actors, each 
possessing different means of influence and representing broad issue support, firms’ CSP is higher. 
The positive association between CSP and proselytizing stakeholder pressure against the business 
field in a country complements past findings that non-targeted firms are often responsive to 
stakeholder extra-institutional influence tactics (Briscoe and Safford, 2008; Julian et al., 2008). The 
strength of institutional and extra-institutional pathways are themselves influenced by field 
characteristics within a country which alter managerial perceptions of the efficacy of business field 
resistance to institutional pressure and stakeholder field mobilization. Our empirical results are 
robust to identification on within country differences in business and stakeholder field 
characteristics over time. We therefore show that, as the prominence and heterogeneity of 
stakeholder fields or proselytizing stakeholder pressure increase, firms make substantive 
improvements in CSP conditional upon the time varying levels of relative business ties to elites and 
proselytizer density. Similar to a country’s political or legal institutional environment, its landscape 
of stakeholder fields is a source of risks and opportunities for firms that conditions the salience of 
stakeholders and firm responsiveness.  
 Our study has implications for several areas important to theory and research on 
institutional change and stakeholders, beyond comparative CSP research. First, our use of 
stakeholder fields and field-level change from field theory (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011, 2012; 
Zietsma et al., 2017) offers new ways of seeing corporate practices as emanating from field-level 
change influenced by stakeholder fields (in addition to country institutions). We believe this 
answers calls for a more blended institutional perspective (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008), where 
the social embeddedness of organizations is intertwined with ideas of social agents, social 
construction, and power and politics. Second, a field theory perspective challenges the notion that 
stakeholder power and influence is primarily derived from individual attributes or operates in an 
atomistic firm-stakeholder dyad. Instead, the dynamic structural perspective provided by field 
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theory highlights that stakeholder salience and influence is related to the composition and ties 
within a stakeholder field as social actors coalesce around issues, as well as between that field and 
the broader socio-political network and business field.  
 Both stakeholder and social movement theory have long included calls for a more holistic 
approach to the socio-political environment in which firms compete (Diani and McAdam, 2003; 
Rowley, 1997). Despite these calls, empirical progress has been limited with a few exceptions 
which rely on painstakingly constructed ego networks of firms and stakeholders (Dorobantu et al., 
2017a), rather than more comprehensive systems in which these partial networks are embedded. 
We draw upon an exciting new data source to overcome the challenge of constructing national-
level socio-political networks that are directed, valued, and include every organization or individual 
actor involved in over 250 million media-reported events. Although used extensively in political 
science, machine-coded event databases are new to management (see Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn, 
2009), and offer new empirical avenues for exploring how the dynamic interconnectedness of an 
organization’s environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) impacts organizational practices and 
outcomes. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Our work stops short of considering the position of the focal firm within the socio-political 
network and its direct ties to the stakeholder field, which Rowley’s (1997) arguments suggest is 
important. Future work could explore whether specific firms in our analysis are proactively 
connected to, or attacked by, specific members of stakeholder fields and how the prominence of 
individual stakeholders, the heterogeneity of peers to which they are directly tied and the ties to 
elites of individual firms influence a given firm’s responsiveness to pressures from different 
stakeholders who are more or less densely tied to their peers (Rowley, 1997). Such analysis would 
allow for greater attention to the moderating or mediating role of firm- or stakeholder-specific 
characteristics within a country. Further, following other studies of changes in corporate practices 
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within a country, we conceptualize firms as embedded in business fields at the country level, 
controlling for the industry in which a firm operates. Future research could explore how stakeholder 
field influence may vary with the structure and composition of industry fields and position of the 
firm within the industry field (King and Walker, 2014). Our conception of stakeholder fields is also 
relatively coarse at the level of environmental and social issues broadly, whereas issues may 
potentially be sub-divided into discrete issue fields such as drinking water, waste disposal, 
hazardous waste, air pollution, etc. Future work could explore variation in how well stakeholder 
fields are embedded within the state field which itself could be broken down into different fields 
and levels of power (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). At present, our use of GDELT precludes such 
additional granularity at the firm-, stakeholder- and state-level across 42 countries. Subsequent 
research should explore narrower and deeper sampling strategies possibly combining GDELT with 
richer qualitative sources in a mixed method design. Such methodology may better illuminate the 
underlying causal mechanisms of influence generating the patterns of association we have 
identified in our cross-national comparative design. 
Finally, our arguments and analysis focus on what are commonly referred to as ‘secondary 
stakeholders’ (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley and Lenox, 2006), who typically do not have a formal 
contractual bond with the firm (as is the case with employees and shareholders). While the inclusion 
of firm fixed effects and a proxy for the importance of CSP to equity markets (e.g. social 
responsibility market index dummy) may absorb some of the effects of these primary stakeholders 
in our analysis, we cannot observe ties between primary and secondary stakeholders likely to 
influence firm responsiveness (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016). Future work could explore how the 
degree of connectivity between primary and secondary stakeholders influences primary 
stakeholders (e.g. managers) readings of their interconnected environments (Crilly et al., 2012), 
and correspondingly, firm responses to stakeholder pressures. Finally, the process by which 
managerial perceptions of salience actually form in response to primary and secondary stakeholder 
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pressure and the mechanisms by which such perceptions lead to variation in responsiveness are 
both omitted from our analysis but important topics for future research. 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation provides evidence that the relationships, norms and actor identities that 
characterize stakeholder fields play an important role in firms’ strategic management of non-market 
stakeholders and the outcomes of those efforts. Whereas prior research has focused on stakeholder 
characteristics, organizational characteristics and institutions as explanatory factors in non-market 
strategy, the studies presented herein demonstrate the value of a more socially embedded view of 
stakeholder influence and firm action. In the first two chapters, I explored the antecedents and 
outcomes of cooperative non-market strategy, an understudied phenomenon (Heyes and King, 
2018) where firms attempt to allay threats by establishing formal collaborations with stakeholders. 
In chapter 1, I show that firms seeking collaborations with social activists are circumscribed in 
forming collaborations when the field in which the activist is embedded is relationally segmented 
across contentious and collaborative factions. In chapter 2, I show that the efficacy of formal 
stakeholder relationships in quelling threats is contingent on the ties that an allied stakeholder has, 
and their identity within the stakeholder field. In chapter 3, I provide evidence that stakeholder 
fields are equally important to more unilateral efforts by firms to address stakeholder interests 
through improvements in corporate social performance. I find that the composition of stakeholder 
fields, their connectedness to broader socio-political networks and direct mobilization against 
firms, are associated with considerably different corporate social performance (CSP) profiles of 
firms across 42 countries.  
In addition to establishing that stakeholder fields matter to non-market strategy, the 
chapters in this dissertation suggest that the mechanisms underlying their impact are multi-faceted. 
Embeddedness in fields can constrain stakeholders from engaging firms in novel ways (chapter 1) 
because fields are characterized by a shared understanding of the rules in the field, or “what tactics 
are possible, legitimate, and interpretable,” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 11). While building 
cooperative relationships with well-connected stakeholders is a valuable non-market strategy, those 
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same networks can constrain the stakeholder in cooperating with firms. The relationships and 
identities that stakeholders have in their fields are also pathways of influence for those firms 
successful in establishing a formal cooperative relationship with a stakeholder to foster more 
advantageous stakeholder environments (chapter 2). Finally, who participates in a stakeholder field, 
their ties to the broader socio-political network and direct action they take against firms (chapter 3) 
matter for non-market strategy because they influence managerial perceptions of the salience of 
issues advocated by the field. In sum, stakeholder fields matter to firms’ strategic management of 
non-market stakeholders because field norms can constrain stakeholder action, fields are 
susceptible to influence through their relational structures and member identities, and fields 
influence issue salience. 
Moreover, the intersection of the findings across the studies suggests important ways in 
which stakeholder fields and cooperative and unilateral non-market strategy may interact. First, the 
role that the density of inter-stakeholder ties plays in increasing the salience of mobilization to 
managers (chapter 3) complements the role that inter-SMO density plays in enabling collaboration. 
While I cannot empirically distinguish whether increases in CSP are a product of firm-stakeholder 
collaboration, the overlap in the findings suggest that it could be. Second, proselytizing 
stakeholders (chapter 3) are those that have specific proscriptions for how firms can address social 
or environmental issues, and conceptually correspond to those SMOs that I have classified as 
‘moderate’ in the first two chapters based on their repertoire in respect of firms. Combined, this 
suggests that stakeholder issue fields and movements that accommodate moderate members with 
solutions to intractable social and environmental problems are most likely to be successful in 
expanding the frontiers of corporate social and environmental change practices.   
Important interactions are also evident across the first two chapters where both the 
antecedents and outcomes of cooperation non-market strategy are investigated. Given the evidence 
on indirect co-optation via relational ties (chapter 2), I find in supplementary analysis that firms are 
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more likely to collaborate with moderates that have ties to SMOs that targeted the firm in the 
previous year. This results in a considerable number of imbalanced triads between SMOs and firms 
(i.e., SMO A is cooperative with SMO B and firm X, while SMO A has conflict with firm X). The 
inclusion of imbalanced triads in the collaboration formation regression models (chapter 1) does 
not alter the negative correlation of movement segmentation, but ceteris paribus, collaborations are 
more likely to materialize in imbalanced triads. While some of this may be driven by the greater 
interconnectedness of moderates and radicals in less segmented movements, chapter 2 suggests it 
may also be driven by firms’ anticipation of the indirect co-optation effects via relational ties. That 
is, firms may be strategically seeking out collaborations with moderates that have greater ties to 
radicals. From the perspective of more radical SMOs, who may be aware of the co-optive effects 
of collaborations, this also raises the question of whether they are more likely to criticize moderate 
peers they are connected to for fear of being co-opted, or seen as such. Finally, taken together the 
first two chapters highlight how the composition and relational configuration of stakeholder fields 
changes over time with incursions by firms through collaboration. As the number of collaborations 
increases, and therefore co-optation of the SMOs in various movements, there is simultaneous 
growth in the proportion of the movement that is moderate over time. As the number of moderates 
grows, the segmentation of the movements also appear on average to decreases over time, which, 
in turn, makes the social conditions for further collaborations more favorable. The interplay 
between strategic collaborations co-opting movement fields and field structures enabling 
subsequent collaboration may explain why firm-SMO collaborations have grown exponentially 
over the past 25 years.  
Empirical Note 
This dissertation draws on two different data sets that contain interactions between firms 
and stakeholders, as well as inter-stakeholder relationships. The first is data that is hand-coded from 
news media, press releases, congressional hearings, legal alerts and firm and SMO financial filings. 
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The second, GDELT, relies instead on natural language processing (NLP) of millions of articles 
from hundreds of media sources around the world. Each data set has a different data collection 
methodology applied to publicly available information, and as a result offers different benefits and 
shortcomings to the researcher. While I have not conducted an analysis comparing the two data 
sets, I offer some observations on the benefits and shortcomings of each based on my experience 
and some cautions for future research. 
Comparatively, the clear benefit of using NLP-based data sets like GDELT is the 
magnitude of the data that can be processed and obtained, versus hand-coded data. In this 
dissertation, GDELT allowed me to expand the scope of the stakeholder fields to include 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, SMOs and 
communities that coalesce around environmental and social issues, and the networks of media 
reported verbal and material, cooperative and conflictual interactions between them and businesses 
and other socio-political actors in 42 different countries over a decade. Relying on a secondary 
source of NLP-based interactional data, however, has two major shortcomings that cannot be 
overcome unless the researcher has access to open code. First, the researcher is circumscribed in 
the dictionaries on which the data set relies. Because GDELT has its origins in political science, 
and conflict studies particularly, the dictionaries it employs for coding firms are limited. As such, 
strategy researchers interested in firm-level data are challenged in finding it in GDELT as just over 
100 of the most prominent firms in the world are coded by name with remaining firms being coded 
with generic terms such as “business” or “auto manufacturer.” Second, the researcher is 
circumscribed in the data sources on which the data set relies, in the case of GDELT, that is media-
based data. Leaving aside issues of media-bias (Earl et al., 2004), the researcher must be mindful 
of what media reports and captures. I employed GDELT’s media-based data in a study that argues 
that stakeholder salience is the mechanism by which CSP is affected by stakeholder field 
composition and ties. Given that stakeholder salience is defined as socially constructed perceptions 
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of managers, the media-based measures I employed conformed with the construct’s definition. The 
threshold for justifying the use of media-based data will be higher for research that extends its use 
to non-perceptual constructs. Both these cautions may be overcome or mitigated where the 
researcher can construct their own actor dictionaries and corpuses of text if the NLP code is open 
source.  
Conversely, the benefits and limitations of the hand-collected data are the exact obverse.  
The researcher is able to specify company or stakeholder samples ex ante, as well as the corpus of 
publicly available sources to be coded. While the first is obvious, the latter is particularly important 
in the context of inter-organizational interactions or ties. Specifically, I found that collaborations 
between SMOs and firms are considerably underreported in news media, but instead figure 
prominently in press releases. This echoes past work on media being biased towards negative news. 
As such, future research interested in cooperative non-market strategy will have to expand the scope 
of publicly available data beyond that contained in media alone to include press releases and 
company financial filings. This is in line with the approach taken to data collection in alliances 
research (Schilling, 2009). It is similarly important to consider what type of ties are of interest in 
inter-stakeholder relationships. Co-organization of, or participation in, extra-institutional tactics 
like protests are likely well covered by media. However, I found that a considerable number of 
inter-SMO collaborations were actually reported in Congressional Proceedings and legal alerts, and 
in some cases were not reported on by media. Additionally, SMOs also issue press releases which 
detail campaigns in which they are participating with others and those press releases are not always 
subsequently reported in the media. This would suggest that past research that has relied on media-
reported co-location at a protest event to create inter-activist ties, may be underestimating the ties 
of those SMOs whose tactics are not exclusively focused on extra-institutional mobilization but 
instead rely also on institutional channels like courts to mobilize. Finally, some inter-stakeholder 
ties, like board interlocks, are never reported in the media, press releases or any other sources other 
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than financial statements and therefore necessarily require hand-collecting. The ability to specify 
the sample of relevant actors and the publicly available data sources and considerable increase in 
the granularity of data that is offered by hand-coding is offset by the resources, both financial and 
time, involved in such an effort. As such, the sample of organizations and geographies are 
necessarily circumscribed by the sheer effort it takes to collect this data – I employed 14 research 
assistants that assisted in the collection of the inter-stakeholder and stakeholder-firm interactions 
data over the course of two years. 
Future Research 
In developing a socially embedded perspective on non-market strategy this dissertation 
speaks to, and complements, research at the intersection of social movements and markets (chapter 
1), social movements and organizational theory (chapter 2), and comparative analysis of corporate 
social performance and stakeholder theory (chapter 3). Simultaneously, the findings and limitations 
of this dissertation, reveal several questions left unanswered that offer opportunities for future 
research. First, this dissertation provides evidence that cooperative stakeholder strategy (e.g., firm-
activist collaborations) has indirect co-optive effects on stakeholders outside the focal dyad, 
however, the scope of these effects were investigated within a single stakeholder field (i.e., one 
social movement). Insofar as stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in multiple 
fields, the scope and pathways of possible indirect effects on other fields merit exploration in future 
research. Secondly, in the same way that stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in 
multiple fields, so are the individuals that populate these organizations. As such, inquiries into how 
individual level characteristics may interact with organizational level determinants of non-market 
strategy offer opportunities to build a more integrative multilevel perspective on non-market 
strategy. Finally, evidence that firms’ cooperative non-market strategy can alter stakeholder fields 
suggests several opportunities for exploring how firms’ actions shape the composition, relations 
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and norms in stakeholder fields. The remainder of my discussion focuses on these three broad 
research opportunities. 
Indirect effects across market and non-market fields 
Recent evidence that contentious interactions between activists and firms have spillover 
effects onto firms’ relationships with politicians (McDonnell and Werner, 2016) suggests a 
complementary inquiry into the indirect effects of cooperative firm-activist interactions. Can firms 
leverage their collaborations with activists that are well-regarded by, or well-connected to, 
politicians, for influence in policy-making? The central role that activist identities plays in my 
context (chapter 2) also suggests that spillover effects may depend on the identities of politicians. 
While in my context I focus on field members’ tactical repertoires and ideologies about whether 
corporations can be part of the social change that activists seek, such ideological differences also 
manifest amongst policy markers or regulators. For example, regulators may have different beliefs 
about the capacity of firms to self-regulate versus the need for coercive regulation, which may 
moderate the degree to which collaborations with activists influence their calculus in respect of 
firms.  
Further, an extension of the indirect effects of firm-activist interactions into market settings 
is also warranted given evidence that firms with cooperative stakeholder relationships benefit from 
superior market returns (Dorobantu and Odziemkowska, 2017; Henisz et al., 2014). Are firms with 
cooperative stakeholder relationships seen similarly more valuable to potential acquirers or alliance 
partners? While there is some evidence that acquirers consider corporate social and environmental 
performance when evaluating targets (Berchicci et al., 2012), a firm’s connections to broader 
stakeholder fields via cooperative stakeholder ties has not been previously considered by corporate 
strategy nor alliances research. The embeddedness of firms in value chain networks, also offers 
possibilities for investigating the indirect effects of firm-activist interactions on firms along a value 
chain. Given the selection of firm targets for contention is informed by their position and power in 
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global commodity chains (Bartley and Child, 2014), we might expect that the effects of contentious 
targeting of downstream consumer-facing firms travel through value chain networks to produce 
collaborations upstream of the original point of contention. Such inquiries would extend a 
burgeoning body of work investigating the indirect effects of activism against firms on their 
industry peers (Briscoe and Gupta, 2016) to a broader set of firms that may be equally susceptible 
to indirect effects by way of their inter-firm relationships (i.e., production networks).  
Individual-level embeddedness in fields  
In the same way that stakeholders and firms are simultaneously embedded in multiple fields 
that affect non-market strategy, so are the individuals that populate these organizations. Given the 
macro-level focus on firms, social movement organizations, and other non-market stakeholders of 
this dissertation, non-market strategy research would be enriched by lowering the level of analysis 
to the individuals that shape firms’ non-market strategies and those shaping stakeholder influence 
tactics. How does the embeddedness of individuals, such as board members, across multiple fields 
(e.g., private versus non-profit sectors) shape firms’ non-market strategy? Evidence abounds in the 
domain of public government experience, where the ‘revolving door’ between government and 
firms influences regulatory outcomes (Katic and Kim, 2013) and market returns (Faccio, 2006). 
We know considerably less about the ‘revolving door’ between firms and other non-market 
stakeholders, such as social movement organizations or other non-profit organizations. Are firms 
with board interlocks to social movement organizations or former employees from those 
organizations less likely to be contentiously targeted because individual level ties act as substitutes 
for formal organization-level ties? Future research that considers how individual-level 
characteristics and embeddedness interacts with organization- and field-level characteristics is 
critically important to advancing multilevel perspectives on non-market strategy.  
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Stakeholder field structure and tactics 
Finally, this dissertation focuses on the stakeholder field as the explanatory variable, 
however, to offer a more strategic view of non-market strategy, it is equally important to understand 
how firm characteristics or actions may alter stakeholder fields in their favor (or disfavor). 
Therefore, another area that merits further consideration is what determines stakeholder field 
structures and the tactics employed by field members in engaging firms. Extending past work that 
takes a network perspective on social movements (Diani, 2013; Wang and Soule, 2012), future 
research could explore if social activists are more likely to mobilize collectively against more 
stalwart firm targets or industries with closed opportunity structures. Insofar as collaborations with 
firms garner criticisms of social activists by their peers, it is likely that the structure of movement 
and other stakeholder fields change in response to changes in the tactics of their members as some 
organizations may distance themselves from stigmatized entities. Finally, comparative research that 
explores the drivers of differences in stakeholder fields across countries, and their evolution is 
another area ripe for inquiry. While I find considerable variance in the composition and prominence 
of stakeholder fields across and within countries, it remains unclear the extent to which these are 
attributable to relatively stable institutional characteristics of countries, such as cultural or political 
institutions, or more dynamic factors such as transnational advocacy networks.   
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APPENDIX 
A.1 DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF FIRM-ACTIVIST COLLABORATIONS 
This appendix provides details on the definition of a firm-activist collaboration used in this 
research. It includes a description of the key defining features of a firm-activist collaboration, as 
well as firm-activist interactions that do not meet the criteria for classification as a collaboration. 
Below I use the term social activist and social movement organization (SMO) interchangeably.  
What is a firm-activist collaboration?  
Definition: A collaboration between a social activist and firm is defined as ‘organizations working 
together by committing resources to achieve mutually relevant outcomes.’ The outcomes can be 
focused on improving performance within the firm by changing its practices, or externally focused, 
where the outcome has a more ‘public good’ character, such as educational programs or habitat 
protection. The key defining features are that the interorganizational relationship is interactive, 
involves the commitment of resources by each party, and is purposeful. Importantly, evidence must 
be available that all three key features are present in order for the firm-activist relationship to 
qualify as a collaboration.  
Key features:  
1. Interactive (i.e., working together) – Interactive denotes that the collaboration involves an 
interactive process where a “change-oriented relationship of some duration exists and that 
all participating stakeholders are involved in that relationship.” (Wood and Gray, 1991: 
148). This means that interactions mediated by third parties or an umbrella organization 
are excluded in that the firm and activist must participate in the relationship. For instance, 
a trade association that includes firm A, working on a project with an SMO, does not 
constitute a collaboration between firm A and that SMO. Participation suggests the 
interaction of the parties, meaning staff or representatives of their respective organizations 
interact directly as part of the collaboration. Further, ‘change-oriented’ suggests that the 
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parties are working together for an outcome (see Purpose below) that involves a change in 
the status-quo. As such, arms-length transactions such as licensing of SMO logos are 
excluded.  
2. Commitment of resources by both parties (rather than simple exchange) – A collaboration 
involves the commitment of resources, understood broadly to include human, financial, or 
capital resources. The broad definition of ‘resources’ to include human resources, means 
collaborations can include advisory roles (e.g., SMO advising firm on its sustainable 
purchasing policy) where no financial commitment of resources is made by the parties. 
Further, the commitment needs to be by both parties, meaning, a mere exchange or flow of 
resources by one party to another does not qualify (e.g., donations, employees volunteering 
at SMO).  
3. Purpose – The collaboration has an articulated objective or outcome. Outcome articulation 
is typically in a particular problem domain, such as water use at a firm’s facility or climate 
change awareness amongst students. This does not necessarily imply that the firm and 
activist have identical goals in the collaboration (e.g., firm may want to repair its 
reputation, and the activist may be seeking funds for a pet project). However, it does imply 
that there is a desired outcome that is relevant to both (i.e., both want to achieve it). Further, 
because a collaboration is directed toward an outcome, the participants must intend to act 
to pursue that outcome. In other words, the realization of the outcome does not define a 
collaboration, but instead the engagement of the actors in a process intended to result in 
action on the outcome (Wood and Gray, 1991). 
Exclusions 
The following arms-length relationships are not considered firm-activist collaborations:  
1. Corporate contributions and gifts, examples include:  
a. Grants or monetary donations to SMOs 
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b. In-kind, material, equipment or technology gifts to SMOs 
2. Corporate support for employee participation in SMOs activities, examples include:  
c. Corporate outreach 
d. Release time for employee volunteers 
e. Compensation for employee participation 
f. Corporate matching of employee gifts 
g. Corporate awards for employee volunteers 
3. Corporate–SMO marketing affiliations, examples include:  
h. Licensing of SMOs name or logo (e.g., certification without interactive component 
or Sierra Club’s logo on GreenWorks line of products and donations resulting) 
i. Purchase of SMOs endorsement 
j. Joint fund-raising campaigns 
k. Product price supplements as donations  
4. SMO-firm interactions mediated by a larger body or third party 
5. SMO-firm market interactions, examples include: 
l. SMO sells the company its products or services (e.g., Carbonfund’s carbon credits) 
m. Firm sells the SMO its products or services (e.g., Greenpeace purchases advertising 
space from the New York Times) 
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A.2 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE CATEGORIES 
Table 17: Environmental Issue Categories 
 
Note. The above includes issues codes from the Comparative Agendas Project’s sub-category of 
‘Environment’, as well as issue topics that fall under other sub-categories but which are applicable to the 
broader environmental movement (e.g., alternative & renewable energy; energy conservation; pesticide 
regulation; fishery conservation; and GMOs). 
  
Code and Topic Description
701: Drinking Water Safety Domestic drinking water safety, supply, polution, fluridation, and conservation (e.g. 
Clean Water Act, pesticides in groundwater)
703: Waste Disposal Disposal and treatment of wastewater, solid waste and runoff (e.g. federal 
management of municipal waste, municipal sewage problems)
704: Hazardous Waste and Toxic 
Chemicals
Hazardous waste and toxic chemical regulation, treatment, and disposal (e.g. 
hazardous waste sites cleanup, hazardous materials transportation, pesticide 
regulation)
705: Air pollution, Global Warming, 
and Noise Pollution
Air pollution, climate change, and noise pollution (e.g. Clean Air Act, EPA 
regulation of chemical plant emissions)
707: Recycling Recycling, reuse, and resource conservation (e.g. beverage container recycling)
708: Indoor Environmental Hazards Indoor environmental hazards, indoor air contamination (including on airlines), and 
indoor hazardous substances such as asbestos (e.g. lead exposure reduction, EPA 
regulation of indoor disinfectants)
709: Species and Forest Protection Species and forest protection, endangered species, control of the domestic illicit 
trade in wildlife products, and regulation of labratory or performance animals (e.g. 
endangered species protection act, marine mammal protection, old growth forest 
protection)
710: Pollution and Conservation in 
Coastal & Other Navigable 
Waterways
Land and water conservation in coastal and navigable waterways (e.g. pollution 
from cruise ships, plastic pollution/invasive species control, oil spills)
711: Land and Water Conservation Land and water conservation other than coastal and navigable waterways (e.g. 
watershed protection, pollution/invasive species in small lakes, rivers, and streams)
806: Alternative and Renewable 
Energy
Alternative and renewable energy, biofuels, hydrogen and geothermal power (e.g. 
promotion of solar and geothermal power, promotion of alternative fuels for 
automobiles, issues of ethanol gasoline, biomass fuel and wind energy programs)
807: Energy Conservation Energy conservation and energy efficiency, including vehicles, homes, commerical 
use and government (e.g. home energy efficiency programs, energy conservation 
standards for household appliances, motor vehicle fuel efficiency)
405: Animal and Crop Disease, Pest 
Control, and Domesticated Animal 
Welfare
Animal and crop disease, pest control and pesticide regulation, and welfare for 
domesticated animals (e.g. welfare of domesticated animals or animals under 
human control, use of animals for research, sale or transportation of animals)
408: Fisheries and Fishing Fishing, commercial fishery regulation and conservation (e.g. fisheries 
conservation and management; fish hatchery development)
498: Agricultural Research and 
Development
Agricultural research and development (e.g. organic farming research, potential 
uses of genetic engineering in agriculture)
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A.3 DESCRIPTION OF GDELT SOURCES, DATA AND MEASURES 
This appendix provides additional information on the Global Database on Events, 
Language and Tone (GDELT) including its sources and potential biases therein as well as in its 
coding thereof, the steps we took to identify environmental and social stakeholders relevant to 
corporate social performance (CSP) to facilitate replication and summary statistics of the 
underlying data. We begin with a discussion of the media sources from which GDELT collects 
event and actor data, and our efforts to minimize potential sources of bias and validate our 
measures. In the second section we describe how the actor codes in GDELT were employed to 
classify individuals and organizations appearing in GDELT into our social and environmental 
stakeholder categories, as well as providing illustrative examples of actors included in each 
category. We conclude with descriptive statistics by country.  
GDELT Sources & Bias 
GDELT data are based on both international and translated local news sources coded using 
the Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions system (Leetaru and Schrodt, 2013). 
Sources include all international news coverage from AfricaNews, Agence France Presse, 
Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, Christian Science 
Monitor, Facts on File, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, and the 
Washington Post; all national and international news coverage from the New York Times, all 
international and major US national stories from the Associated Press, and all national and 
international news from Google News with the exception of sports, entertainment, and strictly 
economic news (ibid.) 
Media bias 
GDELT’s reliance on not only domestic (via the BBC and the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service) but primarily international news sources 
attenuates the likelihood of bias due to varying levels of domestic press freedom because an event 
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is likely to be reported to the extent that foreign correspondents representing foreign news wires 
are present in the country. Nevertheless, we explore whether media bias influences any of the 
measures we derive from GDELT. In order to do so, we rely on a measure compiled annually by 
the V-Dem Project (Coppedge et al., 2017) of the extent to which the media in a given country is 
“(a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical 
of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?” Pairwise correlations 
between the V-Dem media bias measure and our independent variables did not exceed 0.100, with 
the highest correlation of 0.097 reported for stakeholder heterogeneity. Bivariate regressions 
confirmed no significant association between this measure of domestic media bias and freedom and 
any of the measures we derive from GDELT to test our hypotheses. 
While the heavy reliance on international media coverage may bias coverage away from 
small peripheral stakeholders and rural areas, arguably corporations headquartered in a given 
country are going to be most heavily influenced by stakeholders in the major urban areas and those 
represented in the domestic and international media. 
Event count bias 
Two additional concerns regarding the use of GDELT are the shifting scope of coverage 
of source material over time (i.e., users are unable to choose specific common sources across a 
panel of data), and the potential for over-counting of single events (Wang et al., 2016a; Ward et 
al., 2013). Variation across time in certain measures can therefore be driven by both change in the 
underlying construct and change in sources. Within a given year, over-counting of events may bias 
any measures based on discrete counts of events.  
In order to address these two concerns, we normalize the stakeholder field and business 
field variables we calculate using either the equivalent measures for all actors in a given country-
year, or the count of all reported events as appropriate. For example, in the construction of our 
measure of stakeholder prominence in the overall socio-political network, we are assessing the 
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relative prominence of environmental and social stakeholders as compared to the prominence of 
other actors. Any changes in the scope of coverage over time or over-reporting of single events 
should impact both the numerator (i.e., stakeholder prominence) and denominator (i.e., actor 
prominence). The same argument holds for our measure of the relative strength of business ties to 
the elite which is a ratio of the distribution of centrality in the sub-network of interactions initiated 
by business actors as compared to the distribution of centrality in the overall network. Our measure 
of material pressure by proselytizers is also normalized by the overall level of conflictual events in 
the country’s socio-political network. Our measure of proselytizer density is similarly normalized 
by the country’s overall level of density. Only our measure of stakeholder heterogeneity is a raw 
count. To further explore whether the scope of media coverage, which is strongly increasing over 
time, could be biasing this measure, as well as the other four ratios, we performed a bivariate 
regression and found that both stakeholder heterogeneity and proselytizing stakeholder pressure 
were positively and significantly associated with the number of GDELT reported events across 
countries (p=0.000 in bivariate regression results). However, a within country bivariate regression 
analysis (i.e. with country fixed effects) indicated no significant association between the number 
of events and either stakeholder heterogeneity (p=0.391) or proselytizing stakeholder pressure 
(p=0.147). This suggests that time trends in GDELT reported events are less problematic for our 
country and firm fixed effects analyses than for analyses whose primary focus is tracking the 
incidence of events of a certain type over time. To address the potential bias in our comparative 
analyses (i.e., those without country or firm fixed effects), we test the robustness of our results by 
including the sum of all GDELT reported events in a given country-year, and our results remain 
substantively the same (Table B2 Model 15). 
Ideally, we would have liked to reconstruct each of our measures using a data source such 
as King and Lowe (2003) that draws only on Reuters Business Briefing albeit using an alternative 
natural language parsing algorithm. Unfortunately, this data is only available from 1990-2004 and, 
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more importantly, does not incorporate sufficient detail on the role codes we use to classify the 
stakeholder fields. However, authors’ analyses comparing GDELT to this alternative source not 
subject to the criticism of shifting scope of coverage, reveals correlations of the average ordinal 
measure of conflict and cooperation directed at stakeholders in high-level sectors (e.g., Government 
or Business) ranging from 0.49 to 0.76 across 1990-1999 increasing our confidence in the validity 
of GDELT for the purposes of our analysis. Furthermore, the highest correlations are found in the 
earliest time period when the scope of coverage was the most similar. The declining correlations 
over time are likely due to more expansive media coverage by GDELT. 
Alternatively, we could have used the International Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) 
data which makes a more stringent effort to de-duplicate events and confirm that each event record 
reflects an actual event. As noted by Ward et al. (2013), however, such a focus on eliminating false 
positives comes at the cost of reducing coverage:  
“GDELT has many more events per country per unit time, since it does not winnow 
stories extensively. GDELT has about 68,000 country-months (34 years by 167 
countries) compared to about 24,000 in ICEWS. Yet, GDELT has an order of 
magnitude more events. Importantly, the volume of data being harvested by 
GDELT is growing exponentially, as are the base level of events therein–the 
density of data is about 100 Giga bytes in 1997 and has grown to over 600 Gb in 
2011.” (Ward et al., 2013: 5) 
 
As our focus is on the development of a comprehensive structure of stakeholder fields and 
their interactions with the full socio-political network in a country rather than a precise count of 
certain types of events for the purposes of predicting changes therein (e.g., escalations of time series 
patterns in protest events), we believe the benefits in terms of coverage offered by GDELT 
dominate the costs in terms of false positives and duplicated events which we use normalization 
procedures to partially address. 
GDELT Actor Codes & Stakeholder Mapping 
In order to identify CSP stakeholders in GDELT we took the following steps. We began 
with a careful review of what policies and initiatives are evaluated by Thompson Reuters’ analysts 
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in determining environmental and social performance scores for firms. We were interested in 
mapping the topics or issues reflected in our outcome variables to actors within GDELT with 
mandates over (e.g. government agencies), or interests in (e.g. NGOs) the same issues. 
Environmental performance evaluates the efficiency of natural resource use in production 
processes, emission reduction, eco-efficiency of products and services, as well firms’ past 
environmental controversies. Social performance reflects the quality of both labor-related issues 
such as employee benefits, past strikes, HIV/AIDS programs, as well as human rights issues such 
as human rights policies and monitoring, policies on indigenous peoples and child labor.  
The second step in our stakeholder identification was a literature review of research on 
stakeholder pressure for environmental, human rights and labor issues, including surveys of 
managerial perceptions of their importance in these issues, to identify stakeholders most commonly 
associated with the issues and firm policies captured in our CSP measure. From this review, we 
identified five broad categories of actors external to the firm or its value chain typically associated 
with stakeholder pressure on CSP: governments and regulators (Aguilera et al., 2007; Henriques 
and Sadorsky, 1999; Murillo-Luna et al., 2008); intergovernmental organizations (Christmann, 
2004; Lim and Tsutsui, 2012); NGOs and activists (Doh and Guay, 2006; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; 
Lim and Tsutsui, 2012); organized labor groups (Briscoe and Safford, 2008); and community 
stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; Maignan and Ralston, 2002).  
The third and final step in our stakeholder identification was to map the stakeholder 
categories identified in the literature review and the issues captured in our dependent variable onto 
the actors contained in the GDELT database of actor-event triads. All actors in GDELT are assigned 
multiple role and specialty codes based on the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations Event 
and Actor Codebook (Schrodt, 2012). An actor can be assigned up to 5 role codes indicating broader 
role categories to which the actor belongs (e.g. government, media, NGO) and the actor’s specialty 
(e.g. actors whose primary area of operation or expertise is human rights). For example, Greenpeace 
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is coded as NGOENV or an NGO for whom environmental and ecological issues (ENV) are their 
primary focus (ibid.).  
In order to identify GDELT actors as ‘environmental’ or ‘social’ stakeholders, we mapped 
the CAMEO role codes in combination with the CAMEO actor specialty codes. We read the names 
of the actors contained in each role and specialty code to ensure we were correctly identifying 
stakeholders based on the CAMEO codes. Environmental stakeholders are all actors whose 
primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is ENV, and whose primary, secondary, or tertiary 
role code represents any of the five stakeholder categories previously identified (e.g. government 
or regulatory includes government, judiciary, opposition, or legislature). Social stakeholders 
include actors whose primary, secondary, or tertiary specialty code is HRI (human rights) or LAB 
(labor), and whose primary, secondary, or tertiary role code represents any of the five stakeholder 
categories previously identified (e.g. international governmental organizations). We make 
adjustments to account for the fact that GDELT uses the LAB specialty code to denote both 
organizations concerned with labor issues as well as actors that are employees of organizations 
(e.g. LABAGR are agricultural workers). First, we identify organized labor groups based on the 
actor names recorded in GDELT rather than the specialty code (e.g. labor union, trades union). 
Secondly, we only classify actors whose secondary or tertiary specialty codes are LAB, excluding 
those whose primary code is LAB because these are workers rather than organizations or 
individuals with interests in labor issues.  
Table 18 presents CSP stakeholder categories, the GDELT codes included in each 
category, and examples of actor names that appear in GDELT in these categories. Table 19 presents 
the distribution of observations by country, the average CSP score of firms headquartered in the 
country, and stakeholder prominence, heterogeneity of the stakeholder field, and proselytizing 
stakeholder pressure, across all years. 
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Table 18: CSP Stakeholder to GDELT Mapping 
 
Note. Specialty code HRI corresponds to human rights, LAB to labor issues, and ENV to environment. 
 
  
Stakeholder Issue GDELT Codes included in category Examples of GDELT actor names
Regulatory or government
Environment GOVENV; COPENV; LEGENV; 
ENVGOV; ENVJUD; ENVLEG; 
ENVCOP; GOVGOVENV; 
MEDGOVENV; ELIGOVENV; 
COPGOVENV
Minister or Ministry of the Environment; Maria Mutagamba 
(Ugandan Minister of Water and Environment)
Human rights GOVHRI; JUDHRI; GOVGOVHRI; 
COPGOVHRI; LEGGOVHRI
Human Rights Commission; Minister for Women
Labor rights GOVLAB; GOVGOVLAB Labor Minister; Labor and Employment Ministry; Minister of 
Employment and Vocational Training; Rosalinda Dimapilis-
Baldoz (Secretary of the Department of Labor and 
Employment of the Philippines)
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
Environment IGOENV; IGOGOVENV; 
IGODEVENV
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Human rights IGOHRI; IGOGOVHRI; IGOREFLAB; 
IGODEVHRI
UN High Commission for Human Rights; Louise Arbour (UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights)
Labor rights IGOLAB; IGODEVLAB; 
IGOGOVLAB
International Labor Organization
NGOs and activists
Environment NGOENV; ENV Greenpeace; Sierra Club; Friends of the Earth; La Sociedad 
Peruana de Derecho Ambiental; activists unassociated with a 
named organization denoted with 'conservationist' or 
'environmentalist'
Human rights HRI; HRILAB; NGOHRI; 
NGOJUDHRI; NGODEV
American Civil Liberties Union; Transparency International; 
Shirin Ebadi (Nobel Peace Prize winner from Iran); activists 
unassociated with a named group are denoted with terms 
such as 'rights group' or 'rights activist' 
Labor rights NGOLAB; NGODEVLAB International Trade Union Confederation; World Federation 
of Trade Unions
Labor organizations
Labor rights LAB, where actor name corresponds to 
an organized labor organization or 
workers with labor issues (e.g. striking 
worker)
union, organized labour, workers federation; labor activist; 
striking worker
Communities and residents (incl. local authorities)
Environment CVLENV; ENVCVL; CVLGOVENV community, residents, villagers, civil society, landowner, 
voter, citizen
Human rights CVLHRI; REFHRI; OPPHRI immigrant, migrant worker, voter, peasant
Labor rights CVLLAB; OPPLAB community, village, civil society, immigrant, peasant
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics by Country 
 
Country Firms Obs. CSP index
Stakeholder 
prominence
Stakeholder 
heterogeneity
Proselytizing 
stakeholder 
pressure
Australia 277 1,186 42.60 1.638 6.335 0.123
Austria 14 89 60.90 1.318 1.663 0.004
Belgium 15 61 55.72 1.483 3.197 0.029
Brazil 33 86 52.38 1.886 5.465 0.336
Canada 221 1,052 39.80 1.864 7.676 0.116
Chile 20 81 44.10 1.635 1.247 0.053
China 56 195 33.93 1.404 9.897 0.250
Colombia 3 4 70.05 1.059 2.750 0.054
Czech Republic 4 18 58.18 1.781 3.944 0.007
Denmark 16 115 52.54 1.741 3.139 0.005
Finland 20 121 74.02 1.855 2.099 0.007
France 83 559 76.13 1.818 5.925 0.077
Germany 55 274 68.35 1.397 5.898 0.074
Greece 13 40 48.60 1.712 2.575 0.017
Hong Kong 132 650 35.13 1.763 1.286 0.027
Hungary 4 16 79.02 1.906 3.000 0.005
India 80 304 57.03 1.887 10.299 0.080
Indonesia 14 51 51.79 1.888 7.686 0.031
Ireland 13 77 41.21 1.919 3.831 0.022
Israel 13 47 47.97 0.927 7.298 0.060
Italy 34 211 52.95 1.546 3.251 0.038
Japan 412 3,172 52.75 1.334 5.424 0.020
Korea, South 90 289 61.67 0.853 4.727 0.084
Malaysia 40 152 42.55 1.812 3.934 0.051
Mexico 11 20 42.40 1.353 6.250 0.055
Netherlands 32 187 72.95 1.574 3.610 0.049
New Zealand 10 73 48.45 1.541 2.575 0.064
Norway 16 106 55.47 1.440 2.208 0.003
Peru 1 4 32.00 1.515 2.250 0.021
Philippines 20 69 36.63 1.388 5.464 0.073
Poland 20 69 41.15 1.273 3.116 0.000
Portugal 9 64 75.52 1.369 1.688 0.006
Singapore 46 310 37.74 1.344 2.129 0.018
South Africa 119 316 60.12 2.380 7.753 0.085
Spain 47 180 72.58 1.499 3.206 0.018
Sweden 19 123 66.88 1.753 2.317 0.033
Switzerland 35 202 58.87 1.644 3.649 0.035
Taiwan 118 436 38.21 0.996 2.913 0.000
Thailand 7 26 53.86 1.736 6.731 0.004
Turkey 23 94 53.92 0.996 5.670 0.000
United Kingdom 325 2,204 62.22 1.591 7.503 0.199
United States 1,046 6,714 45.82 1.215 11.827 0.515
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